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Abstract
Smart environments are physical spaces, enriched with various sensors, devices, and ser-
vices which aim to support inhabitants in their activities. A typical application area are
environments which support collaboration, enhance productivity, or boost creative ac-
tivities – for instance smart meeting rooms. User adapted behavior and personalization
are central themes of smart environments. However, next to improving the overall user
experience these features and their underlying technologies are a rich source of privacy
issues. Privacy is a broad term which is used for different concepts. Especially in collab-
oration scenarios the concept of interpersonal privacy plays an important role. It affects
the communication of personal information within social interactions and aims to support
social norms and boundaries. The manifold and pervasive communication modalities in
smart environments easily may disrupt social interactions instead of supporting them. In
contrast to privacy preferences in face of abstract entities like governments or corpora-
tions, information disclosure decisions in social interactions tend to be more dynamic and
intuitive, rather than static and rational, which results in more complex disclosure param-
eters whose values are harder to predict and often not easy to describe formally. Existing
solutions to protect and manage privacy in smart environments do not sufficiently con-
sider the specific characteristics of interpersonal privacy within smart environments. In
order to objectively address the generally vague concept of interpersonal privacy, this work
introduces a model to express disclosure decisions in social interactions within smart envi-
ronments. The model is used to develop several set-based patterns of privacy management
which make it possible to programmatically manage interpersonal information exchange.
The practical relevance of these patterns is evaluated in a corresponding user study. As
there is no sole disclosure control method which allows intuitive and individual privacy
control, this work further presents a reference model of a composite disclosure control
system, which stages and integrates various control methods. The benefit of this system
is twofold. First, single components complement each other, and second, users are able to
practice privacy according to their individual needs and preferences. One specific control
method, predicting information disclosure with the help of machine learning techniques, is
addressed in detail. Several existing learning methods as well as a novel one, based on the
previously developed privacy patterns, are presented and evaluated. Additionally, pattern-
based prediction validators are developed which reduce the impact of wrong predictions.
Evaluation results show that learning methods are able to correctly predict disclosures in
many cases while still providing workload-reducing suggestions in cases where predictions
are not correct. The novel learning method is a competitive alternative to existing meth-
ods with special properties especially useful for interpersonal privacy control. This work
is completed with general guidelines how to support interpersonal privacy when designing
and engineering smart environments.
VKurzfassung
Smart Environments sind physische Ra¨ume, die mit diversen Sensoren, Gera¨ten und Dien-
sten ausgestattet sind, um deren Benutzer in allta¨glichen Aufgaben zu unterstu¨tzen. Ein
typischer Anwendungsbereich sind Smart Meeting Rooms, die Teamarbeit unterstu¨tzen,
Produktivita¨t steigern und kreative Aktivita¨ten fo¨rdern sollen. Nutzer-zentriertes Verhal-
ten, Personalisierung und Informationsaustausch sind dabei zentrale Ideen, die aber auch
vielfa¨ltige Probleme im Bereich Privacy bergen. Der Begriff Privacy ist sehr weitreichend
und wird fu¨r verschiedene Konzepte benutzt. Speziell in kollaborativen Szenarien spielt das
Konzept Interpersonal Privacy eine wichtige Rolle. Es bezieht sich auf die Kommunikation
von perso¨nlichen Informationen bei der sozialen Interaktion und dient der Unterstu¨tzung
sozialer Normen und Grenzen. Die vielfa¨ltigen und teilweise versteckten Modalita¨ten fu¨r
die Kommunikation in Smart Environments ko¨nnen soziale Interaktionen schnell entstellen
anstatt sie zu unterstu¨tzen. Wa¨hrend Entscheidungen u¨ber die Freigabe perso¨nlicher In-
formationen gegenu¨ber abstrakten Einheiten (Regierungen, Unternehmen) meist statisch
und rational sind, sind Entscheidungen in sozialen Interaktionen deutlich dynamischer
und intuitiver, so dass Freigabeparameter schwerer zu erfassen und zu formalisieren sind.
Die speziellen Eigenschaften von Interpersonal Privacy werden in vorhandenen Lo¨sungen
zum Thema Privacy in Smart Environments nicht ausreichend beru¨cksichtigt. Um das
unscharfe Konzept von Interpersonal Privacy objektiv zu behandeln, wird in dieser Ar-
beit ein formales Modell fu¨r Freigabeentscheidungen in sozialen Interaktionen eingefu¨hrt
und darauf aufbauend bestimmte Freigabemuster erarbeitet. Diese Muster ermo¨glichen
eine programmatische Herangehensweise an die Handhabung perso¨nlicher Informationen.
Die praktische Relevanz der Muster wird in einer empirischen Studie evaluiert. Da es
keine Methode der Freigabekontrolle gibt, die allein eine intuitive als auch individualisierte
Handhabung perso¨nlicher Informationen erlaubt, wird des Weiteren ein Referenzmod-
ell eines kombinierten Systems fu¨r die Freigabekontrolle erarbeitet, welches verschiedene
Methoden so miteinander integriert, dass sie sich gegenseitig erga¨nzen und Nutzern ein
individuelles Praktizieren von Privacy ermo¨glichen. Eine spezifische Methode, die Vorher-
sage von Freigaben mit Hilfe maschineller Lernverfahren, wird ausfu¨hrlicher behandelt.
Es werden verschiedene existente und ein neues Lernverfahren vorgestellt und evaluiert.
Das neue Verfahren nutzt die zuvor erarbeiteten Freigabemuster. Diese werden auch zur
Validierung von vorhergesagten Freigaben genutzt, wodurch der negative Einfluss falscher
Vorhersagen deutlich reduziert wird. Die Evaluierungen zeigen, dass maschinelle Lern-
verfahren Freigabeentscheidungen oft korrekt vorhersagen, wa¨hrend falsche Vorhersagen
immer noch hilfreiche Vorschla¨ge fu¨r manuelle Entscheidungen darstellen. Die Perfor-
manz des neuen Lernverfahrens ist in vielen Fa¨llen besser als vorhandene Verfahren und
hat speziell fu¨r den Bereich Interpersonal Privacy gu¨nstige Eigenschaften. Diese Arbeit
wird abgerundet durch allgemeine Richtlinien und Empfehlungen fu¨r Entwickler von Smart
Environments bezu¨glich der Unterstu¨tzung von Interpersonal Privacy.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Smart environments are a specific application area of the paradigm of ubiquitous comput-
ing. They are physical spaces, enriched with various sensors, devices and services which
aim to support inhabitants of the environment in their activities. Following the vision of
ubiquitous computing, underlying technology transparently integrates into facilities of the
environment and services fulfill their tasks in a user-centric manner. A typical applica-
tion area are environments which support collaboration, enhance productivity, or boost
creative activities – for instance smart meeting rooms. User adopted behavior and per-
sonalization are central themes of ubiquitous computing respectively smart environments.
However, next to improving the overall user experience these features and their underlying
technologies are a rich source of privacy issues.
Privacy is a flexible term, depending on individual needs and perceptions. It is not a
pure technical issue but involves legal and social aspects. In order to determine privacy
issues and develop corresponding solutions, it is helpful to distinguish different concepts
of privacy (see section 2.1). The most traditional one is privacy in private, sometimes
also described as the right to be let alone. It deals with invasions to and the protection
of private spaces. Issues like surveillance fall into this concept. Problems related to the
processing and storage of personal information outside private spaces by third parties are
covered by the concept of privacy in public. It aims to empower individuals to control the
flow of their information and to prevent malicious usage of private data. Finally there is
the concept of interpersonal privacy. It affects the communication of personal information
within social interactions and aims to support social norms and boundaries. Violations
of this concept appear to be less threatening than the first two, but they fundamentally
conflict with the envisioned user experience of smart environments and thus degrade any
other benefits.
Smart environments have the potential to interfere with each of the three concepts (see
sections 2.2 and 2.3). They may cross natural borders between private and public spaces,
track and distribute personal information without the knowledge of users and beyond their
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control capabilities, and they may disrupt social interactions mediated by the environment.
Preventing these problems and providing efficient means to cope with them are crucial
factors for the success of smart environments.
1.2 Problem Statement
A generally successful approach to protect privacy is to limit the amount of communi-
cated personal information – both by quantitative and qualitative means, e.g. by waiving,
blurring or anonymizing data (see section 3.3.1). This often already prevents invasions to
private spaces and avoids the need to manage personal information in public spaces. Still,
in many cases users want to disclose personal information for the sake of improved ser-
vices or as part of social interactions. Typically, the decision which personal information
to communicate with services in smart environments is regulated by negotiations between
service-side privacy policies and user-side privacy preferences (see section 3.3.2). Policies
describe what data a service consumes and how respectively for which purpose it is used.
With reference to policy parameters, preferences specify which information to disclose to
which service under which conditions. Such negotiations are suitable for the management
of privacy in public, but for several reasons they do not work similarly for interpersonal
privacy. Information disclosure decisions in social interactions tend to be more dynamic
and intuitive, rather than static and rational. They are highly individual and have a
stronger link to the current situation, including social context. This results in different,
potentially more complex disclosure parameters whose values are harder to predict and
often not easy to describe formally. Supporting users in managing interpersonal privacy
requires more intuitive mechanisms to express privacy preferences while recognizing indi-
vidual patterns of information disclosure. Approaches to manage privacy in public often
are backed up by legal regulations, which do not directly prevent but discourage privacy
invasions. Such regulations do not apply to interpersonal privacy – no laws could force an
interaction partner to ignore an unintentionally communicated information.
Current solutions to protect and manage privacy in smart environments do not sufficiently
consider these specific characteristics of interpersonal privacy within smart environments
(see sections 3.3.3 and 3.4). Though user adaption and seamless interaction are core
concepts of smart environments, there is currently no solution for interpersonal privacy
management which provides intuitive control mechanisms tailored to individual ways of
practicing privacy.
In particular there are the following open issues: (I) consideration of social aspects in
interpersonal privacy management and resulting patterns in information disclosure de-
cisions, (II) suitable disclosure control mechanisms that match these patterns, as well as
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their orchestration, (III) automating disclosure control in a user-adaptive but easy to man-
age fashion, and (IV) general guidelines and principles to develop interpersonal privacy
sensitive smart environments and to evaluate corresponding solutions.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis elaborates techniques for smart environments to manage privacy in social
interactions diligently, but in an unobtrusive and seamless way – as generally aspired
by smart environments. More precise – in response to the open issues mentioned in the
previous section – it makes the following specific contributions:
Social aspects and patterns in interpersonal privacy management
A formal model of information disclosure emphasizing social factors is developed. Based
on this model, different patterns of information disclosure are identified. These patterns
indicate specific types of information disclosure behavior and thus allow disclosure control
assistance mechanisms to be improved and tailored to individual users. A survey system
for empirical user studies on the relevance and usage of these patterns in context of dif-
ferent scenarios, i.e. interpersonal information disclosure situations, is developed. Pattern
usage results from an exemplary study and implications for disclosure control assistance
mechanism are presented.
Suitable disclosure control methods and their orchestration
A reference model for a composite disclosure control system is developed which com-
bines existing approaches to information disclosure control. Next to providing multiple
control methods covering different capabilities and temporal schemes, this system’s ad-
vantages are mutual supplementation of individual components as well as user adap-
tive selection of most suitable components.
User-adaptive automation of disclosure decisions
Disclosure decisions may be automated by applying machine learning technologies to ob-
served disclosure behavior. The corresponding learning problem is analyzed and match-
ing learning methods are presented. This involves existing standard methods as well as new
enhanced methods incorporating disclosure patterns. In order to evaluate these meth-
ods with regard to different scenarios and patterns of interpersonal information exchange, a
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corresponding learning method evaluation system is developed. The evaluation results
of exemplary scenarios are presented and discussed with regard to their generalizabil-
ity to certain scenario characteristics. Additionally, specific integration possibilities of
individual methods into a composite disclosure control are described.
Design principles for interpersonal privacy sensitive environments
Existing guidelines and design principles concerning privacy in ubiquitous computing en-
vironments do not sufficiently consider interpersonal privacy issues. Filling this gap, a
list of missing general design principles is compiled. It combines and generalizes
multiple aspects of this work, including the previously mentioned disclosure patterns and
related study results, the concepts involved in a composite disclosure control system, and
the findings about machine learning driven automatic disclosures.
1.4 Overview
Following is an overview about the content of this thesis. Each paragraph provides a brief
summary of a subsequent chapter. The main contributions of this work are covered by the
chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Chapter 2 - Basics. This chapter introduces basic knowledge and declares a common
terminology required for the understanding of this work. Especially privacy is a term
referring to a wide range of concepts and issues. Determining concerns of and developing
solutions for privacy requires to examine this term more closely. For that purpose different
concepts of privacy are described. Similarly, the term smart environment covers various
types of technologies and applications. This chapter positions the concepts of smart en-
vironments within the general research topic of ubiquitous computing and determines the
technical characteristics of smart environments relevant for this work. Eventually, both
topics are merged to point out specific privacy problems in smart environments.
Chapter 3 - Related Work. Privacy has been an issue since the vision of ubiquitous
computing became popular. With reference to the different privacy concepts and issues
identified in the preceding chapter, this chapter reviews previous work about privacy in
ubiquitous computing in general and smart environments in particular. This includes
theoretical frameworks and design principles for privacy sensitive ubiquitous computing
environments, empirical studies analyzing patterns of privacy management, and specific
technical approaches to protect and manage privacy. Finally, it highlights open issues and
narrows them down to those focused in this work.
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Chapter 4 - Information Disclosure Patterns. This chapter elaborates patterns of in-
terpersonal information disclosure not yet considered by related work. It defines a formal
model for disclosure decisions and analyzes deducible set-based structural information and
resulting patterns of information disclosure. Subsequent chapters utilize these patterns in
order to improve disclosure assistance mechanisms. A concept and implementation of a
survey system for capturing disclosure behavior in social interactions is presented. Its pur-
pose is to explore the practical relevance of the elaborated patterns. The survey system
allows to perform empirical studies for different scenarios respectively domains. A specific
study conducted with this survey system is described and corresponding pattern usage
results are shown and discussed.
Chapter 5 - Composite Disclosure Control. As indicated by the review of related work
and by the study results of the foregoing chapter there is no optimal way to control the
disclosure of personal information: the way of choice depends on user preferences, type or
sensitivity of potentially shared information and circumstances accompanying disclosures.
This chapter presents different general approaches for privacy management. This is fol-
lowed by an orchestration of these approaches to a reference model of composite disclosure
control system. Particularly, this chapter discusses the integration of different disclosure
control mechanisms in order to complement each other and for the sake of providing user
specific optimal control mechanisms.
Chapter 6 - Learning Disclosure Decisions. One component of the presented composite
disclosure control system is supposed to conceptualize and automate disclosure decisions
by observing users and applying machine learning techniques to predict or suggest in-
formation disclosures in new situations. This chapter analyzes the actual corresponding
learning problem and presents related standard learning methods as well as a novel method
based on the patterns investigated in chapter 4. These patterns are also used to develop
novel prediction validation methods. Further, this chapter describes a developed system
to extensively evaluate these learning methods in context of different scenarios respec-
tively domains. This evaluation system is applied to manually composed scenarios and
empirically captured data from the study in chapter 4. Corresponding results, i.e. the
performance of different learning mechanisms, are shown and discussed with respect to
their suitability to automate disclosure decisions.
Chapter 7 - Guidelines for Interpersonal Privacy. This chapter combines the various
findings of this work to a generic framework of design principles for privacy sensitive smart
environments in context of social interactions. It extends existing frameworks presented
in chapter 3 by putting a stronger focus on interpersonal privacy and by including the
findings about disclosure patterns from chapter 4. Additionally, it generalizes the rather
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technical concepts and results of chapters 5 and 6 to more abstract design concepts for
disclosure assistance systems in ubiquitous computing environments.
Chapter 8 - Conclusion and Future Work. This chapter concludes this thesis with a
summary of its results and findings and by stating remaining challenges for future work.
2 Basics
Privacy and smart environments are malleable terms referring to a wide range of concepts
and issues. For the sake of disambiguation this chapter examines these terms more closely.
It describes different concepts of privacy, positions the notion of smart environments within
the general research topic of ubiquitous computing and determines the technical charac-
teristics of smart environments relevant for this work. Finally it merges both topics to
point out specific privacy problems in smart environments.
2.1 Concepts of Privacy
Privacy is the main issue driving this thesis, but what actually is privacy? It is a widely
honored but rarely understood issue. In order to develop systems and technologies which
protect privacy and help individuals in managing privacy one needs a clear understanding
of what actually is considered as privacy and in which ways it could be violated.
Looking back in history, privacy initially has been a physical issue, protecting a person’s
home from public invasion and its body from being exposed or touched unwillingly. This
is also known as territorial and bodily privacy. References to the latter one already can be
found in the Justice of the Peace Act in England from 1361 which mentions the arresting
of peeping toms and eavesdroppers (Pratt, 1979, page 54). A historical reference for
territorial privacy is given by a speech of the English parliamentarian William Pitt in the
18th century: “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storms may
enter, the rain may enter – but the King of England cannot enter; all his forces dare not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!” (quoted in Knowles, 1999, page 576).
However, this work is about informational privacy, i.e. concerning the access to and distri-
bution respectively exchange of personal information. In this regard this section elaborates
how privacy has evolved over the years and which corresponding concepts of privacy have
been developed.
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2.1.1 Privacy in Private
Concerning today’s industrial societies, one of the oldest and influential publications pro-
moting privacy is the article “The Right to Privacy” by Warren & Brandeis (1890) which
discusses a judicial manifestation of a right to privacy in the United States. This article
faces invasions of private life caused by photography and newspapers. These days pho-
tographic equipment became small and cheap enough to be used by the general public.
At the same time sensational newspapers (yellow press) started to become very popular.
Information about personal life, previously restricted to domestic circles and oral distribu-
tion, now could easily spread to a wide public. Warren & Brandeis mainly discuss judicial
aspects of privacy. However, they also promote privacy as a concept in that they mention
it as “the right to be let alone”1.
International privacy legislation in the 20th century mainly adopted the concept of privacy
as noted by Warren & Brandeis. For instance the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) by the UN General Assembly (1948) mentions privacy in article 12: “No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the
law against such interference or attacks.” In contrast to Warren & Brandeis, who mainly
aim to protect personal information from unauthorized publication, the UDHR affects
any invasion into private life, be it public media, the government or a single person. The
philosopher Ferdinand Schoeman (1984) proposes a similar understanding but describes
privacy as a state (rather than as a right): “A person has privacy to the extent that others
have limited access to information about him, limited access to the intimacies of his life,
or limited access to his thoughts or his body”.
These concepts focus on “privacy in private” and propose to “limit the ability of others
to penetrate your private space” (Lessig, 2006, chap. 11). They express a “binary under-
standing of privacy” (Solove, 2007, page 163) distinguishing between dedicated public and
private spaces. Individuals practice privacy as a kind of withdrawal from public space.
2.1.2 Privacy in Public
In the 1960s and 1970s, when governments started to employ nation-wide automatic data
processing facilities for managing information about their citizens, Warren & Brandeis’s
concept of privacy did not seem to be sufficient anymore. The increased and long-lasting
placement of personal information outside the private space raised the issue of “privacy
1Warren & Brandeis are not the first to express this concept of privacy but they successfully popularized
it.
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in public” (Lessig, 2006). An influential work facing the new concerns about privacy
is Privacy and Freedom by Westin (1967) which considers privacy as “the right of the
individual to decide what information about himself should be communicated to others
and under what circumstances”. Westin’s work has been used as a base for the US Privacy
Act of 1974 (United States Code) which defines fair information practices for governmental
use of personal information.
The German constitution mentions privacy in article 2, 10 and 13 (Deutscher Bundestag,
1949). Article 2 affects the development of one’s own personality. Article 10 is about
communication privacy (mail, telephony) and article 13 assures territorial privacy. In 1983,
in the context of a national census, the German Federal Constitutional Court consolidated
these articles to a general right to informational self-determination (based on the German
term “informationelle Selbstbestimmung”). Basically this right matches the concept of
privacy given by Westin.
Another notable legislative manifestation of privacy is the Directive 95/46/EC “on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data” of the European Parliament and Council of the European Union
(1995) and its revised version 2002/58/EC from 2002. The directive responds to an in-
creased processing of digital data, especially in the business sector (previous laws mainly
covered governmental privacy invasions). From a legislative perspective it is an influential
rework of the fair information practices mentioned above. Conceptually it is similar in
that it expresses Westin’s understanding of privacy.
Similar concepts of privacy can be found in various other works about privacy with regard
to digitally and potentially centralized as well as permanently stored data within a –
usually impersonal – public space. The common idea is to practice privacy by consciously
controlling the access by other entities to one’s personal information.
2.1.3 Interpersonal Privacy
The concept of privacy in public mainly addresses privacy in face of rather abstract enti-
ties, e.g. organizations, corporations or governments. As highlighted by the social psychol-
ogist Irwin Altman (1975) this concept does not really apply to interpersonal information
disclosure. He describes privacy as a process of dialectic and dynamic boundary regu-
lation, emphasizing social interaction and the environment as driving regulation factors.
In his framework privacy is about regulating interaction with others. This includes sev-
eral behavioral mechanisms, i.e. verbal communication, gestures, visual appearance and
territorial responses. According to Altman social interaction is composed of inputs and
outputs. Inputs refer to information retrieved from others and outputs mean information
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communicated to others. In this regard managing privacy can be described as adjusting
the desired levels of inputs and outputs using different behavioral mechanisms. It is im-
portant to note that, in contrast to privacy concepts described above, Altman does not
put the focus on personal information but on the process of providing information and
receiving feedback. In this process the environment (involving social expectations and
norms) is a significant parameter for information disclosure. In other words, privacy is
not only about hiding information but about reaching a desired state of participation in a
social environment by selectively disclosing information.
Today computers increasingly are used to mediate communication which motivated Palen
& Dourish (2003) to convey Altman’s privacy framework to socio-technical environments.
Technical components used to communicate information are an additional privacy regu-
lation mechanism, that is an additional medium which influences the levels of inputs and
outputs. As such it is a rather complex medium, potentially hard to understand and con-
trol. To shift Altman’s boundary concept to technical settings Palen & Dourish consider
three types of boundaries: disclosure, identity and temporal boundary. The disclosure
boundary addresses privacy as the selective disclosure of information according to circum-
stances like social norms, allegiance, self-representation and expectations one might put
on a social interaction. A noteworthy aspect of the disclosure boundary is that keeping
certain information private may require other information to be disclosed. For instance
to disguise unappreciated information about oneself somewhere in the web, one could set
up an own personal website, which provides intended personal information. Especially if
one has only limited control about what information is public the only way to reach a
desired level of privacy may be to show more information. This illustrates that privacy
in context of the disclosure boundary is not defined by access to individual information
but by a composition of hidden and disclosed information. The identity boundary deals
with the tension between different roles one might take on. Palen & Dourish highlight that
privacy is not bound to one persona per individual. For instance acting as a representative
for an affiliation usually changes the assumed persona which in turn impacts the desired
level of privacy - both for oneself and persons one interacts with. Regulating the identity
boundary in technical environments may fail because the facilities used for social inter-
action may hide or alter intended respectively perceived personae. Loss of context over
time is one example for an unintentionally changed personae. This issue of asynchronous
communication is also addressed by the temporal boundary which regards the fact that
privacy regulation additionally is affected by information disclosed in the past and in the
future as well as potential perception of this information in the future.
Summarized, the privacy concept elaborated by Altman and Palen & Dourish shifts the
focus from information and associated rights to interaction and associated processes. Sim-
ilar to the concept of privacy in public it expresses the need to properly control the flow of
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and access to information. In contrast, interpersonal privacy applies to social interactions
and corresponding unique disclosure factors and implications.
2.1.4 Zero Privacy
The idea of zero privacy is a rather extreme solution to cope with the huge amount of per-
sonal information which nowadays is communicated and stored within the digital world.
It expresses the consensus that digital sharing or processing of personal information and
privacy are contradicting concepts which cannot be realized both without negatively in-
terfering each other. Hence, any information disclosed within a certain public should
be considered to be completely public. Most popularly this has been expressed by Scott
McNealy: “You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it” (quoted in Lucky, 2008). More
recently Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg argued that “people have really gotten com-
fortable not only sharing more information and different kinds, but more openly and with
more people. [. . . ] That social norm is just something that has evolved over time” (quoted
in The Guardian Online, 2010). These seem to be rather simple answers to the problem of
privacy in the age of information technology – they solve privacy issues by negating them.
On the other hand there is something to be said for them. Cochrane (2000) reasons that
“All this secrecy is making life harder, more expensive, dangerous and less serendipitous”.
He sees privacy as a barrier to what technically is possible with regard to exchange of
information and that privacy is a burden of the past one should get rid of – honest people
do not have to fear anything anyway. Etzioni (1999) argues that each privacy right mostly
is shadowed by a higher valued societal right. For instance he confronts the privacy of
HIV infected persons with demands of public health. Here privacy is seen as a barrier to
transparency.
These thoughts are debatable and still not erase all privacy problems. Any published
information looses parts of its original context or may be erroneous. This could fatally
impact a persons integration within the society. Further, societal and technical benefits do
not diminish or reduce the problem of misuse of published information. Consequently, even
if someone is willing to disclose most (if not all) personal information, it still needs some
kind of protection. Eventually it is unclear if zero privacy indeed should be considered as a
real concept. It is still unknown if it is accepted on a wider basis. At first glance the younger
generation which grew up with social networking sites and which generally acts far more
public than older generations appear to be a relevant societal group following a concept of
zero privacy. However, this does not imply that young persons intentionally chose to drop
any privacy concerns. With regard to social networking sites, providers generally have
little interest in strong privacy support as personal user data is seen as a capital resource.
Thus the providers generally motivate site members to share more information rather than
less and often impede defensive information sharing behavior (Schneier, 2010). Switching
12 2.2 The Paradigm of Ubiquitous Computing
to a more privacy sensitive information sharing platform mostly is no option for social
reasons – if the majority of friends acts on Facebook, a switch probably would disconnect
relations in the analogue world. Additionally, the unconcerned privacy behavior of the
young generation might not be a societal evolution at all but an age-based phenomenon.
Young persons generally did not yet experience the fact that life often is not free of rough
edges and flaws but involves mistakes and shifts of opinion which may raise the need to
revoke certain aspects of one’s life from a general public access.
Concluding, it remains to be seen if the idea of zero privacy must be considered as a real
concept of privacy or if it is a phenomenon yielded by technical constraints and limited to
a not yet concerned youth generation. For that reason it is not considered further within
this work but has been elaborated here for the sake of conceptual completeness.
2.1.5 Conclusion
This section described different concepts of privacy in relation to developments in informa-
tion technology. They have been elaborated from an individual’s point of view on how to
protect and manage privacy. It is worth noting that different perspectives yield other in-
teresting conceptualizations of privacy. In this regard Flaherty (1992), Lessig (2006), Diffie
& Landau (2007), and Solove et al. (2008) are insightful references for further reading.
The different understandings of privacy listed here are an important prerequisite when
investigating privacy issues and corresponding solutions. Especially in smart environments,
the application area focused by this work, there may be privacy issues concerning more
than one concept of privacy. In this regard the next but one section gives an overview
about which privacy related problems in smart environments exist. First, however, the
next section introduces the research area of smart environments and ubiquitous computing
in general.
2.2 The Paradigm of Ubiquitous Computing
This thesis addresses privacy issues specific to smart environments. Similar to privacy the
term smart environment lacks a generally valid definition and partly overlaps with other
ubiquitous computing related terms like pervasive computing or ambient intelligence. For
the purpose of disambiguation this section provides a brief overview about ubiquitous
computing and derived paradigms – for instance smart environments – and concludes
what kind of smart environments and corresponding aspects of ubiquitous computing are
in the focus of this work.
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2.2.1 Ubiquitous Computing
In 1991 Mark Weiser, then working at XEROX Palo Alto Research Center, described
his vision of “the computer of the 21st century” where technologies “weave themselves
into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it”. He describes his
vision as ubiquitous computing, a “new way of thinking about computers in the world,
one that takes into account the natural human environment and allows the computers
themselves to vanish into the background”. In these early years ubiquitous computing
mainly was about miniaturizing office equipment and its integration into already existing
patterns of working life. Later on, when mobile phones became popular, the focus moved to
home entertainment and mobile computing (Ronzani, 2009). Today ubiquitous computing
generally refers to technologies where many distributed and mobile devices, integrated
into everyday artifacts, seamlessly and spontaneously interact with each other and with
users in a context-driven manner. The central theme is to support users in work and
other activities by assisting in complex processes and automating tedious repetitive tasks.
Popular and illustrative examples are kitchens which assist in cooking based on available
food or wardrobe mirrors which provide whether forecasts and suggest a suitable dress.
To some extent Weiser’s vision has been realized already today. Computers no more are
only available as heavy weighted desktop systems. Devices continuously shrink in size
which implicitly raises more and more mobile usage patterns. Cars, cell phones and home
appliances nowadays often are able to communicate with other devices and increasingly
gain a certain level of “intelligence”. However, it’s still a long way to really match the
idea of ubiquitous computing. Based on Weiser’s vision various related paradigms have
been developed, e.g. pervasive computing, the Internet of things, ambient intelligence, and
smart environments – each emphasizing specific aspects of ubiquitous computing.
2.2.2 Pervasive Computing
In the 1990s the term pervasive computing mainly has been propagated by Novell and IBM.
It has been a first step in realizing the paradigm of ubiquitous computing and initially was
centered around connecting people and information (Novell) and mobile devices (IBM)
(Ronzani, 2009). After the turn of the millennium pervasive computing has been used
in a broader context. According to Hansmann et al. (2003) pervasive computing follows
the paradigm of ubiquitous computing with regard to user experience but has a stronger
focus on underlying technologies, mainly interoperability and seamless interconnectivity
(Satyanarayanan, 2001).
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Today pervasive computing mostly is used as a synonym for ubiquitous computing –
each preferred by certain research communities and companies (Saha & Mukherjee, 2003;
Ronzani, 2009). Within this work the terms pervasive and ubiquitous computing are used
interchangeably.
2.2.3 The Internet of Things
The Internet of things – sometimes also referred to as physical computing – is a ubiquitous
computing related research area centered around smart and interconnected everyday ob-
jects. An early work is that of Barrett & Maglio (1998) about virtually attaching arbitrary
information to physical objects. Actual information is stored in the web while objects are
marked with information retrieval identifiers (URLs). The main targeted scenario, though
not limited to, is that of exchanging documents by handing out physical objects, a process
which hides network and protocol details involved in the transfer of documents. Existing
network technologies are used in a more user friendly way by using modalities from the real
world. Here objects simply act as ID carriers. Today the exchange of documents via the
Internet is far less complex (using one of the numerous file sharing services) and does not
necessarily require physical objects to provide a user friendly experience. However, objects
with unique identifiers motivate other interesting scenarios and research challenges. Con-
sider the wardrobe example mentioned above which requires wirelessly readable unique
identifiers on garments. Mattern (2003) lists further examples, e.g. operating instructions
“attached” to technical facilities. Though objects themselves only carry identifiers, they
appear to be “smart” if used with appropriate reading devices. Next to simply identified
artifacts the Internet of things also involves more powerful objects which perceive and ma-
nipulate their surrounding context (Siegemund, 2004) and which interact with each other
in order to complete the knowledge about their environment and in order to coordinate
their behavior (Kortuem et al., 2010).
With regard to the ubiquitous computing vision the Internet of things tackles the inte-
gration of computers into everyday artifacts and the interaction with hidden computing
devices using modalities from the “real” world.
2.2.4 Ambient Intelligence
The term Ambient Intelligence (AmI) has been coined by Phillips in the late 1990s (Zelkha
& Epstein, 1998). It describes a vision for digital systems in the years 2010 to 2020.
Aarts & Encarnac¸a˜o (2006) describe the AmI world as one in which “devices operate
collectively using information and intelligence that is hidden in the network connecting
the devices. Lighting, sound, vision, domestic appliance, and personal health care products
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all cooperate seamlessly with one another to improve the total user experience through
the support of natural and intuitive user interfaces”. The notion ambient describes the
integration of technology into everyday objects of the environment while intelligence refers
to social interaction by recognizing persons in the environment, adapting to, learning from
and potentially acting on behalf of them.
AmI stresses a more user centric view of the ubiquitous computing paradigm and tries to
answer the question how to cope with “myriad devices and the ever-present ubiquitous
and pervasive infrastructure” (Shadbolt, 2003). Augusto (2007) highlights that an AmI
system “proactively, but sensibly, supports people in their daily lives” which makes human
centered design and artificial intelligence required to anticipate individual needs of users
to core research areas. The vision of AmI has been taken on by the European Commission
to describe a future information society (Ducatel et al., 2001) which shows that research
on AmI also covers societal aspects and integration issues (Burgelman & Punie, 2006) of
ubiquitous computing scenarios.
2.2.5 Smart Environments
Smart environments can be considered as a specific application of AmI to limited phys-
ical spaces. According to Dey et al. (1999) “one of the goals of a smart environment is
that it supports and enhances the abilities of its occupants in executing tasks”. Cook &
Das (2005) define smart as the ability to autonomously acquire and apply knowledge and
environment as a subject’s surrounding. Therefore they define a smart environment as
one which has and applies knowledge about itself and which adapts to its inhabitants for
the purpose of improved user experience, for instance by automating processes performed
frequently in an environment. Expected experiences vary among users and specific envi-
ronments and evolve with the capabilities of smart environments. Cook & Das describe
their understanding of a smart environment by characterizing its main technical features.
The most basic feature is the remote and automatic control of devices via wireless or
existing cable connections (e.g. power line). This allows devices to visually diminish and
to be integrated into facilities of the environment while still letting them communicate
with each other and users. Device communication is another core feature of smart envi-
ronments which requires certain standards for information exchange and which is the base
for combining distributed device specific information to higher level information and for
letting devices react upon events in other devices. For instance light and temperature in
an environment may automatically adjust in response to an incoming inhabitant’s prefer-
ences. This also implicates distributed sensors which are able to recognize the state of the
environment and activities of inhabitants. More powerful and intelligent devices utilize
the communication infrastructure and aggregated information to provide services which
actually make the environment smart. Such services usually have prediction and decision
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Figure 2.1: The Smart Appliance Lab of the MuSAMA project is a testbed for
smart environments.
making capabilities in order to automate processes, not only based on predefined strategies
but also based on dynamic individual preferences and past activities of inhabitants and
groups of them.
Kirste (2006) complements these rather implementation specific characteristics with a
more user centric definition: “Smart environments are physical spaces that are able to
react to the activities of users, in a way that assists the users in achieving their objectives
in this environments”. Here the term smart refers to the proper selection and combina-
tion of environment actions according to user objectives which requires “a certain level of
understanding of the user’s view of the world”. With regard to underlying technologies,
to a large extent most smart environment scenarios can already be realized today. How-
ever, Kirste highlights that detecting user objectives and providing meaningful actions in
unforeseen scenarios still is a big challenge in smart environments. Indeed this specific
problem of ad hoc scenarios is a core research area of the project MuSAMA2. Figure 2.1
shows an experimental smart environment used by the MuSAMA project.
2.2.6 Conclusion
The initial paradigm of ubiquitous computing has triggered various further research ar-
eas. To a large extent these areas overlap, mainly concerning the aimed user experience.
On the other hand each area emphasizes specific aspects of ubiquitous computing, e.g.
targeted scenarios, functional focus or abstraction of technologies. This work, as part of
the MuSAMA2 project, primarily deals with smart environments whose main application
scenario is that of smart meeting rooms, i.e. environments designed to assist in collabora-
tive work. However, since related ubiquitous computing research areas are not completely
disjoint, it is not strictly limited to dedicated smart meeting room use cases. Within the
scope of this work a smart environment primarily is considered as a physical environment
with various integrated devices whose functionality is driven by services. Services are ap-
plications running on the environment’s devices and usually consume information from
2The MuSAMA project: www.musama.de
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their users to fulfill a dedicated task. Typically these tasks implicate a perceivable change
within the environment but may also induce processes outside the environment. Hence,
from a privacy point of view the relevant aspects are service-driven processing of personal
information and the implicated disclosure of personal information in different forms to dif-
ferent entities. The following section elaborates which privacy issues ubiquitous computing
respectively smart environments raise.
2.3 Privacy in Smart Environments
Core features of smart environments are their adaption to preferences and behavior of
users as well as the support of collaboration processes or leisure activities. Obviously
these features require environment inhabitants to disclose a certain amount of personal
information to the components utilizing this information. This affects various types of per-
sonal information, e.g. user preferences and sensor data required to set up the environment,
tracks of behavioral information used to anticipate intended activities, or any arbitrary
data involved in collaboration or entertainment motivated information exchange. The di-
versity of types of personal information, the various and partly unobservable modalities
used to communicate information as well as the effects of processing personal data within
the environment raise different types of privacy issues. To a certain level these issues
already existed in context of traditional desktop based computing. However, ubiquitous
computing aggravates them because it communicates much more personal information and
it is present everywhere and anytime – there’s no physical boundary and no power but-
ton which disconnects the digital and analogue worlds. Smart environments are limited
in terms of physical space, but this limitation diminishes if each room in a building is
a smart environment or if one spends the majority of a day within smart environments.
This section describes which types of privacy issue may occur in smart environments, with
reference to the privacy concepts presented in section 2.1.
2.3.1 Invading Private Space
The various sensors and devices within smart environments are, by definition, able to
detect inhabitants, their activities and their state. The integration of computing technolo-
gies into facilities of the environment makes this happen silently and transparently. These
capabilities bear the risk to blur natural borders traditionally assumed to separate private
and public spheres. For instance physical borders like walls do not necessarily block infor-
mation from leaving a room. Sensors capturing emotional conditions cross bodily borders,
e.g. facial expressions. Persistently stored and searchable information dissolves spatial and
temporal borders which divide different parts of one’s life. Smart environments have to
ensure to respect such natural borders which separate private and public areas. Otherwise
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they violate the concept of privacy in private. Additionally – considering cognitive re-
sources as a property of private space – excessive interaction requests by the environment
or other awareness snatching events violate this privacy concept in the form of unwanted
distraction.
Obviously the invasion of private spaces conflicts with a user’s expectation that a smart
environment make his life easier. Besides that, Cas (2005) states a more general, societal
reason for preserving private spaces: “Pervasive surveillance creates enormous pressure
to behave in a ‘normal’ way and not to leave the standardized paths of widely accepted
social behavior. On the other hand, social innovation requires deviations by members of
the society”. Still, in some cases it is useful or necessary to let information cross natural
borders, i.e. to let it enter a certain public space. However, here it is important to clearly
communicate this fact to allow users to estimate their current state of privacy and, this
directly leads to the next section, to regulate their degree of privacy.
2.3.2 Exploiting Personal Information
Given that environment inhabitants are willing to communicate information to devices and
services in the environment and given that they are aware of the fact that this information
potentially crosses natural borders, users should know what information is communicated
for what purpose and under which conditions it is used by whom. This follows the concept
of privacy in public. It is not easy to accomplish these requirements. User adopted behavior
may need tracked and aggregated information from various sources which requires the
storing of information by different parties for a longer period of time. Even if the parties
involved in the communication and processing of personal information guarantee a sane
handling of this data (possibly according to agreed policies) one might still have a bad
feeling about it. Policies do not prevent human or technical errors. Such errors may
leak information to unintended recipients or falsify personal information. In the latter
case users had to cope with misunderstandings which may be almost impossible to clarify
once they have been propagated (Garfinkel, 2000, page 28). Especially wrong medical or
financial data may crucially harm a person’s societal status. In fact these problems also
violate the concept of zero privacy.
Another potential issue is that of searching possibilities on stored user data. Users may
agree to disclose certain pieces of information but may not be aware of the fact that this
information could be combined with other, possibly historic data and thus reveals much
more information as originally intended. The same applies to potential future uses of
disclosed personal information. Next to combination of separately harmless information
the loss of context is another problem persistently stored data holds. A sentence said
today in a specific situation in front of a specific group of persons may have a totally
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different meaning if replayed outside of this setting. It is nearly impossible to guess such
transitions of information.
Further, the increasing amount of personal information persistently available at various
locations elicits interests in usage of this information besides its original, agreed purpose.
A (mis)use for marketing purposes usually is not perceived as a strong privacy violation.
In contrast, temptations to use this information for law enforcement may lead to more
critical privacy issues in the long run. Already today a lot of digitally tracked informa-
tion is used for crime investigations, for instance server log files (Diffie & Landau (2007)
provide staggering insights on this topic). Why not use information tracked in smart en-
vironments too, or – utilizing a smart environment’s anticipating capabilities – why not
use predicted intentions? If so, shouldn’t it be prohibited to delete such information be-
cause it is a helpful utility in crime preventions and investigations (Bohn et al., 2003)?
Such thoughts seem to be impossible today but it is likely that once such data is widely
available, corresponding discussions will arise.
All these issues impede the management of privacy in public. The distribution, aggrega-
tion and longevity of information disclosed outside an explicit private space make it hard
to understand and control who has access to which data for what purpose. Indirectly,
unintended disclosures of personal information could also implicate invasions into private
life, e.g. by being inundated with advertisements or by being forced to defend imputations
caused by misinterpreted or wrong personal information.
2.3.3 Interfering Social Interaction
Smart environment are not only designed to assist individual users but also to support
interaction within person groups, for instance collaborative work or social leisure activities.
In this regard services in the environment provide various modalities to communicate and
exchange information between inhabitants, i.e. the disclosure of information is a dedicated
feature. The potential privacy issue here is not the communication of data in principle but
the (in)appropriate respectively (un)intended mediation of information. Interacting with
other persons in a smart environment is a social process which involves the exchange of
information on a give-and-take basis. Not only the persons one interacts with but also the
current situation, including expectations and social norms affect what information a person
is willing to disclose within the environment. For instance a formal meeting situation and
a casual get-together usually have different implications on information exchange, even in
context of identical person groups. A smart environment which disregards such differences
has the potential to violate interpersonal privacy.
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Moreover, the various modalities of information exchange provided by smart environments
complicate interpersonal privacy management, for instance due to automatic distribution
of information or due to semantic transformations of information during a communication
process (see figure 2.2). Even today, in comparably simply equipped technological envi-
ronments, one can find such examples. Unwanted e-mail arrival notifications popping up
while giving a talk is one of them. Feature rich smart environments as described in section
2.2.5 bear much more: medical information may be revealed indirectly due to activated
assistive technologies, emotional conditions might leak because of a corresponding acoustic
or visual personalization of the environment, and collaboration environments may display
inappropriate documents. While not necessarily violating one’s dignity such disruptions
still alter a person’s originally intended boundary between itself and others and thus could
negatively influence any subsequent interaction. Consider a contract negotiation meeting
between representatives of a software company and a client corporation as an example.
During such negotiations each party tries to carry its point as much as possible. Next
to bare facts (pricing, set of features) negotiations are driven by potentially sophisticated
social nuances adjusted by the selective disclosure and withholding of information. An
unintentionally disclosed (or withheld) information might not be perceived as such by an
interaction partner, but it could corrupt an interaction from the perspective of the (invol-
untary) information provider. The problem of semantic transformations may occur due to
improper modalities used to communicate information. An environment which allows to
distribute information to other inhabitants could do this, for instance, via a shared large
display or by forwarding this information to the inhabitant’s mobile devices. Either one
has different implications on social interaction. Own contact data shown in full screen
mode on a large display wall instead of being sent to mobile devices appears rather prig-
gish. The other way around, there may be cases when a document preferable is displayed
on a shared screen where each person retrieves the information uniformly and only for a
limited time.
These issues show that smart environments – actually intended to seamlessly support a
multimodal exchange of information – are also able to derogate interpersonal commu-
nication if they disregard the fact that “privacy management is a dynamic response to
circumstance rather than a static enforcement of rules” (Palen & Dourish, 2003). Privacy
issues concerning interpersonal communication probably are the most challenging ones.
They depend on a variety of – partly diffuse – factors and are highly individual (Ack-
erman, 2000). One problem is the lack of general patterns. Even the defensive scheme
to disclose as less information as possible could be the wrong decision if a social context
advocates the opposite.
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Figure 2.2: Services in ubiquitous computing environments may distribute vari-
ous personal information (documents, contacts, schedules or arbitrary environment
configurations). Users have a hard time in understanding and controlling related
interpersonal privacy implications.
2.3.4 Conclusion
Smart environments have the potential to violate each of the privacy concepts presented
in section 2.1. The described issues often correlate with each other. For instance blurred
natural borders also raise problems with regard to social interaction and misused informa-
tion within a public space could result in invasions into a private space. Hence, resolving
one issue may obliterate another one. Still, some issues cannot be eliminated solely by
technical means from the perspective of the environment. They may require legal regula-
tions, social norms or utilities which empower users to cope with them individually. This
directly leads to the next chapter, which reviews existing work on protecting and managing
privacy in ubiquitous computing in general and smart environments in particular.
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3 Related Work
The previous chapter described various privacy issues one can find in smart environments.
This one investigates to which extent current research is able to handle them. The first
section presents some general high level guidelines and principles elaborated by other
researchers. Subsequently, section 3.2 reviews existing work about privacy needs and
patterns, based on conducted surveys and “lessons learned” publications. Section 3.3
provides an overview about specific technical solutions to protect and manage privacy.
Finally, section 3.4 determines still open issues and narrows them down to those covered
by this work.
3.1 General Guidelines and Design Principles
Privacy issues in ubiquitous computing scenarios are a lively research area since the vision
of ubiquitous computing has been expressed. Hence, a number of theoretical frameworks
have been developed which suggest general guidelines and design principles for privacy
protection and management.
3.1.1 Feedback and Control
An early work is that of Bellotti & Sellen (1993). It discusses privacy issues and possible
solutions in context of RAVE (Gaver et al., 1992), a media space equipped with tech-
nologies to capture and communicate audio and video data for the purpose of improved
collaboration and interaction. Their central message is that a sane handling of private
information requires feedback about when and what information is captured and to whom
it is made available as well as control over what information one projects to whom. In
particular these mechanisms should provide appropriate means for the following affairs:
capture (what information is being picked up), construction (how information is being
processed, including storing, encryption, or combination with other sources), accessibility
(who has access to my information), and purpose (for what purpose information is being
used, now as well as in the future). In addition they suggest several evaluation criteria
to be used as a checklist when evaluating how ubiquitous computing applications realize
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the proposed scheme of feedback and control. Among others these include trustworthiness
(reliability, confidence and understandability of mechanisms), timing (feedback should be
provided when control is required and most effective), perceptibility (feedback should be
noticeable), unobtrusiveness (feedback should not distract or annoy users), intrusiveness
(feedback should not invade the privacy of others), flexibility (control should adopt to
individual privacy needs), and effort (control should require as few actions as possible).
Often it is not possible to respect all criteria, e.g. a low effort tends to reduce flexibility.
3.1.2 Fair Information Practices
Based on the fair information practices expressed by the Directive 95/46/EC of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and Council of the European Union (1995), Langheinrich (2001) has
compiled a list of corresponding design principles for privacy-aware ubiquitous computing
applications. These principles have a broader perspective than the framework of Bellotti
& Sellen, which mainly focuses user interfaces. Following is a short summary:
Notice: This principle expresses the fundamental requirement that any data collection
should not take place without being noticed by the monitored subject. This matches the
above mentioned concept of feedback.
Choice and Consent: In response to proper notifications users should be able to choose
which information others may capture and use. There should not be any data collection
without explicit user consent. This basically refers to what Bellotti & Sellen call control.
Langheinrich highlights that the interaction modalities in ubiquitous computing often
conflict with this principle.
Anonymity and Pseudonymity: The need for a (practically often hard to realize) consent
can be avoided by utilizing anonymization techniques. Applications which require some
form of authentication or which provide personalization should, if possible, incorporate
pseudonymity, a weaker form of anonymity.
Proximity and Locality: This principle aims to balance practical shortcomings of the
previous ones. If neither of them is reasonable, limiting the spatial distribution of infor-
mation still preserves a certain level of protection, for instance by limiting the access to
some information to the physical location where it originates.
Adequate Security: A necessary (but not sufficient) requirement for privacy protection is
the secure processing of information. Though, it is not a practical solution in all cases,
e.g when involved devices do not have enough resources or lack interfaces required to
integrate user-side secrets. The notion adequate proposes to deploy security models which
3 Related Work 25
are reasonable with regard to the sensitivity of communicated information and the cost-
value ratio of an attack.
Access and Recourse: Privacy protection cannot be realized solely by technical means
but requires appropriate social conventions and legal regulations. However, systems should
incorporate technologies to express, enforce and evaluate corresponding policies, e.g. a data
collection and usage limitation policy.
3.1.3 Genres of Disclosure
Palen & Dourish (2003) brought up the term genres of disclosures to describe socially
constructed patterns of privacy management. A genre refers to common negotiations of
the boundaries disclosure, identity, and time (which have been described more detailed
in section 2.1.3) within a specific social context. Systems should be designed to align
with known genres of disclosures, otherwise they are likely to cause privacy violations.
For instance an availability and activity notification system might be useful and accepted
within certain working environments but does not similarly apply to home environments
where the sixteen year old daughter refuses to let her parents always know what she is
doing with whom. Both cases differ in their typical disclosure boundary. An example
for a mismatch with the identity boundary is given by a location tracking system used
in a company. The system was supposed to track persons in their professional role for
the purpose of improved collaboration. However, only staff actually moving around a lot
perceived it as such. Staff working most of the time in their office could not map the
tracking functionality to their professional role – there was no obvious use. Hence, they
perceived it as a system monitoring them as a private person. Of course, new technologies
sometimes require and provoke new genres of disclosure. Though, respecting existing
genres greatly simplifies the realization of proper feedback (or notice) and control (or
consent) mechanisms because privacy related implications usually are already known and
accepted.
3.1.4 Design Pitfalls
Complementing general guidelines, Lederer et al. (2004) have compiled a list of pitfalls
designers of privacy-affective systems (mainly in the field of ubiquitous computing) should
take care of. These pitfalls relate to a user’s understanding of potential privacy issues and
available actions to handle them (in that they match the notions of feedback and control
given by Bellotti & Sellen). They can be summarized as follows:
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Obscuring potential information flow: In order to let users decide the usage of a system,
it should not conceal what kind of potential disclosures may occur. This includes missing
as well as ambiguous privacy declarations. For instance anonymization techniques usually
only apply to certain communication layers, but not so well informed users could assume
to completely act anonymously.
Obscuring actual information flow: In a related manner designs should not obscure actual
information disclosures but display them as immediate as possible. Otherwise users cannot
estimate their current degree of privacy respectively how they appear to whom in situ.
This is also important in order to properly react to accidental disclosures.
Emphasizing configuration over action: Systems should avoid comprehensive but com-
plex privacy settings – they tend to be ignored or not understood by the majority of users.
Instead privacy management should be integrated into already existing actions and as-
sume safe defaults. For instance, smart environments should not activate privacy-affective
services unless an incoming person holds a badge near a receiver at the entry door.
Lacking coarse-grained control: If the latter one is hard to realize, system designs should
not miss simple top-level mechanisms for disclosure control. Examples are interfaces which
adapt the semantics of power buttons, e.g. to hide one’s location, or simple ordinal controls,
e.g. to adjust the precision of location data. Such interfaces offer direct feedback and simple
control at the same time.
Inhibiting established practice: Systems should not disregard existing technical and social
conventions (like genres of disclosures as described above) but try to map them to new
technologies. For instance, context-aware phones which are able to communicate a user’s
activity to a caller in order to explain why a call is not accepted, should not do this
automatically as it violates the convention of plausible deniability.
3.1.5 Further Objectives
The presented frameworks are only a selection which covers the most important issues.
Other frameworks often overlap with these ones but emphasize specific perspectives or add
further insightful principles. For instance in an own work a list of objectives to diminish
user concerns about privacy in smart environments has been compiled (Bu¨nnig & Cap,
2007). These objectives partially overlap with Langheinrich’s principles but assume the
perspective of a user interacting with smart environment services. Additionally, they have
a stronger focus on technical approaches. One of its findings to add here is that services
processing personal information should support user-driven audit mechanisms, i.e. meth-
ods which enable users to autonomously verify policy compliance. Institutional validation
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mechanisms probably are not able to handle the potential vast amount of services and
service providers in ubiquitous computing environments. This mainly affects the concept
of privacy in public. Audit mechanisms do not eliminate corresponding privacy violations
but tend to repress them because violators can be held accountable.
Kobsa (2007) mentions two further noteworthy objectives. First, stored personal infor-
mation should be distributed to several interacting clusters, each covering only a limited
amount of users and a limited portion of user information. Further, he recommends to
shift the storing and processing of information to facilities owned by users. Applications
which require aggregated user information could utilize homomorphic encryption tech-
niques. These objectives technically limit respectively disable violations of the concept of
privacy in public.
Jiang et al. (2002) propose the principle of minimum asymmetry. Information flows in
ubiquitous computing should be designed to “minimize the asymmetry between data own-
ers and data collectors and data users”. With reference to privacy in public, this mostly
means that information flows from owners to collectors need to be reduced while they
should be increased the other way around. With respect to privacy in public this means,
for instance, that each information item communicated to an entity should be responded
with information about how it is being used. An example in face of interpersonal privacy
is that a receiver of some contact information should provide the same information in
return. Esquivel et al. (2007) promote a similar idea using the “fair trade” metaphor. In
practice such a symmetry is hard to realize as the sensitivity or value of information may
be perceived differently among individual information sharing entities.
3.1.6 Summary and Open Issues
These guidelines and principles do not only help in the design phase of ubiquitous comput-
ing applications respectively smart environments, but also function as evaluation frame-
works for existing systems. The presented objectives often affect more than one concept
of privacy. However, most comprehensively they deal with issues concerning privacy in
public (and implicitly help in preserving private spaces). The general notions of feed-
back, control and audit also apply to interpersonal privacy, but do not sufficiently cover it.
Here the genres of disclosure proposed by Palen & Dourish and the approach of minimum
asymmetry by Jiang et al. are important principles. Chapter 7 (Guidelines for Interper-
sonal Privacy) extends the guidelines presented here by explicitly addressing interpersonal
privacy management.
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3.2 Patterns of Privacy Management
Next to high level guidelines and principles, designing privacy management solutions re-
quires an understanding of how users practice privacy, i.e. by which needs it is driven and
which patterns it reveals. This section reviews corresponding work. As this mainly affects
information leaving a private space, the review is limited to the concepts privacy in public
and interpersonal privacy. Note that the following grouping by these two concepts is a
loose one – often patterns affect both privacy concepts.
3.2.1 Privacy in Public
Ackerman et al. (1999) conducted a survey to understand privacy concerns of users of
e-commerce web sites. Though not directly related to ubiquitous computing scenarios, it
provides some general insight on how users practice privacy in public. The authors were
able to distinguish three general clusters of users: privacy fundamentalists, marginally
concerned users and – the majority – pragmatic users. The latter group mainly balances
information disclosure with corresponding benefits. This corresponds to the observations
made by Grudin & Horvitz (2003) who identify the general privacy management strategies
of pessimistic, optimistic, and mixed access control. Here pessimistic refers to preventive
control, optimistic to retrospective control, and mixed to on-demand or in-situ control.
Other findings by Ackerman et al. are how comfortably users feel about sharing specific
types of information and which feedback and control possibilities users considered most
important. In general most users dislike the sharing of financial and medical information
but are more relaxed with regard to personal preferences – probably because they mostly
provide useful personalization and do not have an obvious potential for a crucial misuse.
Concerning feedback and control users mostly care about the factors with whom disclosed
information is shared, for what purpose it is used, and if it is possible to opt out. The
declaration of privacy and data retention policies were comparably less relevant factors.
The authors guess this could be due to a lack of trust in and understanding of such
warrants.
West (2008) claims that the decision to disclose information is strongly influenced by
the perceptibility of positive implications. Users expect to gain something when making
decisions about information disclosure, i.e. they want to be rewarded for making good
decisions. The point is that providing less information theoretically protects privacy but
practically yields less perceivable rewards. In contrast, providing more information usually
has immediate effects. As an example, consider a service which requests some personal
information in order to work and which does nothing when no information is provided. To
also reward a defensive information handling users should be noticed about their current
3 Related Work 29
strong privacy level and services should provide some fallback activities which do not
require personal information. However, while West’s arguments are commendable in terms
of privacy, service providers probably are less motivated to reward a defensive information
sharing behavior.
Another interesting factor influencing information disclosure is given by Huberman et al.
(2005). They conducted a survey where participants exchanged personal information in
the style of a reverse second-price auction (each piece of information was valued with real
money). One of their findings was that participants valued information by how strong it
deviates from the average among all participants. There are two reasons why uncommon
information is handled more sensitively: it is easier to deduce the owner of the information
(identification issue) and there is a risk of embarrassment (social issue). In this respect
the norm deviation of personal information actually is also a pattern in the management
of interpersonal privacy.
3.2.2 Interpersonal Privacy
Adams (2000) investigated privacy issues in multimedia spaces, i.e. environments using
audio and video facilities for interpersonal communication. She highlights that primarily
communicated information is accompanied by several second level information – spoken
words also disclose voice intonations and faces usually expresses emotional conditions.
Hence, Adams not only states information sensitivity, recipients and usage as important
factors but how users perceive them, based on recognized secondary level information.
Joinson et al. (2006) refer to such personal perceptions as dispositional disclosure vari-
ables (in contrast to situational ones). These works show that privacy is a highly individual
affair and that it cannot be managed solely based on the primarily communicated infor-
mation itself but with regard to how it is communicated and which further information it
mediates.
Lederer et al. (2003b) investigated the relative importance of the recipient of an informa-
tion item and the item itself – primarily the current situation one is in – when deciding its
disclosure. For that purpose they conducted a survey which asked participants to choose
the accuracy (true, vague and blank) of two possible activities and locations (working lunch
at downtown and social evening in a live club) when requested by an inquirer (given as an
abstract role, e.g. employer or stranger). The main result is that the information recipient
is a more important factor than the communicated information. Participants more often
chose the same accuracy for different situations but identical inquirers than the other way
around. Though, for the person role employer, the information itself appeared to be an
equally important disclosure parameter.
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Cadiz & Gupta (2001) ran a study in order to examine how people make privacy decisions
when sharing various information (e.g. contact and calendar information, medical data,
hobbies, music, and current activities) with other persons (in contrast to impersonal enti-
ties). Persons are referred to by abstract roles, e.g. family members, friends and co-workers
(scaled by how close relationships are). Participants were able to constrain information
sharing by enforcing notices when an item actually is shared and by limiting it to certain
time frames. One finding of their qualitative analysis is that these features have been
endorsed by most participants but practically they did not influence disclosure decisions
in most cases. Another result is that disclosure decisions are driven by a pattern of four
questions:
• Does this person already have this information?
• Does this person need to know this information?
• Do I care if this persons has this information?
• Is this person trustworthy?
The importance of these questions varies among participants. Some only considered if they
care about sharing an information item with a specific person. Others mainly asked if the
person in question needs an information item at all. The study also shows that there is
no common strategy of openness for specific groups (e.g. family members) or person types
(e.g. a friend). Some treated all family members the same while others did not. Similarly,
even close friends not always implicate openness, e.g. in case of an intimate but gossip
friend. Finally, when managing information disclosure, Cadiz & Gupta suggest to distin-
guish between fast versus slow changing information and descriptive versus communicative
information. Fast changing information quickly gets invalid and thus mostly is disclosed
with less concern. In contrast, rather static information cannot easily be revoked once it
has been disclosed. Descriptive information (e.g. job, age, preferences) is perceived to be
more personal than communicative information (e.g. phone number, location), which does
not primarily say something about a person but is used to get in touch with each other.
However, this distinction is not sharp. Communicative information may involve personal
data (e.g. an e-mail address can reveal the company one works at) or it may induce descrip-
tive information when aggregated (e.g. location tracking). The different information types
should be recognized when designing means to manage their disclosure. Slow changing
information should be handled more carefully and communicative information should be
prevented from becoming descriptive and thus unexpectedly revealing personal details.
Prabaker et al. (2007) analyzed how users tend to specify disclosure rules in context of
a location sharing application. Rules could be parametrized by the location itself, time
and information recipients. When applying these rules, users were asked to justify how
well automatic disclosures match actual disclosures they would choose manually and ad
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hoc. Initial definitions of rules did not perform well in practice and had to be revised
multiple time. Still, final revisions only reached an accuracy of 60% to 80%. Toninelli
et al. (2009) came to similar results concerning phone call acceptance policies. Users have
strategies in mind when to accept or reject phone calls and when to annotate rejects with
explanatory context information. Though, they have problems to define them formally.
The authors mention two reasons why users fail in accurately defining disclosure rules.
First, predefined disclosure decisions face hypothetical situations which might mismatch
real situations or do not sufficiently cover them. Second, intuitive strategies cannot easily
be mapped to formal rule systems because they use different vocabularies and because it
is likely that the formal rule system is not equally powerful, especially when it comes to
exceptional cases and fine-grained disclosure parameters. Though, rules defined ad hoc
(i.e. on information request) or retrospectively usually are more accurate than predefined
ones.
3.2.3 Summary and Open Issues
Several patterns have been identified. None of them appears to be valid for all users.
Users follow one of three three general approaches to privacy (pessimistic, pragmatic, and
optimistic) while individual information disclosure decisions may be influenced by multiple
factors:
• Does the receiver already have this information?
• Does the receiver need to know this information?
• Do I care if the receiver has this information?
• Is the receiver trustworthy?
• Is this information fast or slow changing?
• Is this information descriptive or communicative?
• What is the type of this information?
• How does the receiver perceive this information?
• How does the information deviate from the average?
• What are the immediate positive effects of (not) disclosing this information?
Obviously the decision process to disclose some personal information may get very com-
plex and easily diverges among individual users. Not only that different users concentrate
on different factors, even identical answers to one of the above questions might eventually
result in different disclosures. For instance some users do not feel comfortable with dis-
closing information which deviates from a social norm while others explicitly prefer such
deviations. Hence, it is hard to derive general rules from these patterns.
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The reviewed work mainly considers information recipients, information itself and how
it is used. But, surveys did not investigate the influence of circumstances accompanying
disclosures, e.g. one’s own role and the social context (besides the general social relationship
to a single information receiver). Chapter 4 (Information Disclosure Patterns) deals with
these aspects.
3.3 Specific Technical Solutions
Of course related work did not only elaborate theoretical frameworks and conducted em-
pirical studies. There also exist various technical solutions to tackle privacy issues in smart
environments. In relation to the privacy concepts presented in section 2.1, the following
subsections provide an overview about these solutions.
3.3.1 Staying Private
Supporting the concept of privacy in private means to help users in preserving natural
borders between private and public spaces or – in other words – to help them in preventing
private information entering a public space (which obviates the need to manage privacy
in public). Specific technical solutions for staying private typically utilize anonymization
and pseudonymization, but may also explicitly provide means to define borders between
private and public spaces.
Boundary Regulation and Awareness
In context of smart environments, an example for border management is the virtual wall
proposed by Kapadia et al. (2007), an intuitive mechanism to control the spatial range
of visibility of sensor information. Inhabitants of an environment set up a virtual wall
to decide which information captured by sensors within an environment may be visible
outside the environment, i.e. behind the virtual wall. The wall can be configured to be
opaque or partly respectively completely transparent. For instance a partly transparent
wall could show that and how much persons are in an environment, but not which persons.
The virtual wall is a straightforward concept with a twofold purpose. First, it makes
inhabitants aware of the fact that the real boundary between private and public space
might not match the natural one assumed by physical borders. Second, it provides a
natural metaphor to align it with personal preferences. The virtual wall does not apply
to all aspects of information sharing potentially occurring in smart environments but for
its specific use case it is a commendable solution.
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Figure 3.1: The transparency of a virtual wall decides the visibility of certain
sensor information outside an environment. Source: Kapadia et al. (2007)
Similar to the virtual wall, any solutions promoting intuitive awareness systems help users
in staying private in that they are able to distinguish private from public spaces and thus
not accidentally reveal personal information or mistakenly feel their private space invaded
although this is not the case (Beckwith, 2003). For instance EuroPARC’s RAVE, an early
example of a ubiquitous system, used audio notifications, in particular the sound of an
opening door, to notify inhabitants of an environment that some external person is going to
virtually drop by using the environment’s camera (Gaver et al., 1992). Constantly running
cameras in turn may be highlighted by being mounted on self-explanatory objects, e.g. a
cameraman statue (Bellotti & Sellen, 1993).
Anonymization and Pseudonymization
There are several solutions using anonymization and pseudonymization. One noteworthy
example is the decentralized and pseudonym-based context exchange scheme by Evans
et al. (2007). It is designed for a polling-based communication where Bob wants to check
if Alice is in a specific context C. Alice uses her context and identification, and a key
shared with Bob to generate a pseudonym which is then placed in a database accessible
by Bob. He can then check if Alice is in context C (i.e. he must have some assumption
which contexts to ask for). Pseudonyms do not have to be stored centrally but just need
to be accessible by both communication parties. Preferably they are stored in a database
physically bound to a context. Evans et al. primarily focus transport applications but their
scheme may also be used for asynchronous information exchange in smart environments.
It provides a private communication channel but may only be used for scenarios where a
polling-based communication is reasonable.
Al-Muhtadi et al. (2002a,b, 2006) and Kobsa & Schreck (2003) describe anonymization
techniques to authenticate users and to handle user profiles (for user-adapted services) in
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such a way that the infrastructure provider as well as the participating services cannot link
user information to real identities. The common basic concept is to use mix techniques as
originally described by Chaum (1981). An anonymous service authentication scheme using
capability-based authentication and partially blind signatures is given by Konidala et al.
(2005). Beresford & Stajano (2003) apply mix techniques to location-based services where
users interact with services depending on their location but without allowing service-
providers to track individual users. Though, the middleware implementing the mixing
and mediating between services and users has be to be trusted. Nohara et al. (2005) and
Bessler & Jorns (2005) also use a trusted third party (e.g. the wireless carrier of a mobile
user) to allow pseudonymous service interaction. Effectively such third-party–dependent
pseudonymization techniques do not provide completely private communication channels,
but already require users to put some linkable personal information into a public space.
Hence, such solutions only partially help users in staying private. Actually they are special
ways to manage privacy in public.
A worthwhile further reading about technical solutions aiming to protect privacy along
the notion of privacy in private is Wright et al. (2008, section 5.1).
3.3.2 Managing the Publicity of Information
Whenever the usage of a service requires to put linkable personal information into a public
space (where public does not mean general public but a certain set of other persons or
entities), users face the problem of managing privacy in public. Basically this means to
regulate access to published information as well as altering or revoking it. Hence, technical
solutions for managing privacy in public have to provide mechanisms to express privacy
preferences which regulate information access as well as mechanisms to enforce these pref-
erences. Different but often combined concepts are used to accomplish this. Information
receiver accessing and processing personal information may provide policies how and for
which purpose information is used. In turn, users define preferences (i.e. rules) which are
mapped to such policies in order to decide information disclosure. Another concept is
that users express privacy preferences by defining context-based rules. To specify the ac-
tual set of information to disclose, identity-management systems are a common approach.
Abstract roles often are also used to categorize information receiver, let it be institutions
or natural persons. Finally, personal agents, information management repositories and
audit mechanisms are used to enforce disclosure preferences. The subsequently reviewed
technical solutions demonstrate the application of these these concepts.
Concerning privacy policies, Langheinrich (2002) describes pawS, a privacy management
system using Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) (W3C, 2002b) and P3P Preference
Exchange Language (APPEL) (W3C, 2002a). Originally these languages have been de-
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of PawS, a P3P-based privacy management system for
ubiquitous computing environments. Services and devices in an environment an-
nounce their privacy policies while a user’s personal assistant sets up the services to
align them with configured privacy preferences. Source: Langheinrich (2002).
signed for web privacy management. Langheinrich introduces some extensions for special
requirements in ubiquitous computing scenarios. Environment services use P3P to an-
nounce how they handle personal information. In turn users can specify personal prefer-
ences using APPEL. Preferences and policies may then be used to decide which informa-
tion is disclosed to or captured by the environment. Services provide their policies either
implicitly on service interaction or periodically with so called privacy beacons.
Myles et al. (2003) describe a policy-based approach for exchanging location information.
A central component, the location server, keeps location information of users and handles
their distribution. Information requesters have to specify a usage purpose for a location
request. Users are able to setup validators which get contacted by the location server
before any location information is disclosed. Validators are configured with rule templates
which decide for whom and for which purpose a location may be disclosed.
User-friendly interfaces to set up preferences to negotiate information disclosure with re-
gard to policies are a crucial requirement for the efficiency of such solutions. Especially
P3P and APPEL are not suitable for direct user interaction but require appropriate tools
to set up preferences. Even for website-related privacy management only, this issue is still
subject of research (Cranor et al., 2006; Besmer et al., 2010). In ubiquitous computing
environments the lack of suitable tools is even worse. In any case, cooperative policy
authors are required. Pollach (2007) claims that policies for institutional information ex-
change in practice often are compiled to protect institutions from legal issues – instead of
supporting actual privacy needs of users. For instance they often use ambiguous or down-
playing terms to obfuscate actual collection and usage of information. To set up rules
for the validators used in the location sharing system presented by Myles et al., users are
provided with rule templates representing common disclosure patterns. Still, it is likely
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Figure 3.3: Role-based information disclosure control using the “Privacy Man-
ager”. Source: Lederer et al. (2003a).
that such precompiled template repositories are no practical solution for managing general
information exchanged in smart environments. Some researches propose to use learning
methods to formally conceptualize privacy preferences (Saleh et al., 2007; Zhang et al.,
2007). However, both still require users to abstract privacy preferences in advance in that
information receiver as well as the set of disclosed information must be described using
roles, identities or generalized linear degrees of disclosure accuracy.
An illustrative example for identity-based privacy management is the Privacy Manager
presented by Lederer et al. (2003b). Here users define a set of faces and control the
disclosure of personal information by linking information recipients, situations and faces
(see figure 3.3). Every face describes a subset of personal information or a degree of
information accuracy to disclose. Related approaches are given by Jendricke et al. (2002),
Clauß et al. (2002), and Maibaum et al. (2002). The basic common idea is to abstract a
specific set of personal information to a role or identity, e.g. “anonymous”, “private”, “job”,
or “public”. Roles are supposed to provide an easy way of managing personal information.
However, role concepts always conflict between simple but too general and subtle but
too complex. Indeed Lederer highlights this problem of generality in a subsequent work
(Lederer et al., 2004). The tension between abstraction and specialization also applies to
information recipients modeled as abstract personae, e.g. “friend” or “employer”.
The disclosure management solutions described above rely on social or legal regulations
and audit (Dekker et al., 2007) to ensure that disclosed information is handled according
to a users stated preferences respectively a receiver’s stated policy. The Confab toolkit,
a privacy management solution given by Hong & Landay (2004) technically enforces a
proper handling. Here personal information is organized in so called info spaces. For
instance an individual’s info space could contain a current location and activity. Info spaces
are managed by servers which run on user-owned devices. Any information exchange is
handled by these servers, i.e. if two parties share some information, both must use an
info space server for sharing. The rationale is that information items in info spaces are
annotated with privacy tags which describe under which conditions an information owner
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Figure 3.4: Interaction of info spaces in Confab. Personal information items are
annotated with privacy tags to regulate the access and processing of these items.
Information exchange is managed by info spaces which recognize and enforce these
annotations. Source: Hong & Landay (2004).
is willing to disclose the information. Information requests as well as information items
(including privacy annotations) are encoded in a Confab-specific XML dialect providing
any information needed for automatic data handling. Confab supports pessimistic, on-
demand, and optimistic disclosure control. For pessimistic control, users may define precise
conditions by whom, in which context, for what purpose and possibly how long an item
may be accessed. In case of on-demand control, an information owner is requested to
provide an acknowledgment whenever a corresponding item from her info space is queried.
Optimistic control just logs any access while possibly raising an alarm event when certain
access limits are exceeded. Confab mainly addresses the sharing of context information
whose capturing and processing tightly integrates with info-spaces. Technically it could
also be used for any other personal information but this would require users to convert
and annotate them so that they can be handled by info space servers. In any case, users
must be trusted not to use communication channels outside of info spaces – otherwise
privacy preferences could not be recognized and enforced. While this may be a practical
assumption for context information (where processing applications are well-integrated with
info spaces), it shouldn’t be assumed for arbitrary other shared information.
Although some of the solutions presented here also address interpersonal information ex-
change, they do not fully support the concept of interpersonal privacy for reasons elabo-
rated in the next section.
3.3.3 Supporting Interpersonal Privacy
As reasoned in section 2.1.3, managing privacy in context of interpersonal interaction has
its specific characteristics. It does not focus information and associated rights but inter-
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action and corresponding social relations, norms, and expectations which drive mutual
information exchange. Obviously a technical assistance for such a privacy management is
more difficult to achieve. The assistance has to respect the dynamic nature of social rela-
tions and context as well as the increased individuality of privacy preferences (compared
to the management of general public access to personal information).
At first glance solutions to manage privacy in public appear to be similarly applicable for
interpersonal privacy management. However, these solutions primarily focus the exchange
of personal information with abstract entities (i.e. institutions or generalized personae)
and generally require users to express their preferences in advance within a given formal
system for expressing privacy preferences (i.e. using identities, policy negotiation prefer-
ences, disclosure rules, or personae). In that there are suited well for scenarios where
users have a rather clear understanding of whom to give which information under which
conditions and where users are able (in both qualitative and quantitative terms) to ex-
press this understanding. However, when a user’s disclosure behavior is more complex
and harder to describe formally, e.g. during social interactions within smart environments,
these concepts aren’t practically. Whichever identities for oneself and personae for others
one has defined, it is likely that they aren’t sufficient. Even if they are, people tend to
move interaction partners seamlessly among different abstract personae (Ackerman, 2000).
Finally, the existing user interfaces hardly incorporate interaction modalities available in
smart environments.
To some extent the mentioned Confab toolkit by Hong & Landay aligns with interpersonal
privacy management. Next to a priori disclosure control it provides dynamic situational
control as well as posterior control. Additionally, it does not abstract information recipi-
ents to generalized roles but allows to express and deploy preferences tailored to specific
interaction partners. Still, information management primarily is focused on asynchronous
access rights (in contrast to direct interaction) and requires information to be exchanged
within the info space driven infrastructure which requires personal information explicitly
integrated into that infrastructure in advance.
A promising approach to automate disclosures while still allowing dynamic handling of
information exchange is given by Prabaker et al. (2007). In their already mentioned
location sharing system (see section 3.2.2) users often failed in expressing precise rules for
disclosing their location to other persons. In contrast, automated disclosures learned using
case-based reasoning (CBR) could improve the general accuracy of disclosure decisions.
Unfortunately they do not provide further details here, e.g. why particularly CBR has been
used and how its performance evolves over time. Further, disclosure decisions are binary
only: hide or show a location – a rather simple model compared to the potential diversity
of information exchanged in smart environments. Another limitation is that disclosure
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rules consider social relations to the information receiver but not the social context of
information exchange – primarily because information is exchanged remotely. The same
applies to the “socially aware access control policy model” by Toninelli et al. (2009).
However, they suggest to assist users in defining disclosure rules based on templates and
additionally allow users to take individual perspectives when defining such rules, i.e. users
may define access rights based on information items, information receivers, or request
situations – whichever parameter comes first in a user’s mindset. Again, the proposed
policy model concentrates on a specific type of personal information, in particular status
information (availability, location). On the other hand, to some extent their policy model
also affects interpersonal privacy management within direct social interactions in smart
environments by controlling when a user’s phone should ring or not, depending on the
caller and the current context. The authors do not explicitly highlight it, but privacy
management in this case is twofold. First, it controls information exchange with a caller.
Second, it controls the callee’s self-representation to social interaction partners by deciding
if to interrupt an interaction in favor of accepting a call.
The bottom line is that interpersonal privacy management with regard to direct interac-
tions in smart environment is addressed rarely. If so, it focuses specific information types
and does not fully support the specific characteristics of interpersonal privacy (primarily
dynamics and individuality) described in section 2.1.3 and the corresponding management
patterns described in section 3.2.2.
3.3.4 Summary and Open Issues
There are a number of technical solutions aiming to solve privacy problems in smart
environments. Mechanisms to support users to practice privacy in private, i.e. being
aware of and controlling borders between private and pubic spaces, are quite mature and
comprehensive. Similarly, various techniques have been proposed to manage privacy in
public – although appropriate user interfaces are still a subject of research. To some
extent the broad coverage of these solutions is due to the fact that there is a significant
overlapping with concepts designed for “traditional” computing scenarios, mainly online
activities. In contrast, solutions explicitly addressing privacy management in direct social
interactions in smart environments are not satisfactory. This open issue is dealt with in
the chapters 5 (Composite Disclosure Control) and 6 (Learning Disclosure Decisions).
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed existing work on privacy in smart environments with regard to gen-
eral guidelines, privacy management patterns, and specific technical solutions to support
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users in practicing privacy. It has been shown that each of these aspects lacks some work
particularly focusing interpersonal privacy management during direct social interactions
in smart environments. As anticipated in section 1.2, the following open issues are tack-
led by this work: (I) consideration of social aspects in interpersonal privacy management
and resulting patterns in information disclosure decisions, (II) suitable disclosure control
mechanisms that match these patterns, as well as their orchestration, (III) automating
disclosure control in a user-adaptive but easy to manage fashion, and (IV) general guide-
lines and principles to develop interpersonal privacy sensitive smart environments and to
evaluate corresponding solutions.
4 Information Disclosure Patterns
Smart environments should assist users in handling interpersonal privacy (with respect to
modalities used to communicate information and possible social factors) by automating as
much disclosure decisions as possible while minimizing the steps required to configure the
automatism. Such an assistance obviously needs a certain understanding about how users
practice privacy, i.e. by which patterns it is driven. Section 3.2.2 already presented some
analytical work about patterns of privacy management in interpersonal communication.
However, some questions remain, for instance the impact of a social context to disclosure
decisions. One might have a clear and solid concept of whom to disclose one’s e-mail
address, independent of a social context. In contrast the disclosure of documents in a
meeting may depend on the role one assumes or expectations others have on the meeting
and on oneself. Furthermore, privacy management mechanisms usually assume that a
growing information recipient group implicates a smaller set of disclosed information. This
is a helpful characteristic for an automated disclosure assistance, but does it really apply to
all disclosures? Or do there exist other patterns which may be valuable input to disclosure
assistance mechanisms? It is likely that different patterns exist and that each one motivates
specific disclosure assistance mechanisms.
An obvious approach to investigate these aspects of interpersonal information disclosure
is to observe the disclosure behavior of users in smart environment settings. However,
as those environments still are work in progress (most existing environments are proto-
types in research institutes) and not yet integrated into everyday life it is often impossible
to observe disclosure decisions in real life. Even if it would be possible to observe such
disclosure behavior it is questionable if users are willing to reveal their disclosure deci-
sions because they must be considered as sensitive personal data. An alternative which
circumvents these issues is to capture disclosure decisions by conducting a survey. Here
it is possible to express disclosure situations without necessarily having a productively
used smart environment. Additionally it is easier to respect the sensitivity of disclosure
decisions by providing a reasonable level of anonymity.
This chapter aims to get an understanding of the mentioned aspects of interpersonal
privacy management with the help of a survey system. In that it deals with the specific
issue (I) mentioned in section 1.2. First, section 4.1 presents a way to model disclosure
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decisions, describes which structural information about disclosure habits may be extracted
from a set of disclosure decisions expressed with that model and elaborates resulting
implications for disclosure assistance mechanisms. Subsequently, section 4.2 describes
how to capture disclosure decisions with the help of a survey which applies the model and
evaluation methods from the previous section. It compiles a list of general requirements
such a survey system has to meet and presents DiHabs, a corresponding specific survey
system implementation. Section 4.3 describes the setup and results of an example survey
conducted with the developed survey system and evaluates the results with regard to
implications for disclosure assistance mechanisms in smart environments. Finally, the
findings of these chapter are summarized in section 4.4.
4.1 Modeling and Evaluating Disclosures
This section describes a model to express disclosure decisions during social interactions
in smart environments. Subsequently it elaborates which structural information a collec-
tion of disclosure decisions (represented by that model) provides, which potential privacy
related patterns it reveals, and how these patterns influence disclosure assistance mecha-
nisms. Within the scope of this section the patterns are compiled in an explorative manner.
Their practical relevance is investigated with the help of the survey system presented in
the next section. Their contribution to automating disclosures is evaluated in chapter 6.
4.1.1 Disclosure Model
The main factors driving interpersonal information disclosure are the disclosure situation
and information recipients which usually are other persons one interacts with in an en-
vironment. A disclosure situation may be a meeting in room X in context of project Y
or coffee break chatting in Bob’s office, i.e. a combination of physical and social context.
Especially in smart environments there is a third important factor influencing disclosure
decisions: the modality used to mediate information. For instance a document might be
displayed on a shared large screen or on devices of other persons in the room. In the latter
case information recipients are able to view the document more thoroughly compared to
a limited time display on a shared screen. The modality may also encode constraints how
information recipients may use a disclosed information (e.g. a temporal access limits).
Based on this an interpersonal information disclosure within smart environment scenarios
may be modeled by the following mapping τ :
τ : S ×M × P(P )→ P(I) (4.1)
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where S is a set of situations,M a set of disclosure modalities, P a set of persons potentially
present within the environment and I a set of possible personal information items to
disclose (e.g. documents, contact information, etc.). P(X) denotes the powerset of X. The
precise content of S and M depend on a specific smart environment domain. Additionally
S is likely to be specific to individual users, depending on how they perceive a situation
Adams (2000). For now specific values of S andM are not elaborated in detail but assumed
to be aggregated high-level parameters. This chapter puts the main focus on disclosure
patterns yielded by relations between P(P ) and P(I).
Alternative Models
Next to this model one can also think of alternative formalisms. For instance a state
machine could be used to express states of disclosures with contextual conditions when to
move from one state to another. This allows to express disclosure sequences (e.g. if one
communicates information A, and if then event X happens, information B is exchanged
next). Furthermore a memorization model could be used to encode which interaction
partner already received an information item in the past in order to incrementally set up
a database of access rights. However, state machine models quickly get very complex and
bear the risk of overfitting as the specific dependency of a prior to a new disclosure situation
reduces the generality of individual situations. The dependency on past situations, which
even more applies to memorization models, also conflicts with the dynamics of privacy
preferences in social interactions.
In contrast, the presented model aligns well with the characteristics of privacy manage-
ment when interacting with other persons in smart environments. It represents highly
dynamic decisions which primarily depend on the current setting (i.e. they do not only
depend on information items and receivers and they mostly are independent from previ-
ous interactions). The model also allows to express disclosures triggered by an explicit
request of an interaction partner (information is pulled by a receiver) as well as triggered
by an impersonal event of the environment, e.g. entering the environment or start of a
meeting (information pushed by the owner). Especially the latter case is quite common in
collaboration-oriented smart environments where subjects rather contribute than request
documents. In that the chosen model matches the claim of Palen & Dourish that “[inter-
personal] privacy management is a dynamic response to circumstance rather than a static
enforcement of rules” (2003).
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4.1.2 Evaluation and Implications
Disclosure decisions made by a person constitute a subset of the graph of τ . It is possible
to aggregate various structural information about disclosure decisions from such a subset.
Patterns deduced from that structural information may be used to choose appropriate
disclosure control methods and to enhance automatic disclosure mechanisms (as shown in
chapters 5 and 6). For now only subsets of the graph of τ with a fixed situation s ∈ S and
a fixed modality m ∈M are considered, i.e. only the persons and disclosures vary. Which
additional structural information may be aggregated from graph subsets with varying s
and m is discussed at the end of section 4.1.2. Subsequently such a subset of the graph
of τ is referred to as T . This set represents the disclosure decisions made by a particular
person and thus expresses this person’s disclosure behavior:
T :=

(s,m, g1, τ(s,m, g1)), . . . , (s,m, gn, τ(s,m, gn))

with s ∈ S, m ∈M and gi ∈ P(P ) while i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∧ i ̸= j ⇒ gi ̸= gj . For this specific
sub-graph of τ , D forms the set of disclosed information item sets only:
D :=

τ(s,m, g1), . . . , τ(s,m, gn)

Similar G refers to the person groups1 only:
G :=

g1, . . . , gn

Note that |D| ≤ |G| = |T |. With reference to T , D and G one can extract various infor-
mation which describe different patterns of privacy preferences. The following subsections
elaborate these patterns and deduce implications for information disclosure assistance
mechanisms.
Number of Unique Disclosures
The size of the set D, which is at least 1 and at most min(|T |, |P(I)|), is a simple metric
for the complexity of disclosure decisions. A small number of unique disclosures indicate
a rather simple privacy preferences concept while many unique disclosures display a more
sophisticated management of personal information. For instance a person who only dis-
tinguishes professional and private situations respectively information and who does not
consider other aspects when deciding a disclosure is likely to generate only a few unique
disclosures, two in an extreme case (private and public information). In contrast, someone
who is very eager in disclosing very specific information sets based on a variety of factors
1In this chapter the term group does not denote a mathematical group but is used informally as in
common language, i.e. in context of persons it actually refers to a set of persons.
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(e.g. the precise constellation of persons receiving the information and multiple character-
istics of the current situation), the resulting number of unique disclosures is comparatively
high, potentially similar to the number of disclosure decision instances |T |. For only a few
unique disclosures it may be possible to express the underlying disclosure behavior with a
small, manageable set of rules. When there is a high number of unique disclosures, rules
easily get very complex so that most users are not able or willing to express and main-
tain them. Automating disclosures still may be possible using machine learning based
approaches, depending on the next structural parameter.
Number of Uses of Individual Disclosures
Even persons who make rather specific disclosure decisions which are closely related to
various context information and thus result in a high number of unique disclosures may
repeatedly disclose one or a few general purpose information sets in different situations.
Examples are generic contact data or a default set of slides one shows at different presen-
tations. A disclosure behavior which results in a repeated use of one disclosure allows an
assistance mechanism to utilize this as a fallback disclosure. A high number of occurrences
of individual disclosures in general increases the input machine learning driven assistance
mechanisms have to conceptualize disclosure behavior. In contrast, if all disclosures are
used only once or a few times, an automated disclosure mechanism lacks sufficient infor-
mation to model disclosure decisions.
Poset Characteristics of D
Doc. X
Doc. A
Doc. X
Doc. B
Doc. X
∈ I
∈ D
D ⊆ P(I)
Figure 4.1: Poset graph representation of a set of disclosures D.
The set of disclosures D is a subset of P(I) and thus it
forms a poset (partially ordered set) with regard to the
binary relation ⊆ (see figure 4.1). The width of the poset
(i.e. the cardinality of the poset’s maximum antichain2)
is another structural information describing the complex-
ity of disclosure decisions. For instance a totally ordered
disclosure set D has a poset width of 1 and indicates a
simple linear privacy concept. In contrast, a D with a
poset width equal to |D| indicates quite complex privacy
preferences where individual disclosures do not relate to each other (with regard to set
comparability). A totally ordered set of disclosures mean that in every situation, the set of
information to disclose either is identical, a superset or a subset of another set of disclosed
information. More illustrative this means that disclosures move along one path. This fact
2An antichain is a subset of a poset in which any two elements are incomparable. A maximum antichain
is an antichain with a cardinality at least as large as every other antichain.
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a) one main path b) few major paths c) many scattered short paths
Figure 4.2: Possible disclosure graphs, given by the transitive reduction of the
poset D. Disclosures may move along one or a few main paths (a,b) but may also
miss any major paths (c).
greatly simplifies automated disclosures, let it be rules defined by users or machine learn-
ing based approaches. To some extent this is also valid for posets with a width greater
than one. Each maximal chain3 in a poset can be seen as an individual disclosure path.
The smaller the poset width and the greater the lengths of the maximal chains, the more
applies the pattern that disclosures move along a few certain major paths.
Different path structures are illustrated in figure 4.2. A practical example for one main
path like 4.2.a is when a person decides disclosures solely based on how close relationships
to information recipients are, e.g. ranging from intimate to stranger. Disclosures reflect
this linear structure, e.g. they may range from all to no information. A scattered graph
like 4.2.c could result from disclosure decisions driven by a variety of orthogonal factors
which, in composition, have no linear order. For instance, when assessing information
recipients not only on individual relationships but also on their constellation as a group
and on social roles (of oneself and others), disclosed information sets tend to be distinct
and pairwise incomparable. A small number of main paths like in graph 4.2.b could result
from a mainly relationship driven disclosure behavior with minor influence of other factors,
e.g. if one acts in a professional or private role.
The existence of major disclosure paths reduces the number of possible disclosures and thus
simplifies user defined disclosure rules or increases the chance that disclosures successfully
get predicted by machine learning driven assistance mechanisms.
3A maximal chain is a totally ordered subset of a poset where no elements can be added without loosing
the property of being totally ordered.
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Order Mapping of Groups and Disclosures
Similar to D, the set of all person groups1 G forms a poset. Inspecting and comparing
order relations in both D and G reveals if greater person sets either implicate smaller sets
of disclosed information items (i.e. for a specific situation s and modality m the disclosure
function τ is order-reversing, or antitone, with respect to its person set argument), if the
opposite is true (τ is order-preserving, or isotone), if it results in identical sets of disclosed
information items (τ is order-ignoring, or constant), or if it does not implicate any subset
relations between the corresponding disclosed information item sets (τ is order-loosing).
Figure 4.3 illustrates these types of order mappings.
Based on the set of disclosure decision instances T , the number of occurrences of each
type of order mapping formally can be described as follows. Let R be the set of disclo-
sure decision instance pairs for which the subset relation applies to their person group1
arguments:
R :=

(s,m, g1, τ(s,m, g1)), (s,m, g2, τ(s,m, g2))
 ∈ T × T | g1 ⊂ g2 (4.2)
Then Rp, Rr, Ri and Rl are defined as the sets of disclosure decision pairs with a preserving,
reversing, ignoring, respectively loosing order mapping:
Rp := {(t1, t2) ∈ R | π4(t1) ⊂ π4(t2)}
Rr := {(t1, t2) ∈ R | π4(t1) ⊃ π4(t2)}
Ri := {(t1, t2) ∈ R | π4(t1) = π4(t2)}
Rl := {(t1, t2) ∈ R | π4(t1) ∥ π4(t2)}
Here πn(t) projects to the n-th element in tuple t and ∥ denotes the relation of unequal
sets where neither one is a subset of the other, i.e. A ∥ B ⇔ A ̸⊆ B ∧A ̸⊇ B.
Most privacy management systems assume an order-reversing pattern, that is a greater
information recipient group results in a smaller set of disclosed information. In that case
most pairs of disclosure decisions, i.e. elements from R, are contained in Rr. While this
is true for many cases there also may exist situations where contradicting relations make
sense. For instance when interacting with a greater group of persons one might decide to
disclose more information in reply to growing expectations within the social context. This
illustrates the fact that privacy not only is about hiding information but about providing
an appropriate set of information to reach a desired level of social participation (see section
2.1.3). Knowing if disclosures generally either are order-reversing, order-preserving, order-
ignoring, order-loosing, or if there is no consistent order mapping, is a valuable input for
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b) order-ignoring
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Figure 4.3: Order mapping types of person sets and corresponding sets of disclosed
information item. Order-reversing disclosures, for instance, reflect the pattern that
more recipients implicate less information. Order-preserving disclosures may re-
sult from the intention that a broader audience expects a more comprehensive set
of information. Order-loosing disclosures may be given when distinct information
recipient groups are supposed to get specific individual sets of information.
an disclosure assistance mechanism. It potentially limits the number of possible disclosure
predictions in that only those which do not break order mappings of their set-related
neighbors need to be considered.
Other Privacy Related Characteristics
Until now only disclosure decision instances for a fixed situation s ∈ S and a fixed modality
m ∈M have been evaluated. Looking at varying situations and modalities one can extract
further information. However, as the contents of S and M are specific to certain domains
of interpersonal information disclosure and because a semantic ascertainment of S is a
complex field of research on its own and heavily depends on individual users, patterns
related to varying S and M are not yet considered here (nevertheless section 6.1 provides
specific examples of situations and modalities). Of course, in case it is possible to define
orders on S and M it is interesting to investigate order mappings as it has been done
for the person set argument. Possible orders on modalities may be given by the duration
information is visible or by permissions to read, edit or overwrite information items.
Summary
Summarized the structural information gained from a set of disclosure decision instances
reveals the following patterns: 1) general complexity of disclosure behavior based on the
number of unique disclosures, 2) occurrence of general purpose or main disclosure, 3) ex-
istence of major disclosure paths indicating confidentiality scales, and 4) general types of
order mapping between person groups and disclosed sets of information.
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These patterns are utilized by components of the composite disclosure control system
presented in chapter 5 and by a novel machine learning method presented in chapter 6.
As a short preview, they serve the following purposes: The first two patterns may be used
to assess if automatic disclosures in general and manual disclosure rules in particular are
suitable to handle a user’s disclosure behavior. A low number of unique disclosures and
the existence of general purpose disclosures increase the performance and maintainability
of automated decision components. This knowledge allows users to be offered sensible
control methods, suitable for their privacy preferences. The third pattern, major disclosure
paths, limits the possible decisions a machine learning based component has to consider.
A learning component which recognizes such paths potentially performs better than one
ignoring them. The forth pattern, set order mappings, also helps to limit possible decisions
a machine learning component has to regard in that only predictions which do not break
order mappings of their set-related neighbors need to be taken into account. Additionally
order-mapping–based patterns are used to predict disclosures by interpolations. In case
no automatic decision is possible, patterns 2 to 4 provide hints for meaningful disclosure
suggestions shown to a user for an explicit manual decision. Finally all patterns come into
action for validating disclosures predicted by a machine learning mechanism.
4.2 Capturing Disclosure Decisions
As reasoned in the chapter’s introduction capturing disclosure decisions in the wild often
is not possible. An alternative is to capture such decisions using a survey which allows
to express disclosure situations without necessarily having a productively used smart en-
vironment and which makes it easier to respect the sensitivity of disclosure decisions by
providing a reasonable level of anonymity. The following subsection compiles a generic list
of requirements for a survey system supposed to capture disclosure decisions in context
of social interaction. Afterwards a specific survey system implementation which follows
these requirements is presented.
4.2.1 Survey Requirements
Capturing privacy preferences respectively disclosure decisions for analysis purposes is a
problematic issue because those preferences must be considered private too. In order to
gain knowledge about privacy preferences one has to ensure that users reveal their real
preferences and not those they would reveal to others (i.e. the persons conducting the
survey) or those they feel to be expected of them. Consequently the survey system needs
to decouple structural information from identifying content in privacy preferences and it
needs to credibly communicate this fact to participants.
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Another problem a survey system has to catch is that of hypothetical privacy preferences.
That is if participants are asked for their preferences out of a context they can map to
personal experiences. Especially when capturing privacy preferences related to smart envi-
ronment scenarios this is a difficult challenge as those environments often have a visionary
character and might not be portable to situations participants experienced in real life.
More precise this means that questions in the survey has to refer to situations, modalities,
persons and information items users are familiar with. Consequently one cannot compile
a static list of questions to capture privacy preferences. Instead questions have to be
adapted dynamically to the individual background of participants.
A third requirement is to be as less suggestive as possible when asking survey participants
about their disclosure habits. Looking at existing privacy management systems, often the
management system itself forces to express preferences in a specific structure, for instance
to classify potential information recipients and disclosure situations into (possibly limited)
groups and to describe disclosure rules according to these groups. This might not reflect
real preferences and it is important not to motivate any specific pattern.
Finally, as smart environments often are designed for domain specific use cases, the survey
system needs to be able to address privacy preferences specific for that use cases. For
instance information communicated in environments designed for entertainment purposes
differs from those designed to assist collaborative work, e.g. smart meeting rooms. A
survey system to understand privacy preferences related to a specific smart environment
domain needs to be adjustable for that specific domain.
Summarized a survey system for capturing user privacy preferences needs to 1) anonymize
captured privacy preferences, 2) adapt questions to personal background of participants,
3) allow participants to express privacy preferences independent of a formalism which sug-
gests specific patterns of preferences, and 4) be adjustable for different smart environment
domains.
4.2.2 DiHabs Survey System
Following the requirements in the previous section and according to the disclosure model-
ing and evaluation approach described in section 4.1 the online survey system DiHabs4,
which captures and evaluates disclosure habits, has been developed. Online interviews are
preferable to traditional pen and paper based questionnaires because questionnaires need
to be customized to individual participants. One could still do dynamically adapted verbal
4The software and data related to this system is available at the Open Science Repository of the Com-
puter Science Department at Rostock University: http://opsci.informatik.uni-rostock.de/index.
php/DiHabs. Further information can be found in appendix A.
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Figure 4.4: Condensed screenshot of the third part of an interview, asking for
which information to disclose in context of a specific situation and group of persons.
Person names and information items have been given by the participant in the first
two parts of the interview.
interviews but this makes it hard to reproduce and analyze survey results. Additionally
that would still conflict with the requirement to only gather anonymized information as an
analogue anonymization layer between participants and interviewers seems highly imprac-
ticable. Finally, online (browser based) interviews5 allow participants to answer questions
at their home or office, i.e. at a familiar location which reduces the feeling of being observed
and which increases the willingness to provide private privacy preferences.
DiHabs interviews are structured in three parts. As mentioned above privacy is mainly
considered from a social point of view. For that reason information about the social envi-
ronment of participants is needed. The first part of the interview collects this information
by asking participants to name some persons from their social environment, including fam-
ily, friends, colleagues and so on. The second part requests participants to specify a set of
personal information items for different information types. For instance the information
items mobile, home, office and skype may be possible inputs for the information type phone
number. Participants are not asked to enter real values (e.g. actual phone numbers) but
5Traditionally the term interview refers to face-to-face consultations. Within this work it used as a
shortcut for online interviews.
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descriptive names (e.g. mobile). The purpose of these two first parts of an interview is not
to collect the entered information but to use it for questions about information disclosure
in the third part of the interview in order to meet the second and third requirement from
section 4.2.1. Without the information participants provide in the first two parts, inter-
viewers had either to guess persons and information items relevant for participants (which
might be wrong in that participants are not able to map them to personal experiences) or
they had to use generic roles for persons and information items (which tends to be sug-
gestive). The third part of an interview captures information disclosure decisions, i.e. this
part provides the actual data to be surveyed. Based on the given person names a set of
person groups1 is generated. For each generated group participants are asked to decide the
disclosure of their information concerning specific situations and disclosure effects (details
on this are given in section 4.2.2). Figure 4.4 is a condensed and annotated screenshot of
a disclosure question from the example survey described in section 4.3.
To meet the first requirement from section 4.2.1 (anonymize personal identifying infor-
mation) DiHabs does not record actual person names and information item names. The
survey to conduct with DiHabs strive for structural knowledge only. Hence, it is sufficient
to store person and item names internally as sequential numbers, i.e. the first person name
is represented as a 1, the second as a 2 and so on. Item names are handled similarly. This
anonymous representation does not reduce the structural information one can retrieve
from interview responses.
Interview Specifications
In order to be adjustable for specific smart environment domains (see requirement 4 from
section 4.2.1) DiHabs makes it easy to compile domain specific interviews. An interview
specification consists of some general attributes and multiple sections for specific types of
personal information. The general attributes specify how many persons should be given
by participants and which groups of these persons should be used for disclosure questions
(third part of the interview). Each type of personal information results in an information
type section as seen in figure 4.4. Table 4.1 and 4.2 describe the most important attributes
which make up a specific interview. It is also possible to describe multiple interviews and
let DiHabs choose one randomly for each participant. This allows to validate interviews
regarding suggestive phrases by, for instance, using slightly different situation descriptions
and comparing result differences in participant answers. More details and an example
interview specification can be found in appendix A.
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Attribute Description and example value
npersons Minimum and maximum number of persons participants may specify. Ex-
ample: (10,20)
groups Person groups to ask disclosures for, specified as index sets. Indices refer
to names provided by participants in the first part of the interview. May
be generated randomly. Example: [(1), (2), (1,2), (1,3,4), . . . ]
ngdups Number of groups to use twice to check for inconsistencies in answers.
Example: 2
start, finish Introduction and closing text for the interview. Example: Welcome to . . .
Table 4.1: General interview attributes.
Attribute Description and example value
name Name of the type used in interview questions. Example: Taste in music
nvalues min,
nvalues max
Minimum and maximum number of information items participants may
specify. Example: 5, 10
desc input Descriptive text to use when asking participants to enter exemplary items.
Example: Please specify some artists or albums of your music library. Ideally
your selection reflects a broad spectrum of your taste in music . . .
desc select Text describing a situation (incl. social context and modalities) in which
information of this type might get disclosed (specifying multiple situations
is possible). Example: Tonight you’re meeting for a get-together . . . Everyone
is asked to contribute some music. What’s your choice?
Table 4.2: Attributes for specific information types.
Result Analysis
For each information type and situation used in an interview, DiHabs aggregates responses
and extracts structural information and inferable privacy characteristics as described in
section 4.1.2. DiHabs uses some of them to draw graphs and generate plots which help to
validate and understand the aggregated structural information about privacy preferences
in a more illustrative fashion. Section 4.3 describes the result analysis more practically
based on the outcome of an example survey.
Implementation Details
DiHabs is implemented as a web application. A thoroughly description of DiHabs’s
implementation as well as an exemplary complete interview specification can be found in
appendix A. However, one implementation detail to mention here is how DiHabs ensures
to meet requirement 1 from section 4.2.1 (respect the privacy of privacy preferences).
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Person and information item names given by participants in the first two interview parts
must be considered as sensitive and identifying data. As described above these names
internally are replaced by their index numbers which ensures that finally stored results are
free of identifying data. To prevent sensitive data from being saved server-side as part of
session data, person and item names are stored as cookies in participant’s browsers. Of
course these names still reach the server but there they only exist in volatile memory during
a request-response cycle. This ensures that interrupted sessions or server-side crashes do
not accidentally leak personal data from participants.
4.3 Example Survey
This sections presents the result of an exemplary survey conducted with DiHabs. The
purpose of this survey was to validate the disclosure patterns described in section 4.1.2
and to gain first insights about related implications for disclosure assistance mechanisms.
Additionally it was supposed to generally evaluate the developed survey systemDiHabs.
4.3.1 Survey Setup
This survey has been done with 74 participants, students and coworkers at the author’s
institute. Though DiHabs is an online survey system, interviewers accompanied the first
16 participants in order to assist in possibly unclear questions and to retrieve direct feed-
back on how to improve interviews. Participants still did the survey in front of their own
computers, hidden from the eyes of the interviewer. The feedback of these 16 accompa-
nied interviews has been used to improve the survey interface with regard to usability and
privacy concerns so that subsequent interviews may be conducted unattended. Hence,
the remaining 58 participants did the survey completely online. Results from the first 16
and the remaining interviews did not reveal obvious differences, except that online-only
interviews had to be filtered to exclude interviews obviously not taken seriously. Such
interviews could be detected by the time participants spent on individual disclosure deci-
sions. A regular participant usually allowed at least 25 seconds for an answer, often more.
Interviews where this time constraint did not apply have been excluded. Finally there
were 59 suitable interviews left.
Participants have been asked to decide the disclosure of 5 different information types:
location, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, taste in music and taste in movies. For the
first three types they have been asked for their disclosure in general (i.e. the disclosure
question did not involve S and M , see section 4.1.1). Disclosures for the last two types
were asked in context of a specific situation and modality. For instance participants were
asked to decide the disclosure of a subset of their music library in case they are respon-
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sible for the background music of a get-together. Similarly participants had to select
possible movies to watch with a certain group of persons. Though this thesis primarily
deals with collaboration oriented smart environments, the conducted survey uses rather
technology-independent situations and modalities because most, if not all, of the partici-
pants already experienced similar situation. Nevertheless the selected disclosure situations
already revealed different privacy patterns which may exist similarly in collaborative smart
environment scenarios.
The interview specification used for the survey as well as a corresponding screenshot-based
walk through the resulting online interview can be found in the appendix section A.4.
4.3.2 Results
This subsection presents and discusses the survey results, with regard to the structural
information and patterns elaborated in section 4.1.2.
Figure 4.5 illustrates how many participants provided specific numbers of unique disclo-
sures. The results show that the information types phone and location, which have been
asked for without a reference to a specific situation and modality, in most cases result
in 5 or less distinct disclosures. In contrast requests for music and movie taste related
information resulted in 4 to 8 unique disclosures in the majority of cases. This shows that
privacy management in context of a specific situation (when the disclosed information
is a significant element of a social interaction) is more complex. On the other side pri-
vacy preferences for location and contact information may be expressed using a small and
maintainable set of identities (e.g. public, business and private contact information)6.
Figure 4.6 displays the widths of the poset given by the set of all disclosures respectively
how many interviews resulted in which width. These results comply with the findings based
on the number of unique disclosures. It shows that most phone and location information
disclosures move along one or two paths. In contrast disclosure sets for themusic andmovie
taste related questions often have a greater width, i.e. they have a higher number of order-
unrelated disclosures and indicate a more sophisticated underlying privacy concept.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate the occurrences of the different order mapping types. Specifi-
cally, figure 4.7 shows for how many participants a certain order mapping type occurred in
the majority of cases. It shows that there is no general order mapping type which is valid
6Actually the differences may originate in both information type and situation, i.e. the results do not
indicate a correlation between patterns and either information type or situatiuon alone. However, this bias
of the experimental setting is less relevant here since not a specific correlation but the practical relevance
of patterns in general was the main objective of the survey.
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Figure 4.5: Possible numbers of unique disclosures per information type (respec-
tively situation) and the number of participants for which disclosures resulted in
each of these numbers.
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Figure 4.6: Possible poset widths per information type (respectively situation) and
the number of participants for which disclosures resulted in each of these widths.
The asterisk catches all widths greater than 5.
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Figure 4.7: Possible order mapping types per information type (respectively situ-
ation) and the number of participants for which at least a certain number of disclo-
sure decision pairs (referring to the set R from section 4.1.2) have the corresponding
type. In other words, these plots illustrate for how many participants a certain order
mapping type occurred in the majority (more than 50%, 66%, or 75%) of cases.
for all 59 participants. Though there are users who generally follow an order-reversing
or order-ignoring disclosure behavior, a few disclose information in an order-preserving or
order-loosing manner. In any case there is a significant portion of participants who follow
no general order mapping type (depending on information type and definition of majority,
this significant portion ranges from roughly 30% to 90%). These results do not support
the intuitive expectation that greater information recipient groups implicate smaller sets
of disclosed information. Instead they highlight that disclosure assistance mechanisms not
only need to be designed depending on information types and disclosure situations but
also with regard to individual behavior of users. Figure 4.8 provides another view about
the occurrences of order mapping types. It shows the distribution of mapping type oc-
currence numbers among all 59 participants. For most participants, order-reversing and
order-ignoring mappings occur most often but for information type music and movies this
difference diminishes. This corresponds with the results displayed in figures 4.5 and 4.6.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter elaborated patterns of privacy management in social interactions. The pat-
terns are based on structural information gained from the mapping of information recipient
groups to disclosed sets of information items. The practical existence of the theoretical
patterns have been backed up by an online survey which captured disclosure decisions
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Figure 4.8: Possible order mapping types per information type (respectively situ-
ation) and the number of their occurrences per participant, displayed as box plots
with whiskers representing the highest and lowest values within the 1.5 interquartile
range (IQR) and outliers (+).
for different situations and information types. The survey results showed that no single
pattern applies to all (or most) users. Instead the usage of patterns significantly varies
among information types (and disclosure situation) as well as individual users.
The contribution of this chapter is an exploratory one in that it provided novel views
on how users manage their personal information. It solved a part of issue (I) by analyz-
ing structural relations between information receivers and information items. However,
this chapter only briefly touched how the patterns help in developing privacy manage-
ment mechanisms for smart environments. These aspects are part of the following two
chapters.
5 Composite Disclosure Control
Users practice privacy individually. Personal needs and perceptions result in different pat-
terns of information disclosure, as shown by previous work (see section 3.2) and chapter
4. Even a specific user might have different strategies how to manage her information,
depending on the information type and situation of disclosure. As shown in the previous
chapter, disclosure patterns may be rather simple, easily to express by a small set of rules,
or they may be more complex, so that users cannot express them formally. Still, it may be
possible to assist users in abstracting their privacy preferences, but it is also possible that
disclosure decisions do not follow a concept which can be expressed within a formal sys-
tem: In that case ad hoc user decisions are the only way to manage disclosures accurately.
Hence – picking up issue (II) from section 1.2 – users should have the option to utilize
multiple mechanisms to express and enforce information disclosure. Ideally, a disclosure
management solution adapts to individual users in that it automatically suggests proper
mechanisms to control their information. However, a composition of multiple disclosure
control techniques does not only allow to choose an optimal one for certain disclosure
patterns. It can also be used to let different mechanisms interfere with each other. For
instance ad hoc decisions can be used to learn disclosure decisions or to assist users in
setting up manual disclosure rules. Similarly, a community based disclosure recommenda-
tion system can be used to back up disclosure predictions of a learning based mechanism
or to provide sensible defaults for ad hoc decisions. Last but not least, the decision which
information to disclose can be made by staging different components. Consequently, com-
bined multiple disclosure mechanisms have two main benefits, they provide user-adapted
control techniques and complement each other.
The main challenges in realizing such an approach are how to integrate the different
mechanisms in terms of mutual interaction and supplementation as well as how to choose
appropriate default mechanisms. This chapter deals with these challenges. First, section
5.1 presents and discusses different mechanisms that can be used to manage the disclosure
of personal information. Afterwards, section 5.2 describes how these mechanisms can be
combined and integrated with each other to a composite disclosure control system.
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5.1 Components
Managing the communication and disclosure of personal information (or information in
general) can be done in a variety of ways, each targeting specific information types, individ-
ual user needs, and modalities to enforce information exchange policies. Some mechanisms
are not directly related to privacy management but still make sense to be used to decide
the disclosure of personal information.
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Figure 5.1: Overview of a composite disclosure control. Several components con-
tribute to the decision which information to disclose in a situation with specific
disclosure modalities and information recipients. The components are arranged ac-
cording to their required management workload and potential accuracy in deciding
disclosures in compliance with a user’s actually intended disclosure decision.
Figure 5.1 provides an overview about different approaches to control the communication
of information. These approaches can be arranged according to the workload demanded
from users and their degree of accurately expressing actual disclosure intentions. For
instance formally expressed rules, ad hoc user decisions as well as arbitrary actions linked
to information disclosure have the potential to completely match actual user intentions.
In contrast, a learning-based automatic disclosure system as well as more impersonal
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recommender systems are not able to always correctly model the information exchange
preferences of a specific individual.
At first sight it seems that regular actions with implicit information disclosures are the
method of choice. However, as always each method has certain shortcomings and specific
advantages. The following sections elaborate these special characteristics.
5.1.1 User Decisions
The technically most simple method to control information disclosures are explicit, ad
hoc user decisions. Here users manually decide which information to communicate in the
moment when it is requested. In that the significant advantage of this approach is that
decisions are always correct in terms of current user intentions (assuming a user knows what
she does). A disadvantage is that they demand a user’s attention, potentially distracting
her from actual tasks she wants to perform within a smart environment. User decisions
are the method of choice when other, less obtrusive methods fail or are not available.
Example
Actually current smart environments mostly utilize explicit ad hoc information disclosures
where users are faced with an information request and manually choose the information
to communicate to a service. Consider a meeting where a participant is requested to
show some presentation slides as an example. While the request and distribution may
be automated, there is usually no reasoning mechanism which information from a user is
communicated to the presentation service. Users actively select and push the documents
to display.
5.1.2 Implicit Actions
A disclosure control method which aligns well with the user interface goals of smart en-
vironment are implicit actions. Here privacy control is integrated into already existing
processes. In fact such a disclosure control implements physical metaphors as proposed
by the idea of Internet of Things (IoT). They also are good candidates to follow genres of
disclosures (see section 3.1.3), as long as physical actions map to correspondingly expected
disclosures.
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Example
Straight forward examples of such actions are closing respectively opening a door or a
notebook. In the first case a general room-wide policy may be derived which prohibits the
communication of information exchanged within a room to parties outside of the room.
The notebook example is a more personal action and could be used to generally enable or
disable the disclosure of personal information within a smart environment. Similar actions
are putting a smartphone on a desk with the display turned downwards – the smartphone
then could refuse any information requests by the environment or other persons.
As these examples illustrate, action-based implicit disclosure is an intuitive way to manage
privacy. On the other side it only provides coarse-grained control.
5.1.3 Disclosure Rules
After ad hoc disclosure decisions, precompiled disclosure rules expressing which informa-
tion to communicate to whom under which conditions are the most precise method. Given
that all potential conditions can be sensed and evaluated programmatically, they theoret-
ically are able to completely express the disclosure behavior of an individual. However,
these requirements often are not met in real life. As stated before, privacy is influenced by
a variety of factors, including gut feelings and complex preferences. In that not all factors
can be evaluated using rules and rules easily get too complex to be maintainable or even
expressible by regular users.
Still, within the realms of its capabilities, manually compiled rules are a useful method
to control information disclosure. They are suitable for simple disclosure patterns where
users have clear concept of how to communicate information to whom. Complex disclosure
circumstances usually are not well expressible using rules since they often are not known in
advance and are likely to be insufficient respectively too static. In that rules are a perfect
match for managing rather sensitive information where a disclosure decision primarily
is influenced by the information recipient. In fact the time-consuming compilation and
maintenance of rules are a significant drawback of this approach.
Example
Outside smart environments, an example for a rule system is the Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P) and its companion P3P Preference Exchange Language (APPEL). It
is mainly used to manage which identifying and communicational information users are
willing to hand over to websites. Indeed these systems have been ported to smart envi-
5 Composite Disclosure Control 63
ronment use cases, as presented in section 3.3.2. A more specific example not linked to a
specific system, is a rule which prevents the disclosure of certain documents within a smart
environment whenever a yet unknown person enters the environment. More complex rules
can be arranged by mapping information items to allowed information recipients (which
mimics an access control list).
5.1.4 Learned Disclosure Concepts
Rules theoretically are able to express complex privacy preferences but practically are
hard to maintain. This issue can be balanced by using machine learning techniques which
model repetitive disclosure decisions. Here users do not need to formalize their privacy
preferences manually in advance. Instead preferences are formalized gradually, based on
ad hoc disclosure decisions. This process not only releases users from manually expressing
rules, the input for the modeling mechanism is also given ad hoc on information request,
i.e. at a time when it is easier to estimate potential privacy implications. Additionally
this prevents users from setting up privacy preferences for theoretical disclosure situations
which never occur in practice. Learned disclosure concepts are able to balance the draw-
backs of ad hoc decisions and precompiled rules – more on this follows in the upcoming
section 5.2.
Example
Supposed Bob regularly meets with other persons to work on different projects. Each
project is associated with certain persons participating in meetings and documents shared
within the meeting. This association is a perfect candidate which could be modeled by
a learning mechanism. Compared to rules a learning based approach even gets more
beneficial when more parameters are included in disclosure decisions, e.g. in which room
or at which time a meeting takes place.
5.1.5 Recommendations
Recommendation systems generally are not directly linked to the management of private
information. Instead they often are used to collaboratively assess the value or trustwor-
thiness of entities (e.g. persons, services, or organizations). Consider product reviews or
seller ratings on shopping related sites as examples. Still, the general concept may also
be used to let a community vote for information sharing practices when interacting with
smart environment services. Obviously a group of individuals cannot agree on which infor-
mation items a particular individual should share via a certain service. However, a more
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coarse grained recommendation can be built for which information types and which shar-
ing modalities should be used during service interaction. In other words, not specific pieces
of information are recommended to be disclosed but disclosure parameters portable across
different users. DiGioia & Dourish (2005) propose such concepts as social navigation.
Example
In context of interpersonal privacy management in smart environment scenarios, a recom-
mender systems could assist users in deciding which information to disclose by providing
hints like: “Other users generally exchange contact information by transmitting them to
mobile devices of the information recipients. They rarely share them on the display wall”.
Next to type and modality, context information like the location or number of information
recipients may also be used to parametrize recommendations.
5.1.6 Summary
The disclosure control methods presented here can be classified according to several char-
acteristics:
Pessimistic or optimistic: Pessimistic control express privacy preferences in advance and
target rather sensitive information. Optimistic methods control information disclo-
sure on demand or posthumously when automatic disclosures failed.
Automatic or manual: Disclosures may be decided automatically by a reasoning compo-
nent or manually by the information holder.
Individual or generic: Some methods allow to handle disclosures specifically tailored to
an individual while others only support generic disclosure behavior.
Implicit or explicit: The obtrusiveness of a control method depends on whether it discloses
information implicitly as part of already existing activities or explicitly as separate
control actions.
Coarse or fine grained: Coarse grained control only allows to generally disable informa-
tion exchange (simply speaking) while fine grained control also allows to depict
specific information items to disclose.
These characteristics not always are mutually exclusive or orthogonal. For instance ad-
justing information disclosure by opening or closing a door can be both an implicit and
explicit action. Also, every control method principally is able to support coarse grained
control. However, each method specifically targets certain characteristics, as illustrated in
table 5.1. This table once more highlights that a comprehensive privacy control system
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pess. opt. autom. man. indiv. gener. impl. expl. coarse fine
User decisions X X X X X
Implicit actions X X X X
Disclosure rules X X X X X
Learned concepts X X X X
Recommendations X X
Table 5.1: Disclosure control methods and their main characteristics.
requires a composition of multiple methods in order to meet individual privacy needs.
Users should be able to practice privacy according to the characteristics they prefer.
The next section elaborates how these disclosure control methods can be combined to a
composite disclosure control system. The approach to learn disclosure concepts is explicitly
dealt with in chapter 6. Compared to the other methods, it is the least covered one in
current research about smart environments.
5.2 Integration
Combining multiple disclosure control components not only has the advantage that they
support multiple approaches to information disclosure. It also allows different components
to reference each other for improved accuracy. For instance a learning-based component
can validate predictions using a recommendation system. Another example is the creation
or extension of precompiled disclosure rules using a learned disclosure model.
The next section 5.2.1 describes the temporal scheme in which disclosure control compo-
nents interact. Section 5.2.2 presents a concept how to stage components to a powerful
decision process and how individual components complement each other.
5.2.1 Temporal Scheme
Disclosure control components come into action at different points in time. Generally
one has to distinguish preliminary, situational, and retrospective controls, as illustrated in
figure 5.2.
Preliminary control covers the compilation of disclosure rules. It fits well for regulating
the disclosure of sensitive information. In that it is a pessimistic control method for users
which have clear conception of privacy preferences for certain information items.
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Preliminary 
(pessimistic)
Define rules
Situational      
(pragmatic)
Perform actions
Disclose by explicit 
decision, rules, or learner
Update rules, learner, 
and recommender
Retrospective 
(optimistic)
Update rules, 
learner, and 
recommender
Figure 5.2: Temporal scheme of a composite disclosure control management. A
pessimistic management defines disclosure rules in advance. In contrast, an opti-
mistic management audits disclosures retrospectively and adjusts automatic disclo-
sure components accordingly. A pragmatic situational management involves actions
implicitly disclosing information, explicit user decisions and corresponding updates
of the learner and recommender component as well as an optional immediate update
of disclosure rules.
Situational control involves implicit actions, ad hoc (explicit) user decisions, automatic
disclosures by a reasoning component and immediate manual adjustments of a reasoning
component (in case users want to correct automatic decisions). It is a pragmatic approach
where users manage their privacy on demand, i.e. in the moment when it actually is
necessary and when it is easy to guess potential privacy implications. The obtrusiveness
of situational control depends on the capabilities of the used reasoning components (ideally
users rarely have to manually decide disclosures, only when new situations occur which
are not yet known to the used reasoning components).
Retrospective control follows an optimistic approach to privacy management. It resembles
an audit where users adjust automatic disclosure components more comprehensively than
during the situational control. For instance users could mark bad predictions by a learner,
edit rules which caused wrong disclosures, or selectively revoke previous decisions (e.g.
invalidate all decisions in context of a specific information recipient) when a user’s privacy
preferences change.
5.2.2 Decision Process
Combining disclosure control components requires some kind of orchestration to an overall
decision process. The flowchart in figure 5.3 presents such an orchestration concept. It
displays the staging and interaction of different components. The arrangement is based
on temporal, functional, and data representation characteristics of individual components
5 Composite Disclosure Control 67
and resulting integration possibilities. The operation of individual components should be
quite obvious. Here only the interesting integration parts are explained more detailed.
Suggestions
Disclosure decisions by a recommendation and learning component may not only be used
for automatic disclosures but also for suggesting disclosure. While such suggestion still
require user interventions, they reduce the workload a user has to face when managing
information exchange. In fact recommendations should only be used for suggestions since
they do not support individual privacy preferences and only provide hints on information
types (or classes) and disclosure modalities. Disclosures predicted by a learning component
may be used for suggestions when their prediction does not provide a certain confidence.
User Veto
Any automatic disclosure decision is not applied immediately but delayed by a configurable
time in order to allow users to veto a disclosure. This is an important step in the decision
process as no automatic mechanism will always perform correct disclosures. It also provides
some level of transparency to users in that nothing happens completely automatically
without the possibility to express or revoke consent. The time a decision is delayed and
the degree to which the veto possibility is alerted to a user may be dynamical, depending
on the confidence a reasoning component has in its disclosure prediction.
Rule Templates
Rule templates allow to utilize rules in a more pragmatic (ad hoc) way (Bu¨nnig, 2009b).
Whenever users manually decide a disclosure, users have the option to generate a disclosure
rule for future situations. This is especially useful for exceptional (i.e. less frequent and
thus not learnable) but important decisions which are worth to be manifested in rules.
Rule templates allow to make use of the beneficial characteristics of disclosure rules while
avoiding some of its downsides, namely the abstraction of future situations and the formal
compilation of disclosure parameters to a rule. By providing templates (e.g. by the learning
component) users are released from most of the awkward part of rule compilation. Still,
rules practically only work if their overall size respectively count does not exceed a certain
limit. Additionally, rule templates bear the risk to unexpectedly influence automatic
disclosure decisions for other situations too. Rule templates might tempt users to set up
complex privacy preferences but still rules should only be used to formalize rather simple,
straight forward preferences.
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Figure 5.3: Potential steps involved in an information disclosure driven by a com-
posite disclosure control system.
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Postprocessing
An important part of the decision process are the postprocessing steps. They include
automatic as well as optional manual actions. First, any decision is stored in a disclosure
log. This allows retrospective privacy control at an any later point in time. Second, the
learner component is updated with the new situation (i.e. the training set is extended).
Third, the current disclosure is anonymized and transformed to a general recommendation
to feed back to the recommendation component.
The most simple form of retrospective control is to inspect the disclosure log and remove
or alter previous disclosure situations. This implicitly updates the recommendation and
learning component. A more subtle retrospective control also allows to directly interact
with the recommendation and learning component.
The specific interaction possibilities with the learning component depends on the used
learning method. For so called black box learner, which encode their disclosure decision
model in a way which is not mappable to human decision processes, the only form of
interaction is to inspect and weight previous disclosure situations which make up the
learners training set. For instance users might remove exceptional cases or increase the
weight of exemplary cases (where they see an elementary representation of their privacy
preferences). White box learners, whose model encodes decisions in a human readable
format, provide further interaction possibilities. Chapter 6, which deals with particular
learning techniques, investigates learner-specific interaction possibilities in section 6.7.
5.3 Deployment
Obviously privacy management should be taken into account early when engineering smart
environments. However, this should not lead to the misconception of tightly incorporating
information management components into the environment infrastructure. The environ-
ment should be seen as a tool to accomplish certain tasks, not as a platform to host
and manage personal information. Users have to manage the communication of their data
within different systems. In that the management should stand on its own and not depend
on one particular environment it may be be used in. Figure 5.4 illustrates this directive.
Here the information management is not part of the environment but composed of in-
dependent mechanisms which may also be used when interacting with(in) other systems.
Similarly, the repositories which hold personal information are not part of the environment.
In fact there may be various repositories. This aligns with the recommendation of Kobsa
(2007) to keep information distributed. For the most part the information management is
not directly linked to a particular environment. Points of contacts are information request
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events, implicit actions, context information describing a situation, and recommendations
evaluated by the recommender component (recommendations should be part of the envi-
ronment as they apply to information sharing events within a specific environment and
also should be sharable among multiple persons acting within the environment).
Information 
Repository
Environment 
Services and 
Devices
UserInteraction Partners
Information 
Management
Figure 5.4: Decoupling of the environment infrastructure and user-associated in-
formation management mechanisms. The weak environment and strong user asso-
ciation makes these mechanisms more portable across different systems where users
have to manage their information. It also increases the trust users have into the
management mechanisms.
5.4 Conclusion
This sections presented an abstract concept for a composite disclosure control system.
Several components contributing to this system have been presented. Further, a decision
process has been developed which incorporates these components to a reference model of
a comprehensive disclosure control. The process covers preliminary, situational, and retro-
spective privacy control. It stages different disclosure control components and integrates
them with each other. Finally, a generic deployment strategy for a composite disclosure
control system has been presented. In that this chapter provides a conceptual blueprint
to solve issue (II) from section 1.2. The next chapter deals with a specific component of
the proposed system: the automation and suggestion of disclosure decisions using machine
learning methods.
6 Learning Disclosure Decisions
One component of the composite disclosure control system presented in chapter 5 assists
in making disclosure decisions based on a learned disclosure concept (see section 5.1.4).
The basic idea is to conceptualize the privacy preferences of a user gradually by observing
and learning her disclosure decisions. Though it is unlikely that every aspect of a user’s
concept of privacy management can be grasped by a learning component, it is well suited
to conceptualize disclosure decisions following a stable pattern – without the need for users
to abstract and express preferences manually in advance. In that a learning component
has the potential to remedy issue (III) mentioned in section 1.2.
This chapter investigates the problem of learning disclosure decisions. First, it specifies the
actual learning problem to handle. Subsequently, section 6.2 analyzes which existing meth-
ods are suitable for such a learning problem. Section 6.3 presents a new interpolation-based
learning method which uses disclosure patterns as discussed in section 3.2 and elaborated
in section 4.1.2. How these disclosure patterns may be used to validate predictions made
by a learning method (in order to prevent as much wrong predictions as possible while
supporting as much correct predictions as possible) is described in section 6.4. Further
improvements of learning methods may be possible by utilizing scenario-specific semantic
knowledge. This idea is considered in section 6.5. The presented general learning meth-
ods, the new interpolation-based learning method as well as the validation methods are
evaluated in section 6.6. It presents a scenario-independent learning method evaluation
system, corresponding results for example scenarios, and a mapping of generic scenario
characteristics to suitable learning methods. Finally, section 6.7 analyzes specific possibil-
ities to integrate different learning methods within a composite disclosure control system
(in addition to generic integration approaches presented in section 5.2).
6.1 Learning Problem
In section 4.1 a disclosure decision has been modeled as a mapping of a situation S, modal-
ities M and information recipients P(P ) to a set of correspondingly disclosed information
P(I):
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τ : S ×M × P(P )→ P(I) (4.1)
In order to learn a model which conceptualizes a set of instances of this mapping, it has
to be transformed to a learning problem. This requires to transform the instances of the
mapping’s domain to a feature vector and values from the co-domain to labels. First, this
section investigates the feature space (i.e. the mapping’s domain). Afterwards, it analyzes
characteristics of the label space (i.e. the mapping’s co-domain). Finally, it concludes these
finding to a specification of the learning problem.
6.1.1 Features
Situations
In practice, a situation is an individual factor which might be perceived differently across
users, in extreme cases even based on a gut feeling (see section 3.2.2). However, for the
sake of learning such a mapping, situation descriptions have to be limited to measurable
context information. Location and time are the most prominent ones, though often there is
more measurable context information available, for instance situation type information like
“meeting” or topic information like “project xy” – those may be available as annotations or
attributes of entries in a user’s calendar or in the booking schedule of a smart environment.
To some extend they also can be detected automatically: Christoph Burghardt, another
researcher within the MuSAMA project, explicitly deals with the aggregation of low-level
sensor information to high level situation context (Burghardt & Kirste, 2008; Burghardt
et al., 2011). There also might be measurable individual context information, for instance
personal calender item annotations like “confidential” or “negotiations”. The semantics
and availability of context information describing a situation significantly depends on
concrete scenarios and the participating users. Hence, a situation has to be represented
by a varying number of multiple features, each referring to a specific context information.
Feature values may be numeric (time) or nominal (location), as well as sets of them
(personal annotations attached to a calendar entry).
Modalities
Modalities describe how information is going to be disclosed. This includes the event
firing a disclosure as well as the paths disclosed information is communicated. Possible
firing events could be start of meeting or enter environment. Practically such an event can
be seen as the core request to disclose information. Examples for communication paths
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are show on display wall or distribute to nearby mobile devices. Different communication
paths implicate how information is perceived by the recipients. For instance large shared
screens display information prominently, and detailed, but temporarily and identically for
all recipients. In contrast, if information is distributed to the devices of the other persons in
the environment, it is shown in different ways and the time and duration recipients consume
this information is out of control of the information provider. Thus, a modality requires
multiple features too – one for the firing event (with nominal values as event identifiers) and
one or more describing the medium used to communicate information. Possible medium
related features are device identifiers, medium type or medium characteristics. Again, the
set of features describing a modality should be considered to be scenario-dependent.
In practice there might be different possible communication paths where a user has to
choose one. In that case, the chosen modality is also part of a user’s disclosure decision –
section 6.1.2 gets back to this issue.
Persons
The recipients of information items usually are the persons one interacts with in an en-
vironment, possibly limited by modalities. Obviously they are the most important factor
influencing which information should be disclosed (see section 3.2.2). Persons can be rep-
resented by whatever identity a presence sensing system provides – as long as they are
unique and identical across different situations1. Bijective identifications are preferable
compared to abstract role schemes for the reasons elaborated in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3
(either role assignments are too generic or hard to manage). Hence, this mapping param-
eter can be represented by a single feature which lists all persons acting as information
recipients (i.e. the feature value is a set of nominal values).
1Ensuring that a specific person always is detected as the same one is a challenge on its own – consider
different mobile devices or sensing technologies as examples. This work does not cover this technical issue.
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Example Values
room: C102
weekday: 2
type: meeting
topic: project-x
tags: {confidential, important}
trigger: start-of-meeting
medium: display-wall
persons: {alice, bob, clark, dent}
6.1.2 Labels
The labels to predict by a learned model which conceptualizes a set of instances of the
mapping 4.1 are sets of information items to disclose. Effectively this makes the learn-
ing problem a multi-label problem (Tsoumakas & Katakis, 2007) where each information
item is an individual label. If individual items are part of a hierarchically structured class
taxonomy, the learning problem additionally is a hierarchical one (Wu et al., 2005). For
instance in one situation a person could disclose all documents related to a project “X”
while in another situation she discloses only final versions of documents from that project
(i.e. no draft material). The information disclosed in the latter case is a subset (or spe-
cialization) of the one disclosed in the first one. As indicated above the communication
path, or medium, may also be part of a disclosures decision. While the chosen medium
actually is not an information item, it can be encoded as such when integrating it in the
hierarchical structure of disclosures, e.g. as a root or leaf element. Further hierarchical
structures could be given by permissions. For instance when displaying information on a
shared screen, permissions could regulate if the environment is allowed to store the dis-
played information for later reference. Different scenarios would suggest different types
and degrees of hierarchical structures. The benefit of utilizing hierarchical structures is
that a learned model may fall back to generalized disclosure predictions if exact predictions
are likely to be wrong.
Following is an example disclosure where the items’ path in the underlying hierarchical
class taxonomy is encoded using dot-separators:
documents.project-x.final.displaywall
documents.project-y.displaywall
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This example describes the disclosure of final documents from project X and any docu-
ments related to project Y, using the “displaywall” as the disclosure medium. The medium
also could haven been integrated as a root element (which variant performs best is part
of the evaluations in section 6.6). The semantics of individual path elements of an item
depend on a specific scenario and how a user manages his information. This is not a prob-
lem as standard learning methods utilize structural information only (section 6.5 briefly
discusses enhanced learning methods which utilize semantic knowledge about disclosure
values).
6.1.3 Conclusion
Predicting disclosures according to mapping 4.1 is a supervised hierarchical multi-label
classification problem with features whose values may be numeric, nominal, or sets of
numeric respectively nominal values. The number of features depends on how much context
information is available to describe a situation and on how detailed modalities are described
(the scenarios considered within this work have eight or less features). Labels are sets of
nominal items, each an element of a hierarchical class taxonomy. The number of different
labels and their distribution depends on individual users and the scenario they are part
of.
The training data to learn from grows incrementally, which results in an online learning
problem. However, the distinction between online and offline learning is not that relevant
here as the size of the complete training data as well as the frequency of new cases to
learn is small enough to allow – concerning computational costs – offline learning methods
imitating online learning.
Most learning methods assume features and labels to be of a specific type. It is straight-
forward to convert features from a nominal to a numeric space (and vice versa). The same
applies to set-based values (which can be flattened to multiple scalar values). In contrast,
handling multiple labels and their hierarchical structures is more sophisticated and usually
requires a special combination of non-hierarchical single-label learning methods. The next
section deals with these issues.
6.2 General Learning Methods
Hierarchical multi-label learning problems usually are handled by special wrappers on top
of basic learners, i.e. learners which expect non-hierarchical single-label problems. This
section presents common basic learners and wrapping methods suitable for the learning
problem at hand. The presented approaches are referenced later in section 6.6 to evaluate
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their ability in predicting disclosures, and in section 6.7 to evaluate their characteristics
concerning an integration into a composite disclosure control system as presented in chap-
ter 5.
6.2.1 Multi-Label Learning
A common approach to handle multi-label learning problems is to transform the learning
problem so that it can be applied to single-label learning methods. The next section gives
an overview about different transformation methods, which is followed by a description of
the corresponding implications on performance metrics and their meaning in context of
the prediction of information disclosures.
Problem Transformation Methods
The two most simple problem transformation methods are to reduce each multi-label to a
randomly or otherwise chosen single item or by discarding any sample whose label contains
multiple items. Obviously these methods potentially discard a lot of useful information
which cannot be used to conceptualize the underlying mapping from features to labels.
Another method which discards less information is to replicate samples in that a sample
with a multi-label containing n single-label items is transformed to n samples with identical
features but each mapping to one of the single-items only. Optionally these samples
may be weighted depending on the number of replications (e.g. w = 1/n). While this
method does not discard single-label items or samples, it looses correlation information of
individual labels. More promising methods are the so called powerset and binary relevance
transformation methods (Tsoumakas et al., 2010).
Powerset method. Practically this method considers each distinct multi-label, i.e. each
distinct set of single-label items, as an individual single-label. It is called powerset method
because the theoretical domain of the mapping from features to labels is the powerset of
all single-label items. However, while this method makes the learning problem applicable
to learning methods expecting single-item labels without discarding available information,
it does not exploit any multi-label–related information.
Binary relevance method. This method indeed utilizes multi-label–related information
by aggregating multiple binary learners – one for each single-label item contained in multi-
labels. When predicting the label, i.e. disclosure, for a new situation, each binary learner
is run independently and the prediction is a multi-label containing all single-label items
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whose binary learner has a positive prediction. In contrast to the powerset method, this
method is able to predict multi-labels which haven’t occurred yet in the training set.
Performance Metrics
Learning methods applied to multi-label problems require different metrics than those used
for single-label problems. The most common single-label metric is the ratio of the number
of exactly matching predictions to the number of all predictions (subsequently this is
called the match metric). However, concerning multi-label problems, this is a rather strict
metric which does not measure to which extent a wrong prediction differs from the true
label. Instead, metrics for multi-label learning problems have to consider set differences.
Tsoumakas et al. (2010) state the following most important multi-label metrics: Hamming
Loss, Accuracy, Precision, and Recall. They are defined as follows.
Let L be a non-empty set of single-label items. Further, let X be a set of evaluation
samples (fi, Li) with 1 ≤ i ≤ |X| and Li ⊆ L, applied to a multi-label learner C which
maps features fi to predictions Yi, i.e. Yi = C(fi). Then the hamming loss is defined
as:
HammingLoss(C,X) =
1
|X|
|X|
i=1
|Li △ Yi|
|L|
This metric considers false predicted and true not predicted single-label items, i.e. it
actually is a measure of failure. In contrast, the accuracy is defined as the averaged
Jaccard index:
Accuracy(C,X) =
1
|X|
|X|
i=1

1 if Li = Yi
|Li ∩ Yi|
|Li ∪ Yi| otherwise
It is a general measure of how close a predicted label has been to a true label in average.
Precision and recall are more specific metrics which express how many of the predicted
single-label items actually are part of the true label (precision) and how many of the single-
label items contained in the true label actually have been predicted (recall) on average:
Precision(C,X) =
1
|X|
|X|
i=1

1 if Li = Yi = ∅
0 if Li ̸= Yi = ∅
|Li ∩ Yi|
|Yi| otherwise
78 6.2 General Learning Methods
Recall(C,X) =
1
|X|
|X|
i=1

1 if Li = Yi = ∅
0 if Li = ∅ ≠ Yi
|Li ∩ Yi|
|Li| otherwise
The strict match metric mentioned introductorily is defined as:
Match(C,X) =
1
|X|
|X|
i=1

1 if Li = Yi
0 otherwise
Next to these standard metrics, the application context of privacy management advocates
a further metric. A subset-tolerant match metric, which is zero if the predicted label
contains any item which is not part of the true label and which evaluates to the Jaccard
index in all other cases, is a good measure for a sensitive information management. It is
a combination of the metrics match and accuracy : more tolerant than a strict match but
also more defensive than accuracy in that it only acknowledges wrong predictions which
are subsets of the true label.
Submatch(C,X) =
1
|X|
|X|
i=1

1 if Yi = Li
|Li ∩ Yi|
|Li ∪ Yi| if Yi ⊂ Li
0 otherwise
The most relevant metrics for privacy-related investigations targeted here are match, ac-
curacy, and submatch. The first one indicates how often a predicted disclosure decision
equals an actually intended one. Accuracy is a more tolerant measure which indicates how
much a user would have to adjust the predictions in order to equal the actually intended
disclosures. The latter one, submatch, is a defensive measure of accuracy which does not
accept predictions containing information items not part of the true label.
6.2.2 Hierarchical Learning
Similar to multi-label learning problems, hierarchical problems are coped with by trans-
forming the problem to be applicable to non-hierarchical learning methods. Different
methods are briefly described in the following section, followed by corresponding implica-
tions on performance metrics and their meaning in context of predicting the disclosure of
information.
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Problem Transformation Methods
Technically the powerset transformation method used for multi-label problems can be
used similarly for hierarchically structured labels where each path is considered a distinct
single-label item. However, obviously it does not utilize any hierarchy information con-
tained in labels. A more advanced method is binarized structured label learning (Wu
et al., 2005), sometimes also referred to as hierarchical binary relevance (Tsoumakas
et al., 2010). Similar to the binary relevance method for multi-label learning, a binary base
classifier is instantiated for each partial path starting from the root of the label taxon-
omy. These classifiers are arranged in a similar hierarchy as the (partial) single-label items
they represent. When predicting a label, these classifiers are used in a top-down manner
according to their hierarchical structure. If a classifier provides a positive prediction for
its label, then its child-classifiers are consulted too. In case of a negative prediction or if
there are no child classifiers, the (partial) single-label item corresponding to the current
classifier is included in the predicted multi-label.
Tsoumakas et al. (2010) and Wu et al. (2005) provide more detailed information about
and illustrations of the method described here. Further, they reference more specific
hierarchical learning methods. However, most methods are based on the hierarchical
binary relevance method used here and, while they perform better in specific situations,
there appears to be no critical performance difference which advocates their additional
evaluation here in the first place.
Hierarchy-based prediction validation. Next to exploiting hierarchical information from
labels, the binarized structured label learning method has the advantage of being able
to express a kind of uncertainty, when it predicts a partial single-label item but if it is
unsure about possible hierarchical complements. This knowledge of uncertainty may be
used to decide if a prediction is used for an automatic disclosure or just as a template for a
manual one. However, to make use of this potential feature, the single-label items (which
actually are paths in the overall taxonomy of previously disclosed information) have to be
extended with a virtual leaf node. Then, if any single-label item in a predicted multi-label
does not have this virtual leaf, the prediction is marked as uncertain and is respectively
used as a suggestion for a manual disclosure. Figure 6.1 illustrates this approach. It shows
two disclosures of previous situations, where each single-label item (i.e. a path from root
to a leaf) is annotated with a virtual leaf node. Additionally it shows a predicted label.
Without the virtual leaf nodes, it would be impossible to decide if the nodes A and X
do not have children because the learner neither predicted A (respectively X ) alone nor
one of its children or because the learner explicitly predicted A (respectively X ) alone.
However, using the virtual leaves, it is clear that the learner neither predicted A alone nor
A.B nor A.C but explicitly predicted X alone.
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Figure 6.1: Hierarchical labels extended with dummy leaves. Each circle repre-
sents a node in the hierarchical taxonomy of personal information. The left two
labels are those of previous situations while the right one is the predicted label of
a new situation. The dashed circles are virtual nodes added to each leaf node of a
disclosure. The existence of these virtual leaves in a prediction indicates whether
partial paths are predicted explicitly or because of uncertainty.
Figure 6.2: H-loss metric for hierarchical multi-label learning. Each tree represents
the same label taxonomy of a given data set. The gray nodes in tree (a) represent
a predicted hierarchical multi-label while the gray nodes in tree (b) illustrate the
true label. The H-loss considers the top-most mismatching nodes as indicated by
the checked nodes in tree (c). Source: Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2004)
Performance Metrics
Clearly a hierarchical multi-label learning also requires specific performance metrics in
order to not only account for partial matches of single-label items but also partial matches
of hierarchy paths of single-label items.
A similar notation as for multi-label learner metrics is used, with the difference that the
elements in L (single-label items) correspond to root-starting paths in a given hierarchical
information item structure. That means they are tuples of node elements (e1, . . . , ev) where
e1 is a root node and ev is a leaf node of a hierarchical mutli-label item. This implies that
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redundant sub-path elements are not contained in a label Li (i ∈ {1, . . . , |X|}), i.e. for any
path lengths 1 ≤ v < w one has
(e1, . . . , ev, . . . , ew) ∈ Li ⇒ (e1, . . . , ev) ̸∈ Li
In contrast, let the primed version of a label also contain any sub-path elements:
(e1, . . . , ev, . . .) ∈ Li ⇒ (e1, . . . , ev) ∈ L′i
Note that C now refers to a hierarchical multi-label learner, i.e. a learner which follows
one of the previously mentioned problem transformation methods.
An often used metric is the H-loss proposed by Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2004). The general
idea is that for a given class taxonomy, each node is processed in a top-down manner
(preorder) and whenever a node is present in the predicted label but not in the true
label – or vice versa – the H-loss is increased by a cost value related to the current node.
However, children nodes of a mismatching node are not processed further, i.e. only the
top-most failures are counted, not their derived ones. This scheme is illustrated in figure
6.2 using an example taxonomy with a predicted and true label. For a predicted label Yi
and a true label Li, the set of nodes Zi which contribute to the loss are given by:
Zi =

(e1, . . . , ev) ∈ L′i△Y ′i | ∀w < v ̸ ∃(e∗1, . . . , e∗w) ∈ L′i△Y ′i : e1 = e∗1 ∧ . . . ∧ ew = e∗w

Then the H-loss metric is defined as:
H-loss(C,X) =
1
|X|
|X|
i=1

z∈Zi
ζ(z)
Concerning the cost function ζ, a simple setting is to let it always evaluate to 1. The
problem here is that this favors short-path predictions. To circumvent this, Cesa-Bianchi
et al. suggest to use node-specific values depending on the number of a node’s siblings and
its level within the tree, i.e. the cost ζ(z) for a node z is ζ(parent(z))/|children(parent(z))|
where parent and children evaluate to the corresponding node (set). Nodes without a
parent have a cost value of 1. Given a taxonomy with k root nodes, this cost scheme
normalizes the H-loss within [0, k] and charges errors near the top (or root) more than
those near the bottom (or leafs).
Still, it is questionable if these recursively reduced error costs yield a useful loss metric
in terms of privacy management, where the costs of misclassifications are more related to
semantical but not structural context.
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An alternative metric with less influence of structural context is to simply relate the
number of matching nodes to the number of nodes occurring in both the predicted and
true label. Practically this is a hierarchical variant of the accuracy metric described for
multi-label learners and thus denoted as H-accuracy. It is defined as:
H-accuracy(C,X) =
1
|X|
|X|
i=1

1 if Li = Yi
|L′i ∩ Y ′i |
|L′i ∪ Y ′i |
otherwise
In a similar manner one can define a hierarchical equivalent of the submatch metric defined
for multi-label problems, the H-submatch metric. However, here one has to consider a
specialized subset-relation⊆h since shorter paths mean more general information selections
and thus correspond to more information (in contrast to smaller primed labels):
L1 ⊆h L2 ⇔ ∀(e1, . . . , ev) ∈ L1 ∃w ≤ v : (e1, . . . , ew) ∈ L2
Then the hierarchical submatch metric is defined as:
H-submatch(C,X) =
1
|X|
|X|
i=1

1 if Yi = Li = ∅
|L′i ∩ Y ′i |
|L′i ∪ Y ′i |
if Yi ⊆h Li
0 otherwise
In the context of privacy management, another useful metric is that of adjustment costs. If
a learner is not only used to predict disclosures but also to provide suggestions or templates
for final manual disclosures, the relevant metric here would be how much work a user had
to face when adjusting the suggested disclosure to match the actually intended one. To
some extent the adjustment costs are calculated similarly to the H-loss, i.e. the nodes in
the given class taxonomy are processed in preorder. In contrast, here each mismatch is
charged equally, i.e. also children nodes of mismatching nodes are considered and each
failure increases the costs by 1. For comparison reasons the metric can be normalized
nevertheless by setting an upper bound β of mismatching nodes. In this case the metric
is defined to be 1 when the number of mismatching nodes reaches or exceeds β while
it is divided by β in all other cases. Such an adjustment costs metric, here denoted as
strain, assumes a hierarchically organized user interface to (de)select information items
to disclose. It is defined as follows:
Strain(C,X) =
1
|X|
|X|
i=1
min
 |L′i△Y ′i |
β
, 1

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Reasonable values for the upper bound β depend on the actual user interface used to
adjust suggested disclosures in order to align them with intended ones. However, for
initial evaluation purposes β = 10 is an appropriate bound as more than 10 adjustments
can be seen as in unacceptable strain in any case.
6.2.3 Base Learners
The problem transformation methods described above actually are wrappers around single-
label base learners. This section presents the base learners evaluated within this work.
The list of learners is not supposed to be complete but aims to cover the most popular
ones and to cover the most general concepts used for classification: (non)linear discrimi-
nation, rule systems, and density estimation (Henery, 1994). In particular the following
methods are considered: k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN), Naive Bayes, Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVMs), Rule Induction, and Decision Trees. Besides potential performance differ-
ences, these methods differ in the resources required for training and prediction as well as
in their transparency concerning automatic decisions and possibilities for manual adjust-
ments. With regard to the application context at hand, privacy management, resource
requirements are no crucial factors. In contrast, user interaction possibilities are more
relevant – section 6.7 deals with these aspects more thoroughly. The particular algorithms
used for the mentioned base learners are described more detailed in section 6.6.4.
6.2.4 Confidence-Based Prediction Validation
Each learning method may annotate predictions with a confidence in the correctness of
predictions. Confidence values have different origins respectively meanings depending on
the used learning method. Some methods provide confidences based on class distributions
while others have independent confidence values for each class. The main point is that
confidence values cannot be compared across multiple learners but only across predictions
of the same methods.
Confidence values may be used to validate a prediction made by a learner. Next to
metrics like accuracy and match, an almost similarly important performance metric of a
learning method is its ability to decide if its predictions are likely to be correct. Confidence
values may be used for validation along two general strategies. One strategy is to set a
static minimum confidence value per learner which must be reached in order to support
(i.e. accept) or prevent (i.e. reject) a prediction. The other strategy is to calculate a
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confidence threshold dynamically. For instance, the evaluation system presented in section
6.6 calculates a dynamic confidence threshold as follows2:
1. Confidence values of previous predictions are grouped into two sets, one containing
values of positive (i.e. correct) predictions, and one containing values of negative (i.e.
wrong) predictions.
2. Candidates for confidence thresholds are the medians of any two subsequent confi-
dence values among all (numerically sorted) confidence values of previous predictions
(including the median of 0 and the smallest confidence value, and the median of 1
and the greatest confidence value).
3. For each candidate, an error is calculated. The error is given by the number of smaller
confidence values in the set corresponding to positive predictions plus the number of
greater confidence values in the set corresponding to the negative predictions. From
all thresholds with a minimal error, the one preventing the most negative predictions
is chosen.
6.3 Disclosure Interpolation Based on Order Mappings
Section 4.1.2 elaborated several order-theory–related patterns of information disclosure.
One pattern is based on types of order mappings of disclosure situation pairs. For instance,
two disclosure situations are considered to be order reversing if the person (i.e. information
recipient) group from one situation is a subset of the person group from the other situation
while the subset relation is inverse for the disclosed sets of information. Practically this
reflects the case that a greater information recipient group implicates a smaller set of
disclosed information. Other order-mapping types are order preserving, ignoring, and
loosing (section 4.1.2 defines these types more formally and provides further illustrative
examples). A learning method which has to predict the disclosure for a new disclosure
situation may refer to order-mapping types of previous (i.e. already seen) situations to
interpolate a disclosure for a new situation. As an example, if there are two previous
situations, one with a smaller and one with a greater information recipient group than the
one of a new situation, and if the disclosed sets of information items follow the same order
(i.e. one is a subset of the other), then a similar order can be assumed for the disclosure to
predict for the new situation. Obviously such an interpolation only applies to situations
which differ only in the persons group context (i.e. features expressing the presence of
persons, see section 6.1.1) – otherwise the order of disclosures cannot directly be linked
to the order of person groups. Additionally, an interpolation is only needed when the
2The corresponding implementation can be found in the DiLES software (Bu¨nnig, 2011b), in particular
in the function confsep within the package diles.learn.util.
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person group of a new situation actually differs from all previous situations – otherwise
the disclosure of an identical previous situation could be used directly.
6.3.1 Formal Groundwork
More formally the interpolation requirements and components can be described as follows.
Supposed disclosure situations are described by n features and a label (a set of information
items disclosed in that situation) while the first feature is assumed to be a set of person
identifiers (information recipients). Then let S be a set of m distinct previous, already
seen situations:
S :=

(g1, f11 , . . . , f
1
n−1, l
1), . . . , (gm, fm1 , . . . , f
m
n−1, l
m)

Hence, situation j with 1 ≤ j ≤ m is described by the person group gj , followed by n− 1
arbitrary other feature values f ji with i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and a label lj . Similarly, let
x := (g∗, f∗1 , . . . , f
∗
n−1, l
∗)
be a new situation, i.e. its feature values do not occur in S in that constellation and its label
l∗ still has to be predicted (respectively interpolated). Then the set of situations whose
features differ from x only in the person group and thus may be used for interpolation is
given by the situation filter function Φ:
Φ(S, x) =

(g, f1, . . . , fn−1, l) ∈ S | ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} : fi = f∗i

Note that the set of situations given by Φ(S, x) semantically corresponds to the set of
disclosure decisions T , i.e. instances of the mapping τ , defined in section 4.1.2. However,
it differs syntactically in that the domain and codomain of τ here are encoded in one
tuple: τ ’s person parameter is represented by g, the situation and modalities parameters
are represented by f1, . . . , fn−1, and τ ’s output is represented by l. The different notation
used here has been chosen because it better corresponds to the format used for data
processed by machine learning methods. Further, let ρ be a function providing situation
pairs which are suitable for order-mapping inspections with regard to x:
ρ(S, x) =

(g1, f11 , . . . , f
1
n−1, l
1), (g2, f21 , . . . , f
2
n−1, l
2)
 ∈ S × S
| g1 ⊂ g2 ∧ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} : f1i = f2i
 (6.1)
The situation pairs produced by ρ semantically match the set R from definition 4.2 in
section 4.1.2, i.e. it contains situation pairs where the person group features have a subset
relation while all other features equal. In a similar correspondence the following derived
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c) no preexisting chains
ABEFABD
b) extending one or more chains
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Figure 6.3: Person-group order schemes for order-mapping–based interpolation.
Each circle represents the person-group feature of a disclosure situation while each
letter represents a specific person. The arrows express an is-subset-of relation.
The orange, bold-faced person group is that of a new disclosure situation still to
decide, denoted as g∗ within the text. The other groups are from previous disclosure
situations in Φ(S, x).
functions provide situation pairs with a specific order mapping (preserving, reversing,
ignoring, and loosing):
ρp(S, x) = {

(. . . , l1), (. . . , l2)
 ∈ ρ(S) | l1 ⊂ l2}
ρr(S, x) = {

(. . . , l1), (. . . , l2)
 ∈ ρ(S) | l1 ⊃ l2}
ρi(S, x) = {

(. . . , l1), (. . . , l2)
 ∈ ρ(S) | l1 = l2}
ρl(S, x) = {

(. . . , l1), (. . . , l2)
 ∈ ρ(S) | l1 ∥ l2}
(6.2)
Note that ρp/r/i/l(S, x) ⊆ ρ(S, x) ⊂ Φ(S, x) × Φ(S, x) ⊆ S × S. Interpolation using these
situation subsets benefits from greater subsets. In that it is important that the non-person-
group features have been preprocessed accordingly to eliminate noise. For instance a room
feature may have values “R1” and “R2” while both indicate the same social context, i.e.
they should be joined to “R1/2”.
In real life there may be two situations with identical features but different disclosures, i.e.
disclosure decisions may conflict with past decisions. However, the interpolation described
subsequently assumes non-conflicting disclosures. In this regard previous disclosure situa-
tions could be sanitized by only considering the most recent one of conflicting situations.
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6.3.2 Order Schemes
If and how an interpolation is possible depends on how g∗ relates to the person groups
features of the situations in Φ(S, x). One has to distinguish different order schemes, i.e. how
g∗ integrates into chains of person groups3 from situations in Φ(S, x). The integration may
be described with the notion of upper and lower neighbor situations of x in Φ(S, x) with
regard to the person group feature. Formally these neighbors are given by the situation
filter functions Ω (upper) and ω (lower)4:
Ω(S, x) =

y ∈ Φ(S, x) | π1(x) ⊂ π1(y)∧ ̸ ∃y′ ∈ Φ(S, x) : π1(x) ⊂ π1(y′) ⊂ π1(y)

ω(S, x) =

y ∈ Φ(S, x) | π1(y) ⊂ π1(x)∧ ̸ ∃y′ ∈ Φ(S, x) : π1(y) ⊂ π1(y′) ⊂ π1(x)

Subsequently, the notions of upper and lower neighbors refer to these definitions while the
term neighbors in general denotes to the union of upper and lower neighbors. Based on the
existence of upper and lower neighbors, there are four types of order schemes to consider
(figure 6.3 illustrates the first three):
1. In the ideal case x has both upper and lower neighbors, i.e. g∗ joins existing chains
of person groups (see figure 6.3.a). The order mapping of situation pairs from lower
and upper neighbors may then be used to interpolate a disclosure for situation x, i.e.
l∗. The pairs are given by the Cartesian product of x’ lower and upper neighbors:
ω(S, x)× Ω(S, x)
Note that these pairs are a subset of ρ(S, x).
2. In case x has either upper or lower neighbors but not both and in case these neighbors
have upper respectively lower neighbors as well, i.e. x extends existing chains of
person groups (see figure 6.3.b), the order mappings between the upper/lower neigh-
bors and their upper/lower neighbors may be used for interpolation. The situation
pairs in case of upper respectively lower neighbors are given by:
y∈Ω(S,x)

(y, z) | z ∈ Ω(S, y) respectively 
y∈ω(S,x)

(z, y) | z ∈ ω(S, y)
Again, these pairs are a subset of ρ(S, x).
3. Otherwise, if x has neighbors but no existing chains for g∗ (see figure 6.3.c), then
there are no order mappings which could be used for interpolation.
3Chains of person groups are person groups whore are mutually comparable with regard to the subset
relation.
4The expression πk(t) denotes a tuple projector, evaluating to the k-th element in tuple t.
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Figure 6.4: Joining existing chains with homogeneous order mappings. Each cir-
cle represents the person group feature of a disclosure situation while the orange,
bold-faced circle refers to a new situation, referenced as x within the text. The
letters represent person identifiers. The arrows display an is-subset-of relation with
regard to the person group. The annotations at the top of the circles illustrate the
information items disclosed in the relating situation. Here each digit represents one
specific information item. The question mark indicates that the information items
to disclose still need to be interpolated based on the upper and lower disclosures
and corresponding order-mapping types.
4. The same is true for the case when x has no neighbors at all.
Disclosure interpolations may follow different strategies, concerning how to select order
mappings when g∗ joins or extends multiple chains and concerning fallback methods when
no chains exist or when situation pairs from the chains in all or most cases have order-
loosing mappings (which provide no hints how to interpolate a disclosure for a situation
joining or extending such chains). The following sections describe possible interpolation
strategies with reference to the four order-scheme types described above.
6.3.3 Interpolation When Joining Existing Chains
At first, it is assumed that all situation pairs given by the upper and lower situation
neighbors of x have the same order-mapping type. This situation is illustrated in figure
6.4. For instance figure 6.4.b shows the case where a new situation joins existing chains
of person groups which all have an order-reversing mapping, i.e. a greater information
recipient group implicates a smaller set of disclosed information items. Figure 6.4.a shows
the opposite case while figure 6.4.c illustrates order-ignoring mappings, i.e. the disclosed
information items do not change and ignore the orders of person groups. Finally figure
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6.4.d displays the constellation of order-loosing mappings, i.e. the information item sets
have no order. Each constellation shown in figure 6.4 requires different interpolation
strategies:
a) For order-preserving mappings, the disclosure l∗ of the new situation with g∗ =
{A,B,C} either may be the union of disclosures from lower situations or the intersection
of disclosures from upper neighbors. In the displayed example both would result in
different disclosures, either l∗ = {1, 2} or l∗ = {1, 2, 3}. Both would follow the order
mappings given by the upper and lower neighbors but which one should finally be
used? While one could simply either always use the union of lower or the intersection
of upper neighbors, a better approach from an interpolation perspective is to calculate
the distance5 of g∗ to the intersection of person groups from upper neighbors and to
the union of person groups from lower neighbors and then use upper or lower neighbors
depending on the closest combined person group. If both distances are equal the choice
could be made randomly or follow a default, e.g. using the union of disclosures from
lower neighbors because this is more defensive in terms of the amount of information
which is going to be disclosed. With regard to figure 6.4.a this would result in the
interpolated disclosure l∗ = {1, 2, 3}.
b) The case of order-reversing mappings generally is symmetrical to order-preserving
mappings, i.e. one would use the union of disclosures from upper neighbors and the
intersection of disclosures from lower neighbors. Then, based on the distance of g∗ to
the person group intersection from upper and union from lower neighbors, the nearest
one is chosen. In the displayed example this would result in l∗ = {2, 3}.
c) Interpolating between situations with order-ignoring mappings is straightforward in
that l∗ simply must be identical to the disclosure used in neighbor situations. Conse-
quently, the illustrated example in figure 6.4.c would result in l∗ = {1}.
d) Situation neighbors with order-loosing mappings do not provide any hints for inter-
polation as disclosure orderings do not correlate with person group orderings. As a
fallback one could either choose the disclosure of one of the closest5 neighbor situations
or delegate the disclosure decision to a completely different mechanism (e.g. one of the
learning methods mentioned in section 6.2).
5In context of sets the term distance refers to the Jaccard distance. For two sets A and B it is defined
as 1 − (|A ∩ B|/|A ∪ B|) if A ∪ B is not empty and 0 otherwise. When using distance related terms for
situations (whose features only differ in the person group), it actually means the distance of the situation’s
person group feature values.
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Figure 6.5: Heterogeneous order mappings. Similar to figure 6.4, the upper and
lower neighbors of the new situation x with g∗ = {A,B,C} are displayed. Addi-
tionally, the order-mapping types of the upper and lower neighbor situation pairs
are shown.
Handling heterogeneous order mappings
Until now it has been assumed that all situation pairs given by the upper and lower
neighbors of the new situation x have the same order-mapping type. Interpolation gets
more complicated if these pairs have different types. Figure 6.5 illustrates such a case. The
most simple handling is to not interpolate and to delegate the prediction to another decision
component. On the other side, heterogeneous mapping types can be handled by selectively
dropping neighbor situation pairs until all remaining ones have similar order mappings.
Situation pairs with order-loosing mappings do not contribute to an interpolation and thus
may be discarded first. For the remaining situation pairs there are two general discard
approaches to get a homogeneous set of types, based on order-mapping counts or on
situation distances.
Discard based on order-mapping counts: First, among the situation pairs given by the
lower and upper neighbors of x, discard these whose order-mapping type occurs less
often than another one. If the remaining pairs still have multiple types, discard these
whose order-mapping type occurs less often than another one within the situation
pairs given by ρ(S, x). For instance, if remaining pairs have 2 order-preserving and
2 order-ignoring mappings but |ρp(S, x)| > |ρi(S, x)|, the pairs with order-ignoring
mappings are discarded. That is occurrence numbers are evaluated in a local to
global manner.
Discard based on situation distances: Only keep situation pairs where both situations
have a minimal distance5 to x (compared to the other lower respectively upper
neighbors).
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Both approaches can be combined, i.e. if one strategy does not lead to homogeneous order
mappings, the other one could be applied additionally. However, the order is important
here. In some cases none of these strategies result in homogeneous order mappings. In
that case the interpolation has to be refused. With reference to the example situations
illustrated in figure 6.5, the approach using order-mapping counts would drop all but the
order-preserving situation pairs, resulting in an interpolated disclosure of l∗ = {1, 2, 3}.
In contrast, the distance-based approach would filter all but the order-reversing pairs and
thus interpolate l∗ = {2}.
Eventually the following homogenization strategies (i.e. combination of approaches) may
be applied:
1. do not homogenize (immediately refuse to interpolate);
2. drop order-loosing pairs;
3. drop pairs based on distance;
4. drop pairs based on order-mapping counts;
5-6. permutations of approaches 3 and 4 ;
7-10. approach 2 in combination with either one of 3 to 6
Next to homogenization by dropping pairs, another approach is to drop no pairs but
assume all pairs have the same type, either order-preserving or order-reversing, whichever
occurs more often among x’ neighbor pairs or among pairs in ρ(S, x). If none of both types
occurs more often, interpolation is refused. However, this brute homogenization should
not be applied when the majority of reference pairs (i.e. x’ neighbor pairs or ρ(S, x)) have
an order-loosing mapping. The possible homogenization strategies now extend to:
11. assume a uniform mapping type based on x’ neighbors pairs;
12. assume a uniform mapping type based on ρ(S, x);
13. apply 11 and apply 12 if needed
Which of these strategies performs best in practice is evaluated in section 6.6.
6.3.4 Interpolation When Extending Existing Chains
To some extent the interpolation of a disclosure when x extends existing situation chains
(see figure 6.3.b) works similar to the case when x joins existing chains. However, some
aspects need to be handled differently. Again, first it is assumed that all chains which
x extends have the same order-mapping type, as illustrated in figure 6.6. Depending on
the order mappings found in the chains extended by x, the label l may be interpolated as
follows:
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Figure 6.6: Extending existing chains with homogeneous order mappings. Each
circle represents the person group feature of a disclosure situation while the orange,
bold-faced circle refers to a new situation, referenced as x within the text. The
letters represent person identifiers. The arrows display an is-subset-of relation with
regard to the person group. The annotations at the top of the circles illustrate the
information items disclosed in the relating situation. Here each digit represents one
specific information item. The question mark indicates that the information items
to disclose still need to be interpolated based on the situations whose person group
chains x extends.
a) In case of order-preserving mappings, the new disclosure l∗ is the intersection of
the disclosures of x’ neighbors if x extends the chains at the bottom. Otherwise, if
x extends chains at the top, l∗ is the union of the disclosures of x’ neighbors. In the
example displayed in figure 6.6.a this would result in l∗ = {2}.
b) Interpolation works symmetrically when the extended chains are order reversing, i.e.
l∗ is interpolated by the union of upper neighbors respectively the intersection of lower
neighbors. With regard to figure 6.6.b this would yield l∗ = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
c) Interpolation in case of order-ignoring mappings differs from the case of joining
chains in that the extended chains nevertheless may have different disclosures. In that
constellation there is no interpolation which preserves order-ignoring mappings within
the extended chains. Consider figure 6.6.c as an example. This case can be coped
with by selecting the disclosure of a neighbor (which potentially results in non-ignoring
order mappings with other neighbors) or by applying an order-preserving respectively
order-reversing interpolation:
Select an existing disclosure: Chose the disclosure which occurs most often in x’ clos-
est5 neighbors, in all of x’ neighbors, or in Φ(S, x), depending on which reference
set at first yields a winner (evaluated in the given order). If there is no winner,
refuse to interpolate or try the next strategy.
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Apply order-preserving or order-reversing interpolation: Assume an order-preserving
or order-reversing mapping, depending on which type occurs most often in ρ(S, x)
and then interpolate as in a) respectively b). Refuse to interpolate if both mapping
types occur equally often or if order-loosing mappings occur more often in ρ(S, x)
than any other mapping type.
Both approaches may be used individually or combined in the order listed here. This
results in 4 different strategies to interpolate when extending existing chains with order-
ignoring mappings where two or more chains have different disclosures:
1. do not interpolate
2. select a neighbor disclosure
3. apply order-preserving or order-reversing interpolation
4. use approach 2, if needed followed by approach 3
Supposed that strategy 4 is used, the example displayed in figure 6.6.c would result in
an interpolated disclosure of l∗ = {1}. If all neighbors of x had an equal distance, the
interpolated disclosure would be l∗ = {2}. In case all neighbors have an equal distance
and both disclosures would occur equally often, there would be an interpolation of
l∗ = ∅ if |ρp(S, x)| > |ρr(S, x)|, an interpolation of l∗ = {1, 2} in the opposite case, and
a refused interpolation if order-preserving and order-reversing mappings occur equally
often in ρ(S, x).
d) In contrast to the case of joining chains, it is still possible to interpolate when x extends
chains with order-loosingmappings since interpolation for an extending situation does
not break the order-loosing mappings within the existing chains. This works similar to
the case of extending chains with order-ignoring mappings where different chains have
different disclosures. In particular strategies 1 and 3 may be used here too. When
assuming an order-preserving mapping, the example in 6.6.d would result in l∗ = ∅.
The opposite case would yield l∗ = {1, 2}.
Handling heterogeneous order mappings
In case x extends chains which have heterogeneous order mappings, the same strategies
as used when joining chains apply here (see page 90), i.e. either refuse to interpolate or
discard selected chains until all remaining chains have the same order-mapping type. The
only difference is that distance-based discarding here only needs to consider the distances
of x’ neighbors, not both situations in the reference situation pairs.
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6.3.5 Interpolation When Missing Existing Chains
If the new situation x has neighbors but these neighbors are not part of any chains, as illus-
trated in figure 6.3.c, then these neighbors do not provide interpolation hints themselves.
However, similar strategies as used when extending chains with order-loosing mappings
may be may be used, i.e. interpolation is based on occurrences of order-mapping types in
ρ(S, x) only – see case d) on page 93.
Always use global order-mapping counts
Actually this interpolation variant may also be used for all order schemes where x has at
least one neighbor, i.e. in any case all pairs in ρ(S, x) (not only the direct neighbor pairs)
are used to select the order mapping used for interpolation. This is a comparatively simple
interpolation variant which does not have to deal with heterogeneous order mappings. It
only interpolates if there is exactly one most often occurring order-mapping type in ρ(S, x)
and if this type is either preserving or reversing. Otherwise the interpolation is refused.
6.3.6 Interpolation When Missing Any Neighbors
The disclosure of a new situation x where no existing situation in Φ(S, x) has a person
group feature with a sub- or superset relation to x’ person group feature g∗, i.e. x has
no neighbor situations, cannot be interpolated based on order mappings, resulting in a
refused interpolation respectively the delegation of the disclosure prediction to another
decision component.
6.3.7 Summary
On a very high level an interpolation based on order mappings can be summarized as
follows:
1. detect the order scheme given by a new situation x and previous situations S and
correspondingly compile the set of reference situations from S to be used for inter-
polation;
2. discard certain reference situations in order to homogenize order-mapping types
yielded by the reference situations;
3. interpolate disclosure for x based on detected order scheme, order-mapping types
found in remaining reference situations, and possibly general order-mapping types
in ρ(S, x)
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If in any of these steps the interpolation has been refused, the disclosure prediction must
be delegated to a fallback decision component, e.g. one of the general learning methods
reviewed in section 6.2.
Obviously, the less situations pairs with an order-loosing mapping exist the better is the
performance of an order-mapping–based interpolation. Additionally, the performance ben-
efits from homogeneous order-mapping types within potential sets of reference situations.
The evaluation of the presented interpolation-based disclosure prediction (see section 6.6)
complements performance results with order-mapping statistics in order to illustrate this
correlation.
The interpolation process may vary depending on several parameters. First, there are
the different strategies used to homogenize heterogeneous order mappings and to handle
order-ignoring mappings with multiple disclosures when extending situation chains. Other
parameters control if to refuse an interpolation when extending chains or when missing
existing chains. Further, the definition of lower and upper neighbors from section 6.3.1 may
be altered to only consider neighbors with a minimal distance to the situation to interpolate
(which in turn would make distance-based homogenization strategies obsolete). Finally,
interpolations may be configured to require a minimum number of neighbors in order to
get active. Section 6.6 describes the process of choosing a suitable parameter setup.
An implementation of this method can be found in the DiLES software (see section 6.6
and appendix B), in particular in the class OMILearner within the package diles.learn.
wrappers.social.
Implicit Self-Deactivation
A special characteristic of the interpolation-based learning method presented in this section
is its implicit ability to estimate its suitability for an applied data set. This is the case when
the parameters are set properly by a parameter optimization in face of a given training
set. This method always works in conjunction with another fallback learning method
which is activated when an interpolation is refused. Hence, a parameter optimization
implicitly defines the cases when an interpolation should be used and when the fallback
learner should be used. In particular any parameter specifying required neighbor situation
constellations contributes to the implicit self-deactivation of the interpolation learner for
situations where it performs worse than the fallback learner. A positive consequence of
this characteristic is that the interpolation learner potentially performs at least as good
as its fallback learner alone in all training set cases and in most new cases (the results
presented in section 6.6.8 illustrate this aspect).
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Figure 6.7: Path-integrated and path-connected disclosure pre-
dictions. The circles represent disclosures while the arrows display
is-subset-of relations. A predicted disclosure (dashed circle) may
integrate into or connect to paths given by disclosures of previous
situations (solid circle). The trivial case when no existing paths are
touched by a predicted disclosure is not illustrated here. a) integrated b) connected
6.4 Validate Predictions Using Disclosure Patterns
The previous section described how to use disclosure patterns from section 4.1 to predict
disclosures of new situations. Additionally, these patterns may be used to validate pre-
dictions in order to prevent wrong predictions. Even if disclosures cannot be predicted in
a reasonable amount of cases, automating them with learning methods is still desirable if
wrong predictions are detected in advance. Thus, the purpose of a validator is to decide
if to support or prevent a prediction made by a learning method.
The patterns described in section 4.1 are based on social context information, in particular
the set of persons receiving the information to disclose. Consequently, when validating the
predicted disclosure of a new situation, only previous situations with identical non-social
context should be considered. With reference to the formal groundwork in section 6.3.1,
these situations are given by Φ(S, x) where S denotes all previous situations and x denotes
the new situation.
6.4.1 Disclosure Paths
The pattern of disclosure paths describes the fact that the set of disclosures is a partially
ordered set where consecutive subset relations between disclosures can be seen as disclosure
paths (see figure 4.2 on page 46). More precise, each maximal chain in the poset of
disclosures is considered as a disclosure path. Following are four approaches how to utilize
these paths in order to validate predicted disclosures.
Integrated in existing disclosure paths: The most simple variant is to only accept disclo-
sures which integrate into existing disclosure paths, i.e. which do not increase the
number of disclosure paths (see figure 6.7.a).
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Connected to existing disclosure paths: A looser validation is to also accept predicted
disclosures which create new disclosure paths but which are connected to existing
paths (see figure 6.7.b).
Major disclosure paths: Both previous validations may be varied in that not any exist-
ing paths but only major ones are considered. This raises the question when a
path actually is considered as a major one, i.e. which length it must have at least.
Straightforward candidates for this length threshold are the mean or a quartile of all
path lengths.
6.4.2 Disclosure Complexity
Validation based on disclosure complexity follows the principle of not trying to automate
an apparently complex disclosure behavior. The degree of complexity may be distinguished
based on the poset width of previous disclosures and/or the number of unique disclosures
in relation to the number of all disclosures (among the situations in Φ(S, x)).
Poset width: The simplest approach is to set a maximum poset width and prevent dis-
closures for situations x where the poset width of disclosures from Φ(S, x) is greater
than the specified maximum.
Ratio of poset width to number of unique disclosures: Alternatively, a maximum ratio
of the poset width to the number of unique disclosures from previous situations
Φ(S, x) could be used. For any situation set Φ(S, x) which yields a higher ratio,
predictions would be prevented.
Ratio of unique disclosures to number of situations: Similar to the poset width a maxi-
mum number of unique disclosures may be used to prevent disclosure predictions for
new situations. However, in practice this is likely to prevent many correct predictions
if the cardinality of Φ(S, x) is significantly larger than than the maximum number of
unique disclosures. A more robust validation also considers this cardinality and uses
the ratio of the number of unique disclosures to the number of previous situations
and only supports predictions when this ratio is below a certain maximum.
6.4.3 Disclosure Usage Counts
The idea of using disclosure usage counts for validation is to only support predictions of
established disclosures. The notion of being established may by interpreted as follows.
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Absolute usage counts: A simple interpretation is to only support predictions of disclo-
sures which have been used at least a certain number of times within the situations
in Φ(S, x).
Relative usage counts: A more sophisticated interpretation considers relative usage
counts, i.e. it only supports predictions of major disclosures. Similar to major dis-
closure paths, straightforward count thresholds indicating major disclosures are the
mean count or a quartile of all disclosure usage counts within Φ(S, x).
6.4.4 Order Mapping
In addition to interpolation (see section 6.3), order-mapping–based patterns may be used
to validate disclosure predictions. The basic idea is to check if the predicted disclosure of
a new situation conforms with the order mappings found among the neighbor situations
of the new situation. Obviously this only works if there are neighbors, as illustrated in
figure 6.3. In all other cases a default validation result (support or prevent) has to be
used. Further, an order-mapping–based validation is not needed when the new situation
and its prediction exactly match an existing situation and its corresponding disclosure. In
that case the prediction would be supported right away. Depending on the new situation’s
neighbors, an order-mapping–based validation works as follows.
Validation When Joining Existing Chains
When the new situation joins existing chains (see figure 6.3.a), a predicted disclosure
conforms with existing order mappings if the new situation conforms with, i.e. does not
break, at least a certain percent of mappings. A predicted disclosure for a new situation
x is defined to conform with the mapping of a situation pair (y, z), where y is a lower
neighbor and z is an upper neighbor of x, if the order-mapping of the pair (y, z) is:
a) order loosing (because there is no relation which could be broken),
b) order reversing and the two new pairs (y, x) and (x, y) have an order-ignoring or order-
reversing mapping,
c) order preserving and the two new pairs (y, x) and (x, y) have an order-ignoring or
order-preserving mapping,
d) order ignoring and both new pairs also have an order-ignoring mapping.
Figure 6.8 provides two corresponding examples. In the left example (l∗ = {1, 2, 3}) 3
out of 8 mappings are broken. In the right one (l∗ = {2}) 5 out of 8 are broken. If
only the closest neighbors had been considered (that is without the three rightmost upper
neighbors), the left example would break all mappings while the right one would break
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Figure 6.8: Two examples of order-mapping conformance when a situation (for
which a prediction is to be validated) joins existing chains. Each circle represents
the person group feature of a disclosure situation while the orange, bold-faced circles
refer to a new situation. The letters represent person identifiers. The arrows display
an is-subset-of relation with regard to the person group. The annotations at the
top of the circles illustrate the information items disclosed respectively predicted
in the corresponding situation. Here each digit represents one specific information
item. Dashed arrows indicate order mappings which get broken by the predicted
disclosure.
none. In the not illustrated example of a predicted disclosure of l∗ = {2, 3}, the mappings
of all pairs but those with an order-ignoring or an order-loosing mapping would be broken,
i.e. 6 out of 8 broken mappings.
The cases b) and c) also accept order-ignoring mappings because it is not always possible
to predict a disclosure which has a subset relation with the disclosure of its lower and
upper neighbor. This is the case when their difference consists of only one item, as seen in
the right example in figure 6.8: there is no disclosure which is a subset of {1, 2} respectively
{2, 3} and at the same time a superset of {2}. Additionally, if one order mapping of the
resulting two new pairs is order-ignoring, the other one implicitly equals the order-mapping
of the existing pair.
Validation When Extending Existing Chains
Similar to the case of joining situation chains, when a new situation extends existing chains
(see figure 6.3.b), a predicted disclosure conforms with existing order mappings if the new
situation conforms with at least a certain percent of mappings. However, the definition of
conforms differs. Let x be a new situation and let y be an upper neighbor situation which
itself has an upper neighbor z. A predicted disclosure for x is defined to conform with the
mapping of an upper situation pair (y, z), if this pair’s mapping is:
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Figure 6.9: Two examples of order-mapping conformance when a situation, whose
prediction is to be validated, extends existing chains. Each circle represents the
person group feature of a disclosure situation while the orange, bold-faced circles
refer to a new situations. The letters represent person identifiers. The arrows display
an is-subset-of relation with regard to the person group. The annotations at the top
of the circles illustrate the information items disclosed respectively predicted in the
relating situation. Here each digit represents one specific information item. Dashed
arrows indicate order mappings which get broken by the predicted disclosure.
a) order loosing (because there is no relation which could be broken),
b) order reversing and the new pair (x, y) has an order-ignoring or order-reversing map-
ping,
c) order preserving and the new pair (x, y) has an order-ignoring or order-preserving
mapping, or
d) order ignoring and the new pair (x, y) also has an order-ignoring mapping.
The cases b) and c) also accept combinations of order-preserving respectively order-
reversing with order-ignoring mappings because order-ignoring mappings in (x, y) still
ensure that the pairs (x, z) and (y, z) have identical mappings. Order-mapping confor-
mance is symmetrical when x extends chains at the top, i.e. when x has lower neighbors
which also have lower neighbors. Here one would inspect the existing pairs (z, y) and the
new pair (y, x).
Two examples of order-mappings conformance are illustrated in figure 6.9. In the left case
the predicted disclosure of l∗ = {2} conforms with with the order mappings of 3 out of
5 existing upper neighbor situation pairs. In the right case, with l∗ = {1, 2, 3}, there’s
a conformance with only 2 out of 5 order-mappings. An order-mapping–based validation
with a minimum ratio of conforming order-mappings of 0.5 would support the prediction
of the left case but prevent the right one.
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Validation When Creating New Chains
In case the new situation has either upper or lower neighbors which do not have further
upper respectively lower neighbors (see figure 6.3.c), the only way to validate disclosures
based on order mappings is to use general order-mapping counts (among situation pairs
in ρ(S, x)) as a reference. That is, only these disclosures are supported where one of the
most often occurring order mappings among the resulting new situation pairs (given by x
and its neighbors) also is one of the most often occurring order mappings in ρ(S, x).
Parametrization
An order-mapping–based validation may be parametrized in several ways. First, validation
when extending chains or when creating new chains may be skipped. The rationale here is
that these two cases are weaker indications of order-mapping conformance. Further, when
joining or extending chains, the required minimum ratio of conforming order mappings
may be varied. Straightforward ratio thresholds are 0.5, 0.75, and 1.0.
6.4.5 Combinations
Some of the validation methods presented above can also used in combination while other
impede each other or are redundant. For instance a validation based on disclosure usage
counts makes a validation based on the creation of a new disclosure path obsolete (an
already used disclosure cannot create new disclosure paths). Also, a complexity-based
validator and an order-mapping–based validator impede each other in that the latter one
requires a certain complexity of disclosures in order to come into action. However, reason-
able combinations are:
Usage count and major disclosure paths: First, check if a minimum usage count (abso-
lute or relative) of a disclosure is given. If this validation succeeds, check if the
predicted disclosure is part of a major disclosure path.
Usage count and order mappings: First, check if a minimum usage count (absolute or
relative) of a disclosure is given. If this validation succeeds, validate based on order-
mappings.
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6.5 Utilizing Scenario-specific Semantic Information
Next to disclosure patterns, scenario-specific semantic information may help learning meth-
ods in reasoning about disclosure predictions. For instance information types like identi-
fying or communicational respectively transient or long-living (see section 3.2.2) could be
used to define an ordering of information items similar to the set-based ordering utilized
in sections 6.3 and 6.4. Then this ordering may also be used to interpolate and validate
disclosures. In general, any knowledge about the relative sensitivity of personal informa-
tion is a valuable input for disclosure assistance mechanisms. The same approach may
also be applied to the medium used to communicate information (e.g. a display wall is
more public than a personal device of an information recipient). However, here these ideas
are only mentioned for the sake of conceptual completeness. Subsequent implementations
and evaluations in this work do not investigate this further. An investigation of this ap-
proach seems to be more promising in face of a particular real-life scenario, i.e. for now it
is pointed out as a candidate for future work.
6.6 Evaluation
The previous sections described several techniques for automating the disclosure of per-
sonal information. This section elaborates how these techniques may be evaluated. Basi-
cally an evaluation should be able to answer the following questions:
How do different learning methods compare to each other? This is the most obvious
question. However, methods may be compared to each other in various ways. First, there
are the different performance metrics to consider (see section 6.2). Additionally, these
metrics may be compared globally, i.e. using all tests made with a learning method, or
progressively, i.e. depending on the size of the training set used to learn a prediction
model. For instance there might be methods which perform best when only a few previous
situations exist while they are outperformed by other methods when a large situation set
is available for training. Last but not least, each method should be compared to a plain
or majority-based guessing of disclosures.
Which learner configurations perform best? Learners usually may be configured by sev-
eral parameters. Especially the parametrization of a disclosure interpolation (see section
6.3) is very complex. Determining the best configuration for a learner is an import finding
when evaluating learning methods.
How do different validation methods compare to each other? Section 6.4 described
several validation methods for made predictions. The number of prevented negative (i.e.
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wrong) and supported positive (i.e. correct) predictions is almost as important as general
learner performance metrics. Validators face the opposing requirements to prevent as much
negative predictions as possible while preventing as less positive predictions as possible.
Thus, the actual question is which validator performs best depending on the relevance
assigned to each requirement.
Which correlations exist between results and disclosure patterns? In context of the
elaboration of disclosure patterns in section 4.1, it has been claimed that these patterns
have an impact on disclosure assistance mechanisms. To investigate this impact, the
evaluation system should provide means to inspect correlations between patterns and
prediction performances, validation performances, as well as learner configurations.
Are there generally well-performing methods, configurations, or validators? In other
words this question asks if some methods, configurations, or validators perform equally
well for different users or if results are rather diversified across different users respectively
disclosure behaviors. In the latter case disclosure assistance systems would have to dynam-
ically choose appropriate settings which increases implementation complexity and required
computing resources.
An evaluation system has been developed which is supposed to provide answers to these
questions. The next sections up to 6.6.6 present this evaluation system. This is followed
by a description of the data sets (i.e. scenarios) applied to the evaluation system in section
6.6.7. Finally, sections 6.6.8 and 6.6.9 present and discuss the corresponding evaluation
results. Note that subsequently the developed evaluation system is referred to as DiLES6
(disclosure learning evaluation system).
6.6.1 Evaluation System Overview
The general steps of the evaluation process are illustrated in figure 6.10: The system
loads a scenario and sets up evaluation tasks for different combinations of scenario prepro-
cessors, wrapping learners (e.g. hierarchical learners), and base learners. These parallelly
executable evaluation tasks produce a set of performance results which finally are collected
for analysis and visualization. Subsequently these steps are described in more detail.
6The software and data related to this system is available at the Open Science Repository of the Com-
puter Science Department at Rostock University: http://opsci.informatik.uni-rostock.de/index.
php/DiLES. Further information can be found in appendix B.
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Figure 6.10: Overview of the evaluation process.
6.6.2 Scenario Representation
Scenarios to evaluate are described as a sequence of situations, where each situation de-
scribes a disclosure decision of a subject (the user) based on the disclosure modality and
multiple context information items. This resembles the situation representation described
in section 6.1.1 on page 74. A scenario may contain situations for multiple subjects. How-
ever, the evaluation system unfolds them to individual scenarios for each subject so that a
finally evaluated scenario only contains situations for one specific subject. Table 6.1 shows
an excerpt of a scenario, in particular its first four situations. The disclosure decisions
have been omitted for readability reasons – examples like those given in section 6.1.2 on
page 74 would fit here too. The only required items per situation are subject, persons
(information receivers), and disclosure. All other items are domain-specific context items.
Technically scenarios are written in YAML (Ben-Kiki et al., 2009), which makes them easy
to read and write for humans. Context information item values may be numeric, nominal
(given as a string identifier), or sets (given as a sequence of nominal values). Disclosure
decisions are given as sets of information items, each a string whose hierarchical structure
is encoded using a dot-separator. Appendix B provides an example scenario definition and
further details on how to define scenarios.
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S1 S2 S3 S4 ..
Subject Bob Bob Sue Bob
Trigger start meeting start meeting start meeting start meeting
Medium display wall user devices display wall display wall
Persons Sue, Pete Sue Bob Pete, Paul
Tags internal, meeting external, meeting internal, meeting internal, meeting
Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 6.1: Illustrative excerpt of an exemplary scenario to evaluate. The columns
describe situations from the perspective of a certain subject with corresponding
context information items and the subject’s disclosure decision.
ID Description Example
MR Encode disclosure modalities as label root elements. canvas.documents.x
ML Encode disclosure modalities as label leaf elements. contacts.bob.mobile
Table 6.2: DiLES built-in preprocessors.
6.6.3 Preprocessors
Prior to their evaluation scenarios may be passed through one or more preprocessors.
Preprocessors may filter or edit features (situation context) as well as disclosures. For
instance DiLES provides preprocessors for modality encoding: disclosure modalities may
be encoded in disclosures either as root or leaf elements of individual disclosed items.
Currently these two preprocessor types are the only ones evaluated but as described in
section B.5 (Extending DiLES) new preprocessors and their combinations can be added
easily.
Preprocessing scenarios for modality encoding is particularly important if a disclosure situ-
ation provides multiple modalities to communicate information. Here the chosen modality
actually is part of the disclosure. Generally it is not possible to decide if a chosen modal-
ity dictates the information items to disclose with this modality or if it is the other way
around (an information item dictates the modality to use for its disclosure). The first case
motivates to encode modalities as top-level elements in the hierarchical structure of infor-
mation items while the latter case recommends to encode them as leaf elements. In order
to evaluate which encoding generally (or per subject) performs better, both corresponding
preprocessors have to be considered. For later reference (especially in evaluation results)
these two basic preprocessors are summarized in table 6.2.
Further preprocessors may be used to alter, eliminate or join features. However, as this is
a more general machine learning issue not directly related to disclosure prediction, such
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ID Method Implementation
KNN k-Nearest Neighbors Own (based on Segaran, 2007)
NB Naive Bayes Own (based on Segaran, 2007)
SVM Support Vector Machine LIBSVM (Chang & Lin, 2011)
RL Rule Induction Orange, CN2 (Demsˇar et al., 2004; Clark & Niblett, 1989)
DT Decision Tree Own (based on Roach, 2006)
GS Guess Majority Own (trivial)
Table 6.3: Base learner implementation details.
ID Method Implementation
PS Powerset Own (based on Tsoumakas et al., 2010)
BR Binary Relevance Own (based on Tsoumakas et al., 2010)
HBR Hierarchical Binary Relevance Own (based on Wu et al., 2005)
OMI Order-Mapping Interpolation According to section 6.3
Table 6.4: Wrapping learner implementation details.
preprocessors are not evaluated at this point. The specific scenarios considered in this
work already have rather high-level features which can be used directly. Additionally,
basic feature selection is also part of a later step in the evaluation process – then with
regard to a specific subject and learning algorithm. Anyway, as already mentioned new
preprocessors can be added easily once the need for them arises.
6.6.4 Wrapping and Base Learners
Evaluating disclosure prediction performances of learning algorithms is the primary pur-
pose of DiLES. Section 6.2 described several base and wrapping learning methods. Ad-
ditionally section 6.3 presented a new pattern-based wrapping learner. Evaluating these
methods means to evaluate all combinations of base and wrapping learners. The tables 6.3
and 6.4 provide implementation details for the specific learning methods used in DiLES.
Similar to preprocessors DiLES can be extended to consider further algorithms. Details
on this can be found in the appendix section B.5.
Parametrization
Some of the learning methods accept parameters which influence their behavior. Espe-
cially the Order-Mapping Interpolation (OMI) method has many parameters. Next to
performance results, DiLES also shows the particular learner configurations used for spe-
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cific evaluations. Table 6.5 summarizes the parameters of configurable learning method
implementations.
6.6.5 Evaluation Tasks
An evaluation task is given by a specific combination of a preprocessor, base learner, and
wrapping learner. As illustrated in figure 6.10 it involves feature selection and parameter
optimization, followed by one iterative validation using the original situation sequence
order of a scenario and a given number of iterative validations using randomized situation
orders. Each iterative validation step is followed by an evaluation of a disclosure-pattern–
based validator (as described in section 6.4).
Feature Selection and Parameter Optimization
DiLES uses an evolutionary approach to select features (in context of the task’s specific
combination of preprocessor, base, and wrapping learner) and to parametrize the used base
and wrapping learner. In particular it uses a genetic algorithm with ranking, mutation,
and crossover to find an optimal solution, i.e. a selection of features and parameter values.
Obviously this requires that base and wrapping learners define a reasonable parameter
space to search in. The fitness of a solution is evaluated by performing a cross-validation
(type and parameters are configurable) on the available preprocessed scenario situations.
However, when the size of the parameter and feature space is below a certain (configurable)
limit, a complete grid search is used instead of the evolutionary approach. Details on the
implementation can be found in the source of DiLES, specifically in the file src/diles/
learn/util.py (see appendix B).
Iterative Validation
Typically learning methods are evaluated using cross validation. However, in face of the
targeted application use case, an iterative validation is more expressive to evaluate the
performance of a learning method. The rationale is that an iterative validation resembles
the way in which learners are applied when actually used. That is, the number of situations
which may be used to train a learner grows iteratively. A scenario with n situations results
in n− 2 iteration steps, where step i (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) uses the first i situations for training
and situation i + 1 for testing. This setting may be varied in that i starts at a greater
value than 1 and that multiple situations are used for testing, e.g. also i + 2, i + 3 etc.
In contrast, a cross validation only estimates the performance when a certain number of
situations to learn from is already available. Such an evaluation could bias performance
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Learner & Parameters Description
DT fitness Heuristic function used to decide which attribute to split on when
building the tree. Example: gain
KNN k Number of neighbors to consider when voting for a label (i.e. dis-
closure). Example: 3
dwsigma The sigma value to use for a Gaussian function which weights
votes based on a neighbor’s distance. A greater sigma increases
the weights of greater distances (vice versa, a smaller sigma reduces
the influence of farther neighbors). Example: 2.0
NB iprob, iweight The initial probability of a feature-value-label combination and
its weight. These parameters describe a default conditional prob-
ability based on iweight hypothetical previous samples (Laplace
correction used for feature values in new situations which did not
occur in training situations). Example: 0.5, 1.0
lpcm Laplace correction mode, either on a per-label basis or globally.
Generally, per-label correction performs better when labels are
balanced (uniform class distribution). In contrast, if label occur-
rences are unbalanced, a global Laplace correction tends to yield
better predictions. Example: global
RL The parameters for the Rule Induction (RL) learner directly correspond to those
accepted by the underlying Orange system (Demsˇar et al., 2004). They are used to
adjust the process of finding and evaluating rules and to limit the size of a generated
rule set. More detailed information can be found in the Orange documentation.
SVM The parameters for the SVM learner directly correspond to those accepted by the
underlying LibSVM system (Chang & Lin, 2011). They are used to select and
configure kernel and error calculation functions. More detailed information can be
found in the LibSVM documentation.
PS The Powerset wrapper does not accept any parameters.
BR The Binary Relevance wrapper does not accept any parameters.
HBR The Hierarchical Binary Relevance wrapper does not accept any parameters.
OMI The OMI wrapper parameters are described in detail in section 6.3. Following are
only short descriptions of the particular terms used in DiLES evaluation results.
variants Interpolation variants. Specifies if to only consider cases of join-
ing situation chains, or also extending or creating situation chains,
or if to stick to a simple global order-mapping-count–based inter-
polation (as described in section 6.3.5). Example: [ipolextend,
ipolcreate]
minneighbors The minimum number of neighbors required for interpolation.
Note that a high value of this parameter practically deactivates
any interpolation. Example: 2
nearestonly Only consider the nearest neighbors for interpolation. Example:
False
homogenize Homogenization strategies. Strategies and their combinations are
listed in section 6.3.3 on page 91. Example: [droploosing, distance]
Table 6.5: Learning method configuration parameters. For specific possible values
besides the given examples, please inspect the paramspace attribute in learning
method implementations (more details in appendix B) respectively the evaluation
results described in section 6.6.8.
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results in that it favors methods which perform well on larger training sets but perform
significantly worse on small training sets.
In any case, an iterative validation is performed using the scenario situations in their
original order. Depending on the used scenario the order may not be relevant. In that
case, a more expressive evaluation is to do multiple iterative validations, each with a
randomized order. The number of of randomized orders can be specified as a command
line argument when running DiLES’s scenario evaluation command (see appendix B for
details).
Finally, in each iteration step, a predicted disclosure is validated using the prediction
validators described in section 6.6.5. The outcome of each validator is a simple binary
value whether the prediction is supported or not.
Predicted disclosures, true disclosures (according to the scenario), prediction confidences,
and validator results are collected for each iteration step. These values are wrapped by
so called performance objects which provide various metrics on the values, in particular
the metrics described in section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. Performance objects may provide metrics
for all predictions made for a specific situation order or for predictions made in a certain
iteration among all situation orders. This allows to investigate the progress of learner
performances when the training set grows as well as general performance results. The
example evaluation results presented in section 6.6.8 illustrate these different performance
perspectives.
Parallelization
The number of evaluation tasks is given by product of the number of subjects, prepro-
cessor chains, base learners, and wrapping learners. Considering one subject only, the
methods currently available in DiLES result in 48 evaluation tasks. Each additional sub-
ject multiplies this number. Depending on the number of situations in a scenario and the
number of used randomized situation orders, a single task may require a few seconds up
to several minutes. The latter case motivates to parallelize tasks in order to reduce the
evaluation run-time. DiLES automatically runs evaluation tasks parallelized, one task for
each available CPU core.
6.6.6 Analysis and Visualization
Using the result of an evaluation, DiLES renders various plots which provide different
views on these results. Specifically, the following plots are available.
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Figure 6.11: Example plot of DiLES’ evaluation result analysis. Progress of the
metric h-accuracy for all base learners in combination with a Binary Relevance (BR)
wrapper.
Progress Analysis
Several plots show how learning methods evolve over time. DiLES provides comparisons
of base and wrapping learners for specific metrics as well as a comparison of all metrics
(accuracy, match, etc.) for a specific combination of preprocessor, base and wrapping
learner. Figures 6.11 to 6.13 are examples of such progress view plots. Note that these
plots show smoothed results (using a moving average) since not single iteration steps but
general trends for increasing training set sizes are supposed to be visualized. In the given
examples the y-values for each training size set (i.e. iteration step) are means from 20
randomized situation orders. If original single metric values are binary, e.g. in case of
the match metric, the y-values represent ratios – this is indicated by an asterisk in the
legend.
Global Analysis
Next to progress-oriented analysis DiLES renders plots which summarize performance
metrics globally by averaging metrics across all iteration steps (except the first 10, where
each method is likely to fail similarly) and randomized situation orders. In particular
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Figure 6.12: Example plot of DiLES’ evaluation result analysis. Progress of
the metric match for all wrapper methods in combination with a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) learner.
there is one plot for each metric (see section 6.2) which globally compares combinations of
preprocessors, base and wrapping learners. Further, there are global plots which compare
prediction validators. Examples for such plots are given by figures 6.14 to 6.16.
Global metric comparison Figures 6.14 and 6.15 are examples for plots comparing com-
binations of preprocessor, base learner and wrapper with reference to specific performance
metrics and subjects of the evaluated scenario. Results are illustrated using box and
whisker plots. The shown values are based on predictions made in each step of the itera-
tive evaluation process (i.e. it also includes predictions made when only a small training
set has been used).
Validator performance Figure 6.16 is an example of a plot comparing the performance of
prediction validators. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 list the prediction validators provided by DiLES
and which are referenced in plots like figure 6.16. The green bars represent the ratio of
positive (matching) predictions among all predictions made during the iterative evaluation
process. In contrast the orange bars represent negative (mismatching) predictions. The
lighter fraction of the orange bars represent the ratio of negative predictions prevented
by a corresponding validator (combination) given in the x-axis. The lighter fractions of
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Figure 6.13: Example plot of DiLES’ evaluation result analysis. Progress of
different metrics for an Order-Mapping Interpolation (OMI) wrapper in combination
with a Rule Induction (RL) learner.
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Figure 6.14: Example plot of DiLES’ evaluation result analysis. Global metric
comparison (h-accuracy).
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Figure 6.15: Example plot of DiLES’ evaluation result analysis. Global metric
comparison (h-submatch).
the green bars provide the ratios of positive predictions prevented by a validator. Ideally
the green bar would be completely dark green (no prevented positive prediction) and the
orange bar would be completely light orange (all negative predictions prevented). In the
shown example, the validator pwr25 prevents almost all negative predictions. However, it
also prevents almost all positive predictions, i.e. it does not provide any useful contribution.
On the other side, the validator combination uc1 + cmdp prevents almost every second
negative prediction while only a few positive predictions are prevented.
Runtime Performance
Though runtime statistics of a learning mechanism are not a major issue it is still interest-
ing to investigate how different mechanisms compare to each other in terms of computa-
tional resources for parameter optimization, training, and prediction. Similar to progress
and global analysis, DiLES illustrates this information on a per subject basis. Figure 6.17
is a corresponding example. Here the training times from all iteration steps are shown
for each combination of a preprocessor, wrapper and base learner. Note that the abso-
lute values are not very meaningful since they mostly depend on implementation details.
Instead, these plots are supposed to show relative differences among wrapper and learner
combinations. The displayed example shows that the Binary Relevance (BR) and Hier-
archical Binary Relevance (HBR) wrappers in combination with a Decision Tree (DT),
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Validators based on disclosure complexity
pw1 Poset width of previous disclosures is at most 1.
pw2 Poset width of previous disclosures is at most 2.
pwr25 Ratio of poset width of previous disclosures to the number of unique previous dis-
closures is at most 0.25.
pwr50 Same as pwr25 but with a maximum ratio of 0.5.
pwr75 Same as pwr25 but with a maximum ratio of 0.75.
udr25 Ratio of the number of unique previous disclosures to the number of previous situ-
ations is at most 0.25.
udr50 Same as udr25 but with a maximum ratio of 0.5.
udr75 Same as udr25 but with a maximum ratio of 0.75.
Validators based on disclosure paths
cmdp Predicted disclosure is connected to a major disclosure path (length is at least the
mean of all disclosure paths).
csdp Predicted disclosure is connected to a super disclosure path (length is at least the
3rd quartile of all disclosure paths).
cxdp Predicted disclosure is connected to an existing disclosure path.
imdp Predicted disclosure is integrated in a major disclosure path (length is at least the
mean of all disclosure paths).
isdp Predicted disclosure is integrated in a super disclosure path (length is at least the
3rd quartile of all disclosure paths).
ixdp Predicted disclosure is integrated in an existing disclosure path.
Validators based on order mapping
om50 Situation to predict joins existing situation chains and the predicted disclosure har-
monizes with at least 50% of the order mappings among the neighbor situations.
om75 Same as om50 but requires 75% harmonizing order mappings.
om100 Same as om50 but requires 100% harmonizing order mappings.
omx50 Same as om50 but also consider the case of extending situation chains.
omx75 Same as omx50 but requires 75% harmonizing order mappings.
omx100 Same as omx50 but requires 100% harmonizing order mappings.
omxc50 Same as omx50 but also consider the case of creating new situation chains and then
check if the new order mapping is one that globally occurs most often.
omxc75 Same as omxc50 but requires 75% harmonizing order mappings.
omxc100 Same as omxc75 but requires 100% harmonizing order mappings.
Validators based on usage counts
uc1 Absolute usage count of predicted disclosure is at least 1.
uc2 Absolute usage count of predicted disclosure is at least 2.
ucm Predicted disclosure is a major disclosure (usage count is at least the mean of all
disclosure usage counts).
ucs Predicted disclosure is a super disclosure (usage count is at least the 3rd quartile of
all disclosure usage counts).
Table 6.6: Validators and their support conditions. The validators listed in this
table are specific implementations of the concepts described in section 6.4.
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Validators based on prediction confidences or hierarchical information
minconf Confidence is above a static minimum confidence.
dynconf Confidence is above a dynamic (evolving) confidence threshold.
hierarchy All predicted information elements are leafs within the hierarchically structured set
of information items (only applies when using the Hierarchical Binary Relevance
(HBR) wrapper).
Table 6.7: Validators and their support conditions. The validators listed in this
table are specific implementations of the concepts described in section 6.2.2 and
6.2.3.
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Figure 6.16: Example plot of DiLES’ evaluation result analysis. This plot shows
the performance of prediction validators for a specific combination of preprocessor,
wrapper and learner.
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Figure 6.17: Example plot of DiLES’ evaluation result analysis. Training time
performance for different combinations of wrappers and base learners.
Rule Induction (RL) or Support Vector Machine (SVM) learner require significantly more
training time than other combinations.
Scenario Analysis
In order to correlate evaluation results with patterns of information disclosure as described
in section 4.1, scenarios are analyzed according to these patterns and then illustrated
in summarizing plots (one per subject occurring in a scenario). Figure 6.18 shows two
examples of scenario analysis plots. The subject related to the left plot appears to have
a more complex disclosure behavior than the subject related to the right plot. On the
left side, the number of unique disclosures is greater. Additionally, the right subject often
disclosed the same information. Also, order mappings are rather homogeneous on the
right side – in almost all cases they were either order-reversing or order-ignoring. Such
information helps in reasoning about different performance results among subjects of a
scenario.
Plot Compositions
Since there may be a high number of plots resulting from an analyzed scenario, viewing
plots individually is cumbersome and not very helpful. For this purpose DiLES arranges
plots in interactive HTML-based combined views. These views allow to selectively compare
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Figure 6.18: Example plot of DiLES’ evaluation result analysis. Scenario analysis.
different plots by filtering by subject, preprocessor, base learner, wrapping learner, and
metric. Next to result plots the composition view also shows (a) the scenario used for the
evaluation, (b) the particular learner and wrapper configurations used (as a result of the
afore mentioned parameter optimization), and (c) noteworthy statistics of a learner across
the whole iterative evaluation (e.g. which interpolation method has been used how often
by the OMI wrapper). Figures 6.19 to 6.20 illustrate these plot compositions.
6.6.7 Scenarios
Getting data, i.e. scenarios, which may be used to evaluate disclosure prediction is a
problematic issue. The targeted application area of smart environments and corresponding
use cases including versatile information exchange are still in development and not yet
used on a daily basis in productive settings. To alleviate this lack of real world data the
evaluation has been done with a manually composed scenario and a scenarios derived from
the data gathered in the survey described in section 4.3. Another promising approach is
to automatically generate scenarios based on specific patterns of disclosure behavior.
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Figure 6.19: Screenshot of DiLES plot compositions. This example shows rank-
ings of preprocessor, wrapper and learner combinations for selected metrics and
subjects. Plots to show are selected in the parameter sidebar on the left. Green
parameter values indicate that a corresponding plot is shown. To identify the plots
for specific parameter values, the mouse may be moved over a corresponding value
to fade out all non-matching plots (as shown in this example screenshot).
Manually Composed Scenario
The manually composed scenario is about Bob, a web developer working as a freelancer.
Sue contacts Bob and requests him to develop and set up a customized WCMS for her
company. The scenario describes several meetings which take placing during the lifetime
of this project. A detailed description of this scenario including all situations can be found
in appendix C.
Scenarios Derived from DiHabs Survey
The data of the conducted DiHabs survey (see section 4.3) has been converted to be used
as a DiLES scenario. Here the type of information has been used to set up a hierarchy
on disclosed information as well as a label-based context information besides the persons
which are supposed to retrieve disclosed information. The following excerpt of the scenario
file illustrates the conversion result:
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Figure 6.20: Screenshot of DiLES plot compositions. This example shows plots
which compare the progress of different performance metrics (during the iterative
evaluation process) for the used wrapper methods. If the mouse pointer is moved
over a specific plot, the corresponding parameters in the sidebar are highlighted.
- disclosure: [’x:type-2.item-0’, ’x:type-2.item-1’]
labels: [’2’]
persons: [’1’, ’2’]
subject: ’3’
- disclosure: [’x:type-3.item-5’, ’x:type-3.item-6’]
labels: [’3’]
persons: [’2’, ’3’, ’4’, ’6’]
subject: ’3’
This shows two situations which correspond to two answers made by the survey partic-
ipant number 3. In the first situations persons 1 and 2 where part of the situation and
thus information receiver. The situation is annotated with a label ’2’ which indicates
the situation type, i.e. information type asked for in the interview. The information type
also contributes the hierarchical structure of disclosed information items. Since the con-
ducted DiHabs survey did not consider different disclosure modalities for the same types
of information, all disclosures have the same modality (here encoded as an ’x’). Because
the interview data has been anonymized, this scenario has no meaningful values but plain
numbers. Nevertheless it expresses survey-based disclosure behavior. See appendix C for
more details on this scenario.
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Generated Scenarios
Automatically generated scenarios bear the risk of being not representative concerning real
world situations (even more than manually composed scenarios). On the other side, they
allow to express scenarios where subjects follow specific patterns of disclosure behavior.
This makes it possible to evaluate learning mechanisms with regard to explicit disclosure
patterns. Another advantage of generated scenarios is the comparatively high amount of
evaluation data provided by them. In this work this approach is not investigated further
but seen as a potential future work. However, a starting point for work in this area is
provided in Bu¨nnig (2009a).
6.6.8 Results
As anticipated, evaluation results of the investigated scenarios differ widely among the
subjects of a scenario. For instance, there is no base learner and no wrapper method which
performs best for most subjects. The individuality of results per subject are illustrated
in the following subsection. Nevertheless, overall rankings of base learners, wrappers and
their combinations indicate which methods to focus on in future research or when working
on disclosure assistance implementations. Such rankings are provided by the next but one
sub section.
Results per Subject
Presenting the evaluation result for the disclosure decisions by each subject involved in the
evaluated scenarios would exceed the space available in this work. Instead the complete
results are available in an open science repository at http://opsci.informatik.uni-
rostock.de/index.php/DiLES– arranged within the afore mentioned HTML-based inter-
active plot compositions. As a reference, here only the results for selected subjects of the
scenario generated from the DiHabs survey results are shown. In particular the results
are investigated with reference to the questions listed in the introduction of section 6.6:
• How do different learning methods compare to each other?
• How do different validation methods compare to each other?
• Which correlations exist between results and disclosure patterns?
• Which learner configurations perform best?
Performance of wrappers and base learners Figures 6.21 to 6.24 show the iterative
progress of the match metric for all learners, each in combination with a specific wrapper.
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Figure 6.21: Progress evaluation results of base learners with a PS wrapper (sce-
nario: dihabs, subject: 32 ).
That is each single plot allows to compare base learners, given a wrapper method. All
plots together allow to compare impacts of wrapper methods on base learners. The given
examples illustrate several interesting effects. First, the performance of a base leaner may
vary significantly depending on the used wrapper. For instance the RL learner performs
best when used with a BR or HBR wrapper but drops to second worst when used with
Powerset (PS) wrapper. The OMI wrapper on the other side diminishes the differences of
base learners – even the Guess Majority (GS) learner performs quite well.
In fact the OMI-wrapper is the best performing in this case. This is backed up by figure
6.25 which shows a global (i.e. non-iterative) comparison of wrapper and base learner
combinations. However, other metrics may yield slightly different rankings as shown in
figure 6.26.
Figures 6.27 to 6.30 show the progress evaluation results for subject 27. Here the wrapper
methods have less impact on the performance of base learners. Also, the OMI wrapper
performs worse than for subject 32. However, it is not significantly worse than the other
wrappers. This is illustrated in figure 6.31.
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Figure 6.22: Progress evaluation results of base learners with a BR wrapper (sce-
nario: dihabs, subject: 32 ).
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Size of training set
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
M
at
ch
Learner comparison for hbr wrapper (20 random orders)
knn*
svm*
gs*
nb*
rl*
dt*
Figure 6.23: Progress evaluation results of base learners with an HBR wrapper
(scenario: dihabs, subject: 32 ).
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Figure 6.24: Progress evaluation results of base learners with an OMI wrapper
(scenario: dihabs, subject: 32 ).
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Figure 6.25: Global evaluation results of all learner and wrapper combinations
according to metric match (scenario: dihabs, subject: 32 ).
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Figure 6.26: Global evaluation results of all learner and wrapper combinations
according to metric h-accuracy (scenario: dihabs, subject: 32 ).
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Size of training set
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
H
ac
cu
ra
cy
Learner comparison for ps wrapper (20 random orders)
knn
svm
gs
nb
rl
dt
Figure 6.27: Progress evaluation results of base learners with a PS wrapper (sce-
nario: dihabs, subject: 27 ).
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Figure 6.28: Progress evaluation results of base learners with a BR wrapper (sce-
nario: dihabs, subject: 27 ).
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Figure 6.29: Progress evaluation results of base learners with an HBR wrapper
(scenario: dihabs, subject: 27 ).
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Figure 6.30: Progress evaluation results of base learners with an OMI wrapper
(scenario: dihabs, subject: 27 ).
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Figure 6.31: Global evaluation results of all learner and wrapper combinations
according to metric h-accuracy (scenario: dihabs, subject: 27 ).
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Figure 6.32: Subject 27.
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Figure 6.33: Subject 32.
Correlation with disclosure patterns The scenario (respectively disclosure) analysis plots
provided by DiLES help in reasoning about the differences of performance metrics among
subjects. Figures 6.32 and 6.33 show the scenario analysis plots for subject 32 and 27.
The disclosure behavior of subject 32 shows that order mappings either are order-ignoring
or order-reversing. In contrast, the order mappings for subject 27 are more diversified.
Additionally the poset width is greater. These characteristics explain why the OMI wrap-
per does not provide much contribution in this case. Also, the greater number of unique
disclosures from subject 27 explains the general worse performance of wrappers and base
learners compared to subject 32.
Validators Next to learners DiLES also evaluates prediction validators. Figures 6.34
and 6.35 show the validator evaluation results for both subjects (for the OMI and PS
wrapper, which had the best match performance for these subjects). The general perfor-
mance metrics for subject 27 are worse than for subject 32, but validators still are able to
prevent a significant portion of negative predictions. Usage-count–based validators in com-
bination with order-mapping–based validators perform best in this case, i.e. they prevent
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Figure 6.34: Prediction validator evaluation results in context of an SVM learner
used with an OMI wrapper (scenario: dihabs, subject: 27 )
more negative predictions while supporting more positive predictions than others. The
situation is different for subject 32. Here the OMI wrapper already contributed to posi-
tive predictions, which is the reason why order-mapping–based validators do not provide
additional contributions. Better candidates are the confidence based validators minconf
and dynconf. Which one is better depends on whether supported positive or prevented
negative predictions are more important for the corresponding subject.
Learner and wrapper configurations The configurations used for wrappers and base
learners during DiLES’ evaluation process are determined using cross-validation based
evolutionary parameter optimization. Inspecting these configurations is especially inter-
esting for the OMI wrapper (because it has a reasonable amount of parameters and because
it is a new wrapper method introduced by this work). Figure 6.36 shows the configuration
summaries provided by DiLES. These configurations also explains why the OMI wrapper
does not provide much contribution in case of subject 27. On subject 27 the OMI wrapper
has been configured to only consider the neighbors with a minimal distance. In contrast,
the OMI wrapper used for subject 32 has been configured to involve all neighbor situa-
tions when interpolating disclosures. Hence, in case of subject 27 there a less situations
when the minimal required number of neighbor situations is available, which deactivates
the OMI wrapper more often (see section 6.3.7 for details on this parameter optimization
based behavior of the OMI wrapper).
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Figure 6.35: Prediction validator evaluation results in context of a SVM learner
used with an OMI wrapper (scenario: dihabs, subject: 32 )
Figure 6.36: Combined learner and wrapper configuration used for the OMI
wrapped SVM learner for subject 27 and subject 32 (scenario: dihabs).
Overall Rankings
The results above presented relate to specific subjects of a scenario. The reason for this
is that disclosure behavior is rather individual, i.e. an automatic disclosure mechanism
primarily needs to be evaluated in context of one subject. However, it is still interesting if
certain learners, wrappers, validators and configurations generally tend to perform better
than others. This references the introductorily stated question: “Are there generally well-
performing methods, configurations, or validators?”. Tables 6.8 to 6.12 list such general
rankings for an evaluation using the scenario generated from the DiHabs survey.
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Learner and wrapper rankings The learner and wrapper rankings are based on the means
of corresponding metrics: the displayed values are the means of all per-subject-means (e.g.
the values in table 6.10 are based on mean values as displayed in figure 6.14). Note that
the metrics are based on an iterative validation, i.e. it also includes performance results
from predictions when only a small set of disclosure situations have been used to train a
learner respectively wrapper.
match
SVM 0.59 0.02
RL 0.57 0.02
DT 0.56 0.02
NB 0.56 0.02
KNN 0.50 0.02
GS 0.20 0.03
h-accuracy
SVM 0.81 0.01
RL 0.80 0.01
DT 0.79 0.01
NB 0.77 0.01
KNN 0.70 0.01
GS 0.32 0.03
h-submatch
SVM 0.69 0.01
RL 0.67 0.02
NB 0.66 0.01
DT 0.65 0.02
KNN 0.60 0.01
GS 0.22 0.03
strain
SVM 0.11 0.01
RL 0.12 0.01
DT 0.13 0.01
NB 0.13 0.01
KNN 0.17 0.01
GS 0.39 0.02
Table 6.8: Overall ranking of base learners for the DiHabs scenario evaluation.
Each table corresponds to a certain performance metric and lists the learner ID as
well as the metric’s mean value and error margin for a 0.95 confidence interval.
match
OMI 0.57 0.01
PS 0.49 0.02
BR 0.48 0.02
HBR 0.46 0.02
h-accuracy
OMI 0.77 0.01
HBR 0.68 0.02
PS 0.68 0.02
BR 0.66 0.03
h-submatch
OMI 0.66 0.01
PS 0.56 0.02
BR 0.56 0.02
HBR 0.54 0.03
strain
OMI 0.15 0.01
HBR 0.16 0.01
BR 0.18 0.01
PS 0.22 0.02
Table 6.9: Overall ranking of wrappers for the DiHabs scenario evaluation. Each
table corresponds to a certain performance metric and lists the wrapper ID as well
as the metric’s mean value and error margin for a 0.95 confidence interval.
Scoring of validators: The validators are ranked using weighted sums of scores. For
each combination of a base learner, a wrapper and a subject, validators first get scored
by a weighted sum of prevented negative and supported positive predictions. The weights
simply express if prevented negative or supported positive predictions are more important.
The initial score for a validator v is calculated as follows:
wnegvpreneg + wposvsuppos
where vpreneg is the mean of prevented positive predictions and vsuppos is the mean of
supported positive predictions (the mean of all iteration steps from the iterative validations
on the original and x randomized situation orders). Then all validators are assigned a
relative score within [0, 1] which is given by:
sv/sbest
where sv is the initial absolute score of a validator and sbest is the best initial absolute
score of all validators. For each combination of subject, base learner and wrapper these
scores are summed up and finally normalized to be again within [0, 1]. A validator which
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match
OMI-SVM 0.61 0.03
OMI-RL 0.59 0.04
PS-SVM 0.59 0.03
OMI-NB 0.59 0.03
HBR-SVM 0.59 0.03
BR-SVM 0.58 0.03
BR-RL 0.58 0.04
HBR-RL 0.58 0.04
PS-NB 0.57 0.03
OMI-DT 0.57 0.04
HBR-DT 0.57 0.03
BR-DT 0.56 0.04
OMI-KNN 0.56 0.03
BR-NB 0.55 0.03
PS-DT 0.54 0.04
PS-RL 0.54 0.04
HBR-NB 0.53 0.03
OMI-GS 0.51 0.04
PS-KNN 0.50 0.03
BR-KNN 0.48 0.03
HBR-KNN 0.46 0.03
PS-GS 0.15 0.03
BR-GS 0.11 0.04
HBR-GS 0.02 0.02
h-accuracy
BR-RL 0.82 0.02
HBR-RL 0.82 0.02
HBR-SVM 0.82 0.02
HBR-DT 0.82 0.02
BR-DT 0.81 0.02
OMI-SVM 0.81 0.02
OMI-RL 0.80 0.02
PS-SVM 0.80 0.02
BR-SVM 0.79 0.03
OMI-NB 0.78 0.02
OMI-DT 0.78 0.02
PS-NB 0.77 0.02
OMI-KNN 0.77 0.02
PS-DT 0.76 0.03
PS-RL 0.76 0.03
HBR-NB 0.76 0.02
BR-NB 0.75 0.02
PS-KNN 0.71 0.02
OMI-GS 0.69 0.03
HBR-KNN 0.68 0.02
BR-KNN 0.66 0.02
PS-GS 0.25 0.02
HBR-GS 0.22 0.02
BR-GS 0.11 0.04
h-submatch
OMI-SVM 0.70 0.03
HBR-SVM 0.69 0.03
BR-SVM 0.69 0.03
OMI-RL 0.69 0.03
PS-SVM 0.68 0.03
OMI-NB 0.68 0.03
BR-RL 0.68 0.03
HBR-RL 0.68 0.03
PS-NB 0.67 0.03
HBR-DT 0.66 0.03
BR-DT 0.66 0.03
OMI-DT 0.66 0.03
BR-NB 0.65 0.03
OMI-KNN 0.65 0.03
PS-RL 0.65 0.03
HBR-NB 0.63 0.03
PS-DT 0.63 0.03
PS-KNN 0.59 0.03
OMI-GS 0.59 0.03
BR-KNN 0.58 0.02
HBR-KNN 0.56 0.02
PS-GS 0.17 0.03
BR-GS 0.11 0.04
HBR-GS 0.02 0.02
strain
HBR-SVM 0.10 0.01
HBR-RL 0.10 0.01
BR-RL 0.10 0.01
HBR-DT 0.10 0.01
BR-DT 0.11 0.01
OMI-SVM 0.11 0.01
BR-SVM 0.11 0.01
PS-SVM 0.12 0.01
HBR-NB 0.12 0.01
OMI-RL 0.12 0.02
OMI-NB 0.13 0.01
BR-NB 0.13 0.01
PS-NB 0.14 0.01
OMI-DT 0.14 0.02
PS-RL 0.15 0.02
OMI-KNN 0.15 0.02
PS-DT 0.15 0.02
HBR-KNN 0.17 0.01
BR-KNN 0.18 0.01
PS-KNN 0.19 0.01
OMI-GS 0.21 0.02
HBR-GS 0.36 0.03
BR-GS 0.44 0.03
PS-GS 0.54 0.05
Table 6.10: Overall ranking of wrapper and base learner combinations for the
DiHabs scenario evaluation. Each table corresponds to a certain performance metric
and lists the wrapper and learner ID as well as the metric’s mean value and error
margin for a 0.95 confidence interval.
is always the best one, for each combination of subject, base learner and wrapper, would
then have a score of 1. Individual score values provide not much insights, however, they
are suitable to compare different validators.
Runtime rankings The runtime rankings shown in table 6.12 are supposed to illustrate
runtime differences among the base learners and wrappers evaluated here. Note that
individual values do not provide much insights because they vary when the evaluation is
run on different platforms and because they are implementation-dependent. However, they
allow to compare runtimes among wrappers or learners. Comparing runtimes of wrappers
for specific base learners is more robust than vice versa. This is because all wrappers
are own implementations in Python while the base learner implementations partly are
implemented in C and also come from different sources.
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wneg = 2, wpos = 1
uc2 + omx100 0.94
uc2 + omx75 0.94
uc2 + omdp 0.90
ucm + omx100 0.90
ucm + omx75 0.90
uc2 0.90
uc2 + oxdp 0.90
udr25 0.90
dynconf 0.88
ucm + imdp 0.87
ucm 0.86
ucm + ixdp 0.86
ucs 0.84
uc1 + omx100 0.84
uc1 + omx75 0.84
pwr25 0.79
udr50 0.77
uc1 + omdp 0.77
uc1 + oxdp 0.76
uc1 0.76
omxc100 0.75
omxc75 0.75
pw1 0.70
omx100 0.69
omxc50 0.68
omx75 0.68
udr75 0.63
omx50 0.62
isdp 0.61
imdp 0.61
ixdp 0.59
cmdp 0.57
csdp 0.57
cxdp 0.56
pw2 0.55
om100 0.55
hierarchy 0.55
om75 0.54
pwr50 0.54
minconf 0.53
om50 0.52
none 0.47
pwr75 0.47
wneg = 1, wpos = 1
uc2 + omx75 0.97
uc2 + omx100 0.96
uc2 + omdp 0.96
uc2 0.95
uc2 + oxdp 0.95
ucm + omx75 0.94
ucm + omx100 0.93
ucm + imdp 0.92
ucm 0.92
ucm + ixdp 0.92
uc1 + omx75 0.92
uc1 + omx100 0.91
ucs 0.90
uc1 + omdp 0.89
uc1 + oxdp 0.88
uc1 0.88
omxc75 0.84
omxc100 0.84
dynconf 0.83
udr50 0.82
omxc50 0.81
omx75 0.80
omx100 0.80
udr25 0.79
omx50 0.77
pw1 0.76
isdp 0.75
imdp 0.75
udr75 0.75
ixdp 0.74
cmdp 0.72
csdp 0.72
cxdp 0.72
hierarchy 0.71
om100 0.71
om75 0.70
pw2 0.70
om50 0.69
minconf 0.68
none 0.65
pwr25 0.62
pwr50 0.60
pwr75 0.56
wneg = 1, wpos = 2
uc2 0.96
uc2 + oxdp 0.96
uc2 + omdp 0.96
uc1 + omdp 0.95
uc1 + oxdp 0.95
uc1 0.95
uc2 + omx75 0.95
uc1 + omx75 0.95
uc2 + omx100 0.94
uc1 + omx100 0.94
ucm + imdp 0.94
ucm 0.94
ucm + ixdp 0.94
ucm + omx75 0.93
ucm + omx100 0.92
ucs 0.91
omxc75 0.89
omxc50 0.88
omxc100 0.88
omx75 0.87
omx50 0.86
omx100 0.86
isdp 0.84
imdp 0.84
ixdp 0.84
hierarchy 0.83
cmdp 0.83
csdp 0.83
udr50 0.83
cxdp 0.82
udr75 0.82
om75 0.82
om100 0.81
om50 0.81
pw2 0.80
minconf 0.79
pw1 0.78
none 0.77
dynconf 0.73
udr25 0.66
pwr50 0.62
pwr75 0.61
pwr25 0.45
Table 6.11: Overall ranking of validators for theDiHabs scenario evaluation. Each
table corresponds to a weight combination for prevented negative and supported
positive predictions. See tables 6.6 and 6.7 for descriptions of validator IDs.
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Optimization (s)
HBR-RL 225.35 18.91
HBR-SVM 200.09 10.43
BR-RL 120.07 9.10
BR-SVM 106.87 8.12
BR-KNN 50.42 3.41
OMI-RL 35.42 2.38
HBR-KNN 28.26 1.67
OMI-SVM 21.28 1.53
OMI-KNN 21.20 1.55
BR-NB 18.73 1.29
HBR-NB 17.67 1.13
OMI-NB 17.26 1.22
PS-RL 14.86 0.96
OMI-DT 13.97 0.36
PS-SVM 8.57 0.55
OMI-GS 5.12 0.07
PS-NB 2.93 0.13
PS-KNN 2.29 0.01
HBR-DT 1.21 0.08
BR-DT 0.52 0.04
HBR-GS 0.10 0.01
PS-DT 0.10 0.00
BR-GS 0.01 0.00
PS-GS 0.00 0.00
Training (ms)
HBR-RL 194.17 12.17
HBR-SVM 146.25 10.18
BR-RL 81.50 6.50
HBR-DT 77.08 5.01
BR-SVM 58.99 4.19
BR-DT 31.00 2.23
HBR-NB 17.69 1.50
OMI-RL 13.08 1.08
PS-RL 12.43 0.82
OMI-DT 6.47 0.22
PS-DT 6.02 0.21
HBR-GS 5.80 0.71
HBR-KNN 5.34 0.70
BR-NB 5.33 0.38
OMI-SVM 4.65 0.20
PS-SVM 4.05 0.15
OMI-NB 0.66 0.00
OMI-GS 0.52 0.01
BR-GS 0.45 0.03
OMI-KNN 0.42 0.00
PS-NB 0.23 0.00
BR-KNN 0.22 0.02
PS-GS 0.09 0.00
PS-KNN 0.00 0.00
Prediction (ms)
BR-KNN 13.53 0.95
HBR-KNN 7.30 0.43
BR-NB 2.58 0.18
BR-SVM 2.44 0.18
BR-RL 2.39 0.18
HBR-RL 1.78 0.09
HBR-SVM 1.67 0.09
HBR-NB 1.58 0.09
PS-KNN 0.65 0.00
OMI-NB 0.57 0.03
OMI-KNN 0.49 0.05
PS-NB 0.45 0.02
OMI-SVM 0.41 0.02
OMI-RL 0.31 0.01
BR-DT 0.27 0.02
PS-SVM 0.27 0.01
HBR-DT 0.26 0.01
OMI-GS 0.22 0.01
OMI-DT 0.21 0.01
PS-RL 0.15 0.00
HBR-GS 0.05 0.00
BR-GS 0.03 0.00
PS-DT 0.02 0.00
PS-GS 0.00 0.00
Table 6.12: Overall ranking of runtimes for the DiHabs scenario evaluation. Each
table lists the mean runtime and error margin for a 0.95 confidence interval (among
all per-subject-means) for all base learner and wrapper combinations. Optimization
time is given in seconds, while training and prediction time is given in milliseconds.
Similar to validator rankings, not individual values but the comparison of values are
the insight provided by these rankings.
6.6.9 Discussion
The evaluation results presented in the previous section illustrate that machine learning
methods are a suitable approach for automating respectively assisting disclosure decisions.
However, they also show that the quality of predictions not only depend on particular
learning methods but also the subjects disclosures are predicted for.
Learning Methods
Especially the results presented by the overall rankings show that – regarding performance
metrics – the most promising base learning methods are SVM, DT, and RL. Concerning
wrappers, generally best performance is given by the OMI, HBR and BR wrappers. How-
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ever, the differences here are less significant. In fact in several cases the plain PS wrapper
performs almost as good as the other wrappers. This raises the question if the overhead
introduced by more sophisticated wrappers than the PS wrapper is worth their improve-
ments. Potential overhead issues are (a) increased runtime, (b) increased implementation
complexity, and (c) reduced human readability and adjustability.
Runtime Regarding runtime performance (see table 6.12) especially the HBR and BR
wrapper significantly increase the runtime of parameter optimization, training and pre-
diction (up to a factor of 35). While time may not be a crucial factor in the practical
application of a machine learning based disclosure assistance system, the related differ-
ence in usage of processing resources is an important point to consider – particularly in
context of assistance systems running on power-constrained mobile devices.
Implementation complexity All three sophisticated wrappers significantly increase the
implementation complexity and are less likely to be available in standard machine learning
libraries on whatever platform an actually implemented disclosure assistance system is
deployed.
Human readability and adjustability Anticipating the findings of the upcoming section
6.7, both the HBR and BR wrapper practically undo any transparency given by a used
base learner. The OMI wrapper still provides a reasonable level of transparency and in
some cases even does not influence the transparency of its base learner at all. Obviously
the PS wrapper does not obfuscate the behavior of its base learner in any case.
Besides implementation complexity, the OMI wrapper clearly entails less overhead-based
negative implications than the HBR and BR wrapper. At the same time the OMI wrapper’s
performance metrics keep up with those of the HBR and BR wrapper – in some cases it
even outperforms them. Comparing the OMI and PS wrapper, the former’s predictions
mostly are more accurate than those of the PS wrapper. In fact the OMI wrapper has
the potential to only perform worse than the PS wrapper in a very few cases – given the
wrapper parameters are constantly optimized (i.e. whenever the set of previous situations
to learn from grows). Note that this is not the case for the results presented in the previous
section. There learner and wrapper parameters have been optimized only once per subject,
base learner and wrapper – otherwise the evaluation system’s runtime would be too long.
Summarized, in the majority of cases OMI appears to be the best choice as a wrapper
while SVM and RL are the generally best performing base learners.
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Learning Method Configurations
There is no overall ranking of base learner and wrapper configurations because they are
rather diversified and lack a general trend. Hence there are no generally recommendable
configuration settings. Instead parameters should be optimized dynamically. Especially
the OMI wrapper parameters have a strong link to the individual disclosure behavior of a
subject.
Preprocessors
The scenarios evaluated here indicate no trend if disclosure modalities should be encoded
as root or leaf elements in the hierarchical structure of disclosed information. One reason
is that the DiHabs scenario has no varying modality at all. The manually composed
scenario has varying modalities but these modalities have a distinct correlation with dis-
closed information items. Hence, performance metrics for the evaluated preprocessors Root
Modality (MR) and Leaf Modality (ML) are almost similar. Concerning the question how
to encode disclosure modalities further scenarios have to be composed and evaluated.
Validators
Prediction validators are a contributing extension to a machine learning driven disclo-
sure assistance mechanism. Especially in the case when learners often fail to correctly
predict disclosures, the more valuable are prediction validators. In fact, the number of
detected incorrect predictions mostly behaves proportionally to the number of incorrect
predictions.
As shown in table 6.11 the best validators for the DiHabs scenario are uc2 (a predicted
disclosure must have been disclosed at least two times before) in combination with a
validator which checks the order mappings and disclosure path relations of a prediction
(e.g. omx75 and omdp). The uc2 validator alone appears to be a good generic choice.
However, if one wants to make sure to use the best validator for a particular subject,
it has to be determined individually (also because the decision of whether to focus on
prevented negative or on supported positive predictions is rather subjective). Finally the
validator evaluation for the manually composed scenario yields different results – here uc1
performs significantly better than the uc2 validator7. The consensus is that a disclosure
assistance mechanism which utilizes validators has to incorporate multiple validators and
dynamically decide which one to choose for a particular subject.
7Results for the manually composed scenario are not shown here for the lack of space. Please inspect
the online available result illustrations at http://opsci.informatik.uni-rostock.de/index.php/DiLES.
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Correlations with Disclosure Patterns
As illustrated by the result plots for the two example subjects 27 and 32 in the previous
section, there is an obvious correlation between the distribution of order-mapping types
and the performance of the OMI wrapper: when there are primarily order-ignoring and
either order-reversing or order-preserving mappings (i.e. no or only a few order-loosing
mappings), then the OMI wrapper shows its strengths. Rather obvious correlations are
the number of unique disclosures, the poset width and disclosure usage counts (the first
two generally reduce prediction quality when growing, the latter one when falling).
Generalizability
The evaluation results for the two investigated scenarios provide common insights on base
learners and wrappers. The OMI wrapper and the SVM and RL learner appear to perform
best in most cases. In contrast, results for validators, preprocessors and learner respectively
wrapper configurations cannot be generalized. Here disclosure assistance mechanisms have
to keep ready multiple methods and choose the best one on a per-subject basis.
User Metrics
The performance metrics used to assess the learning methods not necessarily align with
subjective metrics of users. The reason is that the negative impact of a misclassification
not only depends on “syntactical” errors (e.g. number of falsely predicted information
items) but also on the sensitivity a user associates with a particular information item. In
fact in context of an objective evaluation of learning methods this methodological problem
cannot be avoided. However, in practice the potential mismatch of technical and subjective
metrics should not be that relevant. The composite disclosure control system presented
in chapter 5 also provides other mechanisms than machine learning based disclosures, e.g.
manual rules and explicit user decisions. These mechanisms should be preferred to manage
rather sensitive information. In that case the sensitivity of information whose disclosure
is managed by machine learning methods is less diversified, i.e. the difference of objective
and subjective metrics is less significant.
6.7 Model Interaction
In chapter 5 (Composite Disclosure Control) it has been reasoned that a comprehensive
disclosure assistance has to utilize different mechanisms to control information disclosure.
Automating disclosures by learning a user’s disclosure behavior is just one mechanism.
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Section 5.2.2 already described general possibilities to integrate a learning-based disclosure
assistance within a composite disclosure control system. This section elaborates learner-
specific integration possibilities. In particular, the learning methods considered so far are
analyzed with respect to their human readability and manual tunability (Bu¨nnig, 2008).
6.7.1 Naive Bayes Classifier
For each independent variable (e.g. situation, modality and person attributes) a naive
Bayes classifier calculates the disclosure probabilities for each set of information items
disclosed before. Subsequently, per information set these probabilities are combined (as-
suming they are independent from each other) and ranked. This calculation process isn’t
very intuitive for humans in terms of explaining disclosure decisions. However, to commu-
nicate decisions made by the classifier more comprehensible, the classifier could state the
n most influential context attributes of the predicted disclosure decision. In response to
wrong predictions users could adjust the influence of individual attributes. For instance if
a location attribute significantly contributed to a wrong disclosure decision, the user could
degrade the relevance of the location attribute until a correct prediction would have been
made. Of course, this is only applicable when the correct information set to disclose is
already known to the classifier.
6.7.2 Decision Trees
Decision trees describe information disclosure preferences as a graph with a hierarchical
structure of decisions. The actual classification (disclosure decision) is given by the leafs.
The nodes test features for particular values and branches denote which node to process
next depending on the result of a value test. In contrast to a naive Bayesian classifier
conditional dependencies between attributes are regarded due to the top-down concatena-
tion of feature evaluations. In principle a decision tree is capable of classifying correctly
at least the training set but the accuracy is limited if there are any size restrictions (e.g. if
a tree is supposed to conceptualize privacy preferences in a human readable way). While
a disclosure behavior expressed by a decision tree enables users to review and tune au-
tomatic disclosure decisions they do not really match human decision processes as they
always start from a single root. Further they are hard to adjust since changing decisions
on particular nodes may need a rather extensive rearrangement of the tree in order to still
catch the decisions made within the situations that set up the training set. The same is
true when the training set gets extended by new manual disclosure decisions that have been
misclassified by the current tree. In that case a user has to review again the whole tree in
order to understand and evaluate it. In other words one can say that decision trees (re-
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garding their output representation) are suitable for expressing static privacy preferences
but inappropriate for iterative adjustments of privacy preferences.
6.7.3 Rule Learner
In principle any decision tree also can be expressed as a set of rules. In that case a rule
describes a path from the tree’s root to a leaf. There is one rule for each leaf which combines
the decisions made within the path from the root to that leaf. The leaf constitutes the
consequent of a rule. However, such a set of rules is far more complex than necessary. The
purpose of rule learning is to find a smaller set of rules than the one directly read from a
decision tree. The less rules the easier it is for users to review them in order to compare
them to their intuitive privacy preferences. This is a clear advantage compared to decision
trees.
In its basic form rules are logically linked Boolean expressions (material conditionals)
testing features for specific values. Rules can either be read in order or arbitrary. In-order
rules can be seen as one deeply nested if-then-else construct. Such a rule set is not very
intuitive since it must be read completely top-down to understand the last rule. A set
of rules where each rule alone is a valid classification is more comprehensible to users.
However, they bear the risk that situations outside the training set that created the rules
could be classified differently by different rules. Further they tend to be larger than in-
order rules. Nevertheless this can be seen as an acceptable drawback since it is easier for
users to adjust or extend rules. When rules are ambiguous the user can be consulted for
an exact disclosure decision. Subsequently the rules can be adapted by relearning them
including the situation that caused the case when there was no unique classification.
Rules learned by inductive logic programming are of first-order logic and therefore more
expressive than rules based on propositional logic (Muggleton, 1994). They are able to
describe relations between features, optionally in a recursive manner. Rule sets created
by inductive logic programming may be shorter than propositional rules and they may
be closer to a human’s idea of handling private data. However, at the same time rules
expressed by first-order logic can be hard to verify intuitively. Especially in case of recursive
expressions users may fail to realize all consequences of an information disclosure rule.
6.7.4 Instance-Based Learning
Instance-based learning (sometimes also called case-based reasoning or analogy learning)
memorizes past situations with corresponding disclosure decisions and tries to decide new
situations based on analogy to previous situations. It is a lazy learning method as there
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actually is no learning at all until a new situation has to be classified. Any generalization
out of the training set is done whenever an unknown situation has to be classified. The
most popular example are nearest neighbor classifiers which decide new situations based on
its distance to previous situations. A typical approach is to regard the k nearest situations
and to adopt the disclosure decision made in the majority of this k situations, optionally
voted by their distance value. This is called a k-nearest neighbor classifier.
Concerning transparency instance-based learning is able to give reasons for its decision by
exposing the situations used for deriving a decision for a new situation. Users can tune the
decisions made by adjusting the relevance of past situations and individual features (and
thus their resulting distance values), similar as mentioned for a naive Bayes classifier.
6.7.5 Support Vector Machines
SVMs practically are block boxes. It’s internal mechanism of using a kernel function
based feature space transformation and calculating distances to support vectors is beyond
a normal human decision process. With regard to tuning there are only generic possibilities
like dropping situations and weighting features, though SVMs do not provide indications
how individual situations and features influence its predictions.
6.7.6 Multi-Label and Hierarchical Wrappers
Wrappers like Binary Relevance (BR) and Hierarchical Binary Relevance (HBR) in fact
obliterate any readability and tunability of wrapped base learners since a potentially high
number of base learners are used whose labels (disclosures) do not correspond to finally dis-
closed information sets. The same limited generic tunability options exist as for SVMs.
6.7.7 Order-Mapping Interpolation Wrapper
In contrast to BR and HBR wrappers the OMI wrapper does not obliterate readability and
tunability characteristics of a used base learner. It does not combine multiple base learners
but acts as an additional decision instance in front of a single base learner, i.e. either the
OMI wrapper predicts a disclosure or its base learner. Similar to instance-based learners
there is no model of the OMI wrapper one could investigate. Instead made predictions
are human readable in that the past situations used for interpolation may be displayed to
users. Then users are provided with hints which situations to drop in order to tune the
interpolation process. Additionally, when investigating made predictions, users may mark
persons which should not be considered for interpolation.
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6.7.8 Summary
In conclusion good candidates for readable and manually adjustable learning methods
are k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) and Rule Induction (RL) learners in combination with a
Powerset (PS) or OMI wrapper. Still, specific representations of learner models and made
predictions as well as interfaces to interact with them are a field of research on its own.
However, the analysis provided here is a good starting point for future work in this area.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter dealt with machine learning based automation of information disclosure deci-
sions. First, it defined the corresponding learning problem and reviewed existent learning
methods matching the defined problem. New metrics to asses learning methods in con-
text of information disclosure have been defined (e.g. submatch and strain). Further,
a new learning method which acts as a wrapper around standard learning methods has
been developed. This new method investigates order mappings with regard to hierarchical
information sets and information receiver sets. Additionally the disclosure patterns elab-
orated in chapter 4 have been used to develop prediction validators which are supposed
to prevent negative predictions. In order to evaluate the reviewed and developed learning
related mechanisms, an evaluation system (DiLES) has been developed. This system is
not only capable of evaluating the mechanisms presented here but is extensible for further
investigations. Based on two scenarios describing a sequence of disclosure situations, the
evaluation system has been used to compare the presented learning methods and valida-
tors. Finally, learning methods have been reviewed with regard to their suitability for an
integration into a composite disclosure control system. In particular the focus has been
on human readability and adjustability of learned models.
One main finding of this chapter is that the developed OMI wrapper is a competitive
alternative to other sophisticated wrappers like HBR and BR. Not only that its perfor-
mance metrics are similar and sometimes better, it also introduces less overhead in terms
of computation resources and does not obfuscate the decision model of its base learner.
Additionally its ability to decide when to delegate predictions to the base learner makes
it a safe alternative to a simple PS wrapper. Another main finding is that the presented
validator mechanisms are a valuable extension to a learning method in order to reduce the
negative impact of misclassifications. Generally the evaluation results support a machine
learning based disclosure control assistance. Though the match performance is below 0.5
in some cases, the strain metric mostly is in acceptable bounds (less than 0.2) which means
that disclosure predictions at least are a good suggestion template for final manual disclo-
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sures. Finally the OMI wrapper and the generally well performing RL learner also meet
transparency requirements for human readability and adjustability.
In conclusion, the mechanisms presented in this chapter are able to handle issue III from
the introductory problem statement in section 1.2 (automating disclosure control in a
user-adaptive but easy to manage fashion).
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7 Guidelines for Interpersonal Privacy
This chapter consolidates the findings made in this work with the general guidelines pre-
sented in section 3.1 – within the specific context of managing interpersonal privacy in
smart environments. It serves as a starting point for engineers designing and implementing
smart environments with implicit as well as explicit interpersonal information exchange.
Section 7.1 lists potential pitfalls which may violate the concept of interpersonal privacy.
Having these issues in mind when engineering smart environments helps to avoid dis-
ruptions in social interactions mediated by the environment. The subsequent section 7.2
extends principles presented in section 3.1 by additionally focusing interpersonal privacy.
These two sections are not direct consequences of technical findings made in this work but
represent the author’s insights on conveying interpersonal privacy to smart environments,
based on sociological research (see section 2.1.3) and explorative studies (see sections 3.1
and 3.2.2). In contrast, the final section 7.3 compiles specific recommendations based on
technical results of this work.
In order to distinguish the principles and guidelines presented in this chapter from general
privacy principles, first a short recap of the concept of interpersonal privacy (as described
in section 2.1.3) is given. Interpersonal privacy is a process of dialectic and dynamic
boundary regulation where subjects regulate interaction with other persons via several
behavioral mechanisms. It adjusts desired level of inputs and outputs by providing in-
formation and receiving corresponding feedback. The goal is to reach a certain state of
participation in a social environment. Practicing interpersonal privacy involves factors
like social norms, allegiance, self-representation, and expectations in social interactions.
Rather than managing information and associated rights, it is about composing a set of
hidden and disclosed information for a particular social interaction. Privacy preferences de-
pend on roles individuals may act as and often lack general patterns. Smart environments
impact interpersonal privacy in that they introduce new privacy regulation mechanisms
by providing multiple modalities to communicate with others.
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7.1 Pitfalls of Violating Interpersonal Privacy
These pitfalls extend the ones compiled by Lederer et al. (2004) (see section 3.1) by
emphasizing potential disruptions of social interactions.
7.1.1 Employ Manifold Communication Modalities
While many modalities to communicate information (e.g. shared displays, audio chan-
nels, device-to-device) allows to tailor information exchange to individual requirements,
it also complicates communication in that users easily choose improper modalities which
distribute information to an unintended audience or which mediate information in an un-
expected manner. Manifold communication modalities also make it hard to predict to
whom and how information flows in case of automatically triggered information exchange.
Instead users should be provided with a manageable set of tools supporting social interac-
tions.
7.1.2 Hide Communication Modalities
This pitfall partly arises from the previous one, i.e. in case of too many modalities some of
them easily do not get recognized. The idea of ubiquitous computing generally motivates
to let technology vanish into the background. However, care has to be taken to not hide
functionality, e.g. information exchange modalities. Users should be able to recognize and
understand how information may be distributed in an environment.
Hidden modalities also exist when non-communicational services “leak” information by al-
tering the environment in a way perceivable by other persons within the environment. For
instance any user-preference–based environment-adaption indirectly communicates per-
sonal preferences to other inhabitants. In case of assistive technologies this may even
reveal medical information. Services adjusting the environment in a publicly perceivable
manner should highlight this fact to their users.
7.1.3 Amplify Automation
Smart environments aim to assist users by automating tedious and repetitive tasks. Exag-
gerating this theme may lead to unexpected or even unrecognized automatic distribution
of personal information to other environment inhabitants. When automating processes,
special care has to be taken to not only provide correct but also to avoid unexpected au-
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tomated communication. The degree of automation should develop with the “familiarity”
inhabitants of smart environments have with deployed technologies.
7.1.4 Distort Mediated Information
The modalities available to exchange information with other persons in an environment
present information in different forms, i.e. mediated information usually is transformed
to some extent. These transformations should not involve significant semantic changes.
For instance information distributed to mobile devices may be scaled down and thus hide
content of originally communicated information or even change its meaning. As a result
intended boundaries between self and others may get altered or intended personae are not
perceived as such by others. When the environment offers to disclose information items it
should provide a preview how the information finally arrives at the information receiver.
7.1.5 Discard Interaction Contexts
The meaning of an information item always is linked to the context in which it is shared.
A sentence said at a specific time in a specific social setting might yield different inter-
pretations when repeated in another situation. Hence, asynchronous communication and
a corresponding loss of context bears the risk of changing the information one originally
disclosed. Smart environments which provide modalities for asynchronous communication,
e.g. by recording disclosed information items, may disrupt social interaction posthumously.
In practice the possibilities to prevent such disruptions are limited as not all context linked
to disclosed information can be captured. Even worse, the linked context might again be
composed of sensitive information items. The general guideline to prevent such pitfalls is
to avoid the temporarily decoupled communication of information or to limit it to infor-
mation items which are not vulnerable to related semantic transformations.
7.2 Enhanced Existing Principles
This section enhances the privacy principles and guidelines presented in sections 3.1.1
to 3.1.3, in particular the notions of feedback and control by Bellotti & Sellen, the pri-
vacy principles by Langheinrich, and the genres of disclosure by Palen & Dourish. These
principles are extended by putting a special focus on information disclosure during social
interactions.
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7.2.1 Feedback
In context of the concept of privacy in public the guideline of providing feedback expresses
the need to show which information is communicated to whom under which circumstances.
In context of interpersonal privacy, the fact that and which information is exchanged
usually implicitly is known by the owner as he fired up the process. Instead, a proper
feedback here means that the person disclosing information should know how it is perceived
by his communication partners. This could be accomplished by providing previews of how
information is presented to others.
7.2.2 Control
Obviously, managing interpersonal privacy requires appropriate control mechanisms to
regulate information exchange. Especially in social interactions it is important to provide
coarse grained control mechanisms because a social setting might change spontaneously
and users may not be able or willing to deflect their focus from their current interaction.
In practice this means users should be empowered to easily switch used modalities and
adjust which persons receive information items. Additionally, users should be able to veto
automatic disclosure processes.
7.2.3 Flexibility
The guideline that privacy control mechanisms should be flexible is especially important
for interpersonal privacy management. More than for other privacy concepts, preferences
are highly individual and often not generalizable to limited abstract types (e.g. mostly
private versus mostly public). In practice this means that universal coarse-grained control
should be accompanied by optional fine-grained control. Additionally, one should not
assume too simple patterns of privacy management (e.g. disclose less to strangers and
more to friends).
7.2.4 Effort
While powerful control mechanisms are important, initially the overall effort required for
managing interpersonal privacy should be as low as possible in order to prevent disruptions
in social interactions because of privacy control. Next to coarse-grained controls this means
that information exchange mechanisms and services should ship with a sensitive default
behavior (e.g. communicate no information at all, or only follow sufficiently established
disclosure patterns).
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7.2.5 Proximity and Locality
Langheinrich’s principle of proximity and locality proposes to limit access to information
by spatial and temporal constraints. In context of interpersonal privacy this principle’s
rationale is to prevent unintended transformations of information due to a loss of its
original context. Social interactions mediated by smart environments should be strongly
coupled to the place and time of their occurrence.
7.2.6 Genres of Disclosure
The notion genres of disclosures refers to known and established practices of information
disclosures, i.e. common patterns used to negotiate the boundary between self and oth-
ers. Respecting existing genres simplifies the realization of proper feedback and control
mechanisms because privacy related implications usually are already known and accepted.
Of course new interaction possibilities as given in smart environments also introduce new
genres which yet have to get established. For instance a meeting of persons from differ-
ent companies might usually end with some exchange of contact information, e.g. using
business cards. Smart environments may shift this genre of disclosure in that contact
information is exchanged automatically using mobile devices of participants or using a
shared screen. The bottom line is that automatic disclosure mechanisms should respect
current expectations of users. New disclosure practices which conflict with known genres
should be avoided. However, it is always possible to let new genres emerge from existing
ones by carefully deploying corresponding information exchange practices. A conflict with
a known genre would be if the slides of a presentation given in a smart environment are
accessible for every attending person. While this is a great feature in terms of collabo-
ration, it simply does not align with current common practices. The introduction and
communication of such features should be well thought out and not happen silently.
The guideline to align mechanisms in smart environments with existing genres of disclosure
is the least tangible one because genres are constantly evolving and because different user
groups may have different expectations.
7.3 Additional Recommendations
As stressed multiple times in this work, users may follow different patterns of privacy
management, ranging from simple binary to sophisticated ones. This means that multiple
control mechanisms, where each supports certain patterns, should be available (see chap-
ter 5). For instance it shouldn’t be taken for granted that disclosed information inversely
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scales with the number of persons receiving information or that information receivers can
be allocated into a small set of distinct groups (see chapter 4). This section summa-
rizes the findings about disclosure patterns and control methods made in this work to
general recommendations for designers and engineers working on privacy sensitive smart
environments. The next section 7.3.1 builds on chapter 4 (Information Disclosure Pat-
terns). Conclusions from chapter 5 (Composite Disclosure Control) are recapitulated in
section 7.3.2. Finally section 7.3.3 derives recommendations from the results in chapter 6
(Learning Disclosure Decisions).
7.3.1 Privacy Patterns
Abstraction of persons to roles or allocating them in groups in order to simplify privacy
management is possible for certain information types but should be avoided as a general
theme. As shown in the survey results in section 4.2.2, identifying and communicational
information like phone numbers and location generally is disclosed using only a few unique
values. This indicates that values may be mapped to abstract information recipient groups
like friends, colleagues, or public. In contrast, information which entails potentially mani-
fold derived information, e.g. music (taste), is disclosed as various values which cannot be
grouped reasonably. This possibility of abstraction is also influenced by the ordering of
disclosures when modeled as sets of information items. Some information types arrange
in an almost total order (again location and contact data) while others are only partially
ordered or not ordered at all. This characteristic determines to which extent hierarchical
relations between abstract roles may be utilized (e.g. friends see more information than
colleagues). The main message here is that one should not generally assume simple disclo-
sure patterns which motivate to organize information recipients in groups – such patterns
may only be applicable to specific information types.
Order mappings describing relations between sets of disclosed information items and sets
of persons receiving these items often are expected to be reversing or ignoring. While this
is true for some users, it is definitely not a general pattern. Besides individual users, the
most often occurring order mapping type again depends on the type of shared information.
The more self-contained a disclosure, the more often order-reversing and order-ignoring
mappings occur. In contrast, the more derivable information a disclosure entails, the more
often order-loosing mappings occur. The diversity based on information type and users
inhibits any general recommendation on patterns to expect in terms of order mappings.
If control methods utilize order mappings, they should be able to adapt to individual
distributions of mapping types.
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7.3.2 Disclosure Control Methods
Several disclosure control methods and their composition have been presented in chapter 5.
In order to fully support the various needs users may have in managing their information
during activities in smart environments several methods have to be deployed and staged
in a certain manner. The essence here is that it is important to provide methods which
cover preliminary, situational, as well as retrospective approaches to privacy control. This
ensures privacy may be practiced in a defensive, pragmatic, and optimistic way.
When deciding which control methods to concentrate on initially, predefined rules and
implicit actions are recommended. The first one because it aligns with currently existing
mechanisms to manage information. Though rules are impractical in many cases, most
users feel familiar with them at first. On the other side, implicit actions (disclosure
decisions mapped to physical actions) are comparatively novel control methods which,
when properly designed and implemented, may easily be adopted by users. This basic
setting can then be extended to a complete composite disclosure control system which also
involves generic recommendations and an individual learning-based disclosure assistance.
In any case, users should be able to veto any automatic processes and to review processes
at a later time in order to understand and possibly adjust automated disclosures. This
helps to establish new practices of privacy management, i.e. to constitute new genres of
disclosures.
7.3.3 Automated Disclosure Assistance
The problem of automating disclosure decisions using machine learning methods have been
elaborated in chapter 6. It presented several learning techniques, including a novel one, and
evaluated them with example disclosure situations. The general outcome is that learning
methods are a recommendable technique to automate disclosure decisions. Though they
do not perform well in all situations, they are at least suitable to suggest disclosures and
in that reduce the workload users face when managing information exchange.
Recommended methods to initially concentrate on are k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) and
Rule Induction (RL) in combination with a Powerset (PS) or Order-Mapping Interpolation
(OMI) wrapper (to handle the hierarchical multi-label characteristics of the underlying
learning problem). Both the KNN and RL learner mostly perform at least as good as the
others while being human readable and adjustable. The RL learner has the additional
advantage of being both readable and adjustable by humans (unless very low-level context
information is used). Similarly, the performance of the PS and OMI wrappers competes
with the Binary Relevance (BR) and Hierarchical Binary Relevance (HBR) wrappers, while
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being less costly in terms of resources and while not obfuscating the model of the wrapped
basic learner. Since a well optimized OMI wrapper in principal is at least as good as a PS
wrapper, it may safely used as the default wrapper. Its only downside compared to the
PS wrapper is its more complex implementation.
The performance of learners should not only be measured according to the number of
correct predictions but also according to their strain metric, which assesses the workload
of manual corrections of predictions.
Finally, validators as presented in section 6.4 should be used additionally as they prevent
a significant number of wrong predictions and thus indicate when disclosure decisions by
a learning mechanism should not be used but delegated to another decision component
(e.g. a user herself).
The basic message is that although learning mechanisms do not perform well in all cases,
they are still helpful when wrong predictions are detected and instead used as a suggestion
or a template for a final manual disclosure decision.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter dealt with issue (IV) from the introductory problem statement. It compiled
general privacy guidelines for designers and engineers of smart environments targeting
social interactions.
The pitfalls help engineers to evaluate existing solutions with regard to potential viola-
tions of interpersonal privacy. The enhanced existing principles complement the general
understanding of how to develop privacy sensitive environments. Finally, the recommen-
dations based on the findings made in this work support engineers in making specific
technical decisions when working on mechanisms to manage interpersonal privacy within
smart environments.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis addressed the issue of managing privacy in smart environments, while empha-
sizing problems and solutions in context of interpersonal privacy. At first, it elaborated
different concepts of privacy and how ubiquitous computing in general and smart environ-
ments in particular may interfere with these concepts. Subsequently already existing work
aiming to solve these issues have been reviewed. The following chapters developed solu-
tions to some of the open issues, namely to understand patterns of interpersonal privacy
management, to orchestrate different disclosure control methods to a composite disclosure
control system, and to automate disclosure decisions using machine learning techniques.
These solutions have been rounded out to guidelines for developing smart environments
aiming to support interpersonal privacy.
Following is an analysis to which extent the proposed solutions resolve the issues stated
in section 1.2: (I) consideration of social aspects in interpersonal privacy management
and resulting patterns in information disclosure decisions, (II) suitable disclosure control
mechanisms that match these patterns, as well as their orchestration, (III) automating
disclosure control in a user-adaptive but easy to manage fashion, and (IV) general guide-
lines and principles to develop interpersonal privacy sensitive smart environments and to
evaluate corresponding solutions. Each subsequent section summarizes the contributions
to clear a particular issue and the unsolved problems to be handled in future work.
8.1 Patterns of Interpersonal Privacy Management
Chapter 4 tackled the issue of understanding social aspects in privacy management. It de-
veloped a model to express disclosure decisions in social interaction in smart environments
and elaborated patterns of privacy management based on relations between information
receiver groups and disclosed information items. These patterns build upon set-based
structural information and thus introduce objective characteristics to the generally vague
concept of interpersonal privacy. These objective characteristics provide novel parameters
to programmatically address the management of personal information in social interac-
tions.
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Still, there is room for future research in this area. Patterns based on the decision pa-
rameters situation and modality only have been touched briefly. Candidates for objective
characteristics are sensitivity, visibility and persistency of modalities as well as social at-
tributes of a situation.
8.2 Disclosure Control Mechanisms and Their Orchestration
The orchestration of disclosure control methods to a composite disclosure control system
has been handled in chapter 5. It presents a conceptual framework to solve the issue that
different users and different information types demand for different practices of manag-
ing information exchange. The proposed system covers multiple approaches to privacy
management, including preliminary, situational, and retrospective control. Its methods
range from simple and optimistic to sophisticated and pessimistic control. The system not
only sums up different control methods but integrates them with each other in order to
balance shortcomings and leverage strengths of individual methods. In that it serves as a
comprehensive blueprint for engineering privacy-sensitive smart environments.
Still open issues in this area primarily exist on the proper realization of individual com-
ponents, especially with regard to user interfaces and data exchange between different
components. This is also the reason why there is no prototype implementation of the pro-
posed system – there is still enough research to be done on individual components (chapter
6 is an example for this).
8.3 Automating Disclosure Control
The issue of automating disclosure control to let users manage personal information indi-
vidually but with a reduced workload was the concern of chapter 6. It developed a formal
groundwork to transform disclosure behavior to a learning problem. Next to suitable ex-
isting machine learning methods this chapter presented a novel method which predicts
disclosures by interpolating past disclosures based on order-mappings of information re-
ceivers and items. Besides explicitly incorporating patterns elaborated in chapter 4, this
new method has the salient property of only becoming active when there is a high prob-
ability of correct predictions (given a preliminary parameter optimization). Additionally
various validators have been developed which utilize patterns from chapter 4 and which
significantly reduce the negative impact of incorrect predictions. A toolkit has been de-
veloped which allows to evaluate learning methods and validators for arbitrary scenarios.
The presented results of two example scenarios show that disclosures may be automated
using machine learning methods. For some users of the example scenarios a match ratio
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of 0.9 could be reached. Still, for other users this ratio was below 0.2. However, in these
badly performing cases, validators where able to detect up to 85% of wrong predictions.
Additionally, the strain metric was around 0.2 and the h-accuracy metric settled at 0.6.
Hence, even if machine learning methods are not suitable to automate disclosures in all
cases, they still reduce the workload by generating templates for manual disclosures. In
the end each user has to decide a personal performance threshold to separate automated
and suggested disclosures. In any case, the mechanisms presented in chapter 6 solve issue
(III) by either automating disclosures or by assisting in manual disclosures.
Of course the presented results are valid for the two example scenarios only, i.e. there
cannot be made a final decision if issue (III) is clearly solved. Nevertheless, the developed
evaluation toolkit makes it easy to perform additional evaluations on other scenarios and
learning methods in the event of future requirements.
It still has to be assessed if the metrics evaluated by the toolkit align with subjective user
metrics. This, however, requires the capturing of scenarios in productively used smart
environments. Another still unsolved part of issue (III) is the specific design of modalities
for human interaction with learned prediction models. Starting points for this work have
been provided at the end of chapter 6.
8.4 General Guidelines and Principles
Chapter 7 was supposed to provide missing guidelines and principles for developing envi-
ronments with explicit support for interpersonal privacy. It picked up existing principles
and extended them by additionally focusing privacy issues in smart environments during
social interactions. These rather abstract guidelines then have been complemented by
more technical recommendations for engineering privacy solutions, based on the findings
made in chapter 4 and 6. In that chapter 7 contributes to solving issue (IV).
On the other side, this issue hardly can be solved completely since guidelines may change
with the evolution of smart environments and their integration into day-to-day life. Ad-
ditionally, the technical recommendations also have to be adjusted with the technical
progress of mechanisms used to manage personal information. Especially more precise
guidelines and recommendations related to the design of user interfaces are an ongoing
open issue.
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Appendices

A DiHabs
This appendix chapter provides methodological details about the survey conducted in
chapter 4 (Information Disclosure Patterns) for the sake of transperency and reproducibil-
ity. It briefly describes how the survey system DiHabs may be used to define interviews
and to analyze corresponding survey results. Finally it shows the interview definition used
for the survey presented in section 4.3 as well as a screenshot-based walk through the
resulting interview.
A.1 Introduction
DiHabs is a Django1 application for conducting online interviews about information dis-
closure behavior within social interactions. Software and data related to DiHabs is hosted
at the Open Science Repository2 of the Computer Science Department at Rostock
University. Please consult the software’s README file for deployment and configuration
instructions.
A.2 Interviews
Interviews are defined as plain Python dictionaries which must have the the following
items:
name:
Name of the interview.
npersons min and npersons max:
Minimum and maximum number of persons a participant has to name when asked
for her social environment.
npersons max sample:
Maximum number of persons to actually use for generating person groups.
1Django: https://www.djangoproject.com/
2Open Science Repository: http://opsci.informatik.uni-rostock.de/index.php/DiHabs
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ngdups:
Number of person group duplicates (to check for conflicting disclosures).
groups:
Either a precompiled list of groups (where a group is a tuple of person index numbers)
or a list specifying how much groups to generate for different group sizes (i.e. the
value groups[i] specifies the number of groups of size i+1).
messages:
A dictionary of messages used in page templates. Each message is interpreted as
markdown3 formatted text. Inspect DiHabs’s README or the example interview
definition in section A.4 for more detailed information.
itypes:
A list of dictionaries, each specifying a particular information type respectively sit-
uation where participants are supposed to decide disclosures for.
name and plotname:
Name of the information type (plotname should be a short name to be used in
plots).
nvalues min and nvalues max:
Minimum and maximum number of information items participants must pro-
vide.
desc input:
Description of the information items participants are supposed to provide.
desc select:
Description of the information type and situation where the disclosure of in-
formation items have to be decided. This description must include the social
context and modalities of information disclosure.
A.3 Analysis
Survey results are stored in a Python shelve4 database (mapping participant session
IDs to corresponding interview data). The DiHabs application provides a script to analyze
results in such a database. Supposed the DiHabs application’s Python module is available
in PYTHONPATH, it can be run as follows:
$ python -m dihabs.analyze
The --help option shows a summary of this script’s functionality.
3markdown: http://daringfireball.net/projects/markdown/
4Python shelve: http://docs.python.org/library/shelve.html
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List Results
A list of all results in a survey results database is shown when using the --list option:
$ python -m dihabs.analyze --results=results.db --list
0: 69c48713... (2010-09-07 09:39:31.107497, 7ea0be9a..., Demo)
1: 1dd50bff... (2010-09-07 09:47:48.395140, 7ea0be9a..., Demo)
2: 3e269763... (2010-09-09 12:49:35.249546, 7ea0be9a..., Demo)
3: 6246deab... (2010-09-09 12:49:48.900607, 7ea0be9a..., Demo)
4: fb1776cf... (2010-09-09 12:49:51.995939, 7ea0be9a..., Demo)
...
For each participant, this shows the participant’s session ID, the interview start-time, and
the interview ID and name. Especially the session ID is needed to select individual results
for further analysis.
Inspect a Specific Result
The data related to a specific participant can be shown using the --dump option:
$ python -m dihabs.analyze --results=results.db --usid 69c48713... --dump
usid: 69c487130a3a4869b97725247b19761f:wq
interview: {’templates’: {}, ’npersons max’: 20, ’name’: ’September’, ’messages ..
start: 2010-09-07 09:39:31.107497
end: 2010-09-07 10:14:34.895914
npersons: 12
groups: [92, 8, 12, 6, 14, 46, 158, 152, 2, 20, 28, 16, 4]
nvalues: [10, 5, 3, 9, 8]
test: False
disclosures: [{’group’: 92, ’values-per-type’: [262, 10, 1, 328, 7], ’values’: 10 ..
A textual summary of detected disclosure patterns can be retreived similarly using the
--analyze option (instead of --dump).
Render Order-Mapping Graphs for a Specific Result
In order to inspect order-mappings in the disclosure behavior of a specific participant, the
analyzer script may render graphs which illustrate the order-mappings of situation pairs
where the information receiver person groups are comparable with each other:
$ python -m dihabs.analyze --results=results.db --usid 69c48713... --graph \
--dest exampleplots/
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000010000000 000100000000 001000000000 010000000000
001100000000001010000000 011000000000
001110000000 011100000000000110010000
001110100000 011101000000011110010000
Figure A.1: DiHabs example plot.
This renders graphs for each information type found in a result. Figure A.1 shows an
example graph. Here the circles represent disclosure situations while the binary numbers
represent the presence of persons (information receiver) in a situation, i.e. the number
000011 indicates that persons 5 and 6 were present (i.e. part of information receiver
group) whole persons 1 to 4 were not present. The arrows show is-superset-of relations
concerning the person groups. The colors indicate the type of order mapping. Green
arrows reflect order-reserving, orange order-preserving, blue order-ignoring, and dashed
purple arrows indicate order-loosing mappings. Order-mapping relations are transitive
except when two nodes are connected directly.
Render Pattern Usage Plots for All Results
The options --plot and --plot2 may be used to render plots which illustrate the occur-
rence of certain information disclosure patterns, including order-mapping types.
Examples for these plots can be found in section 4.3.
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A.4 Example
The site project used for the survey in chapter 4 may be referenced as an example for the
generic documentation above. Especially the files sipro/settings.py and sipro/urls.
py should be consulted. The corresponding source code can be found on the CD shipped
with this thesis as well as at the Open Science repository at http://opsci.informatik.
uni-rostock.de/index.php/DiHabs. Details about this Django site project can be found
in its README file. The project also contains the used interview specification and the
captured results.
The raw interview specification is shown in the next subsection. This is followed by a
screenshot-based walk through the resulting online interview. Since most of the survey
participants used German as their first language, the interview is written in German too.
Interview Specification
As already mentioned, interviews are specified as ordinary Python dictionaries. Text parts
are written in markdown5 to keep them compact while still supporting an appropriate
formatting. The different specification attributes have been described in section 4.2.2.
spec = {
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
# general attributes
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
’name’: "Stud",
’npersons min’: 10,
’npersons max’: 20,
’npersons max sample’: 12,
’ngdups’: 0,
’groups’: [(1,), (2,), (3,), (4,),
(1,2), (2,3), (2,4),
(1,2,3,), (2,3,4), (3,4,7),
(1,2,3,5), (2,3,4,6), (1,2,3,4,7),
],
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
# messages to use in templates
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
’messages’: { # generic messages
’title’: "Umfrage zur Freigabe perso¨nlicher Informationen",
’start’: """
# Umfrage zur Freigabe perso¨nlicher Informationen
5markdown: http://daringfireball.net/projects/markdown/
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Durch die Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage unterstu¨tzt du ein
Dissertations-Projekt zum Thema Datenschutz. Vielen Dank schon mal!
Ziel der Umfrage ist es, strukturelle Informationen in
Datenschutzpra¨ferenzen zu erfassen. Einen Eindruck davon
bekommst du am Ende der Umfrage durch eine erste Auswertung deiner
Antworten.
## U¨berblick
Die Umfrage besteht aus drei Teilen. Da
Datenschutz eine individuelle Angelegenheit ist, mu¨ssen auch die
Fragen dazu individuell formuliert werden, z.B. sollten sie sich
auf Personen beziehen die du kennst. Die ersten beiden Teile der
Umfrage dienen dazu diese individuellen Informationen zu erfassen.
Im ersten Teil wirst du gebeten, einige Personen aus deinem Umfeld
anzugeben, z.B. Freunde, Verwandte oder Kollegen. Im zweiten Teil
bitten wir dich fu¨r bestimmte Informationstypen (z.B.
Kontaktinformationen) einige Beispielwerte anzugeben. Diese Eingaben
werden im dritten Teil verwendet um die eigentlichen
Datenschutzpra¨ferenzen zu ermitteln, z.B. welchen Personen du
welche Kontaktinformationen weitergeben wu¨rdest.
Abschließend liefert dir eine erste Auswertung deiner Antworten am
Ende der Umfrage einige Information u¨ber dein Vorgehen bei der
Freigabe perso¨nlicher Informationen.
## Datenschutzhinweis
Die von dir eingegebenen Personen und
Beispiele fu¨r perso¨nliche Informationen werden **nicht
gespeichert**, sondern ausschließlich fu¨r die individuelle
Formulierung der Fragen im dritten Teil der Umfrage verwendet.
Tatsa¨chlich spielt es fu¨r uns keine Rolle, ob du bei den Personen
volle Namen, Spitznamen oder kryptische Pseudonyme eingibst.
Hauptsache *du* kannst mit den Personennamen etwas anfangen,
wenn sie im dritten Umfrageteil wieder auftauchen. Simultan verha¨lt
es sich mit den Angaben perso¨nlicher Informationen.
Gespeichert werden lediglich die Antworten im dritten Teil. Dabei
werden alle Eingaben durch Nummern ersetzt, so dass
wir keine Ru¨ckschlu¨sse auf tatsa¨chliche Eingaben oder deine Person
machen ko¨nnen. Alle gespeicherten Daten sind komplett anonymisiert.
## Kontakt
Bei Fragen schreibe einfach eine Mail an
<christian.buennig@uni-rostock.de>.
""",
’start ack’: "Weiter",
’finish’: """
# Vielen Dank fu¨r die Teilnahme!
""",
’privacy’: """
Die hier eingegebenen Namen oder Bezeichnungen werden ausschließlich
fu¨r die Formulierung nachfolgender Fragen verwendet und **nicht
gespeichert**!
""",
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’setnames title’: "Personen aus deinem Umfeld",
’setnames intro’: """
Die nachfolgenden Fragen beziehen sich auf konkrete, dir bekannte
Personen. Dafu¨r mu¨ssen nun 10-20 Personen aus deinem Bekanntenkreis
(privat, familia¨r, beruflich u.s.w.) benannt werden.
Wichtig ist, dass nicht *nur* Freunde oder *nur* Verwandte
angegeben werden. Es ko¨nnen z.B. auch Personen angegeben werden,
mit denen man eher selten zu tun hat.
""",
’setnames need more’: """
Das hat leider nicht gepasst.
Es sind %d oder mehr Personen erforderlich.
""",
’setvalues title’: "Perso¨nliche Informationen",
’setvalues need more’: """
Das hat leider nicht gepasst.
Es sind %d oder mehr Eintra¨ge notwendig.
""",
’disclose title’: "Weitergabe perso¨nlicher Informationen",
’disclose persons’: """
Die Antworten auf dieser Seite beziehen sich auf die folgende
Personengruppe:
""",
’badstep’: """# Wiederholte Eingabe
<div class="inputerror">
**Bereits geta¨tigte Eingaben ko¨nnen leider nicht wiederholt bzw.
gea¨ndert werden.**
</div>
""",
’badstep ack’: "Okay",
},
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
# information types
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
’itypes’: [
{ ’name’: ’Aufenthaltsorte’, ’plotname’: "Location",
’desc input’: """
Nenne bitte eine Reihe von Orten an, an denen du dich
regelma¨ßig oder gelegentlich aufha¨ltst (das kann ta¨glich oder
auch einmal im Jahr bedeuten). Beispieleingaben wa¨ren *zu Hause*,
*Bu¨ro*, *Strand*, *Lieblingskneipe*, *im Auto*, ...
Es sind mindestens %d Eingaben erforderlich.
""",
’desc select’: """
Stell dir vor, die oben genannten Personen sind an deinem
Aufenthaltsort interessiert. Bei welchen der folgenden Orte wa¨re
es okay, wenn *alle* oben genannten Personen den Ort bei Nachfrage
automatisch erfahren, d.h. ohne dass du die Weitergabe deines
Ortes noch einmal explizit besta¨tigst.
""",
’nvalues min’: 3,
’nvalues max’: 10,
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},
{ ’name’: ’Telefon & IM’, ’plotname’: "Phone",
’desc input’: """
Nenne bitte die Telefonnummern oder Instant-Messaging-Kontakte,
unter denen du zu erreichen bist. Hier sind nicht tatsa¨chliche
Nummern von Interesse, sondern deren Bezeichnungen, z.B. *Privat*,
*Mobil*, *Skype*, *ICQ*, ...
Es sind mindestens %d Eingaben erforderlich.
""",
’desc select’: """
Welche der folgenden Telefonnummern oder IM-Kontakte wu¨rdest du
*allen* oben genannten Personen vorbehaltlos weitergeben?
""",
’nvalues min’: 2,
’nvalues max’: 6,
},
{ ’name’: ’E-Mail’,
’desc input’: """
Nenne bitte deine verschiedenen E-Mail-Konten, die du verwendest.
Wie bei den Telefonnummern sind hier keine tatsa¨chlichen
Nummern erforderlich, sondern frei wa¨hlbare Bezeichnungen wie
*Privat*, *Uni*, *Sportverein*, ...
Es sind mindestens %d Eingaben erforderlich.
""",
’desc select’: """
Welche der folgenden E-Mail-Adressen wu¨rdest du *allen* oben
genannten Personen vorbehaltlos weitergeben?
""",
’nvalues min’: 2,
’nvalues max’: 6,
},
{ ’name’: ’Musikgeschmack’, ’plotname’: "Music",
’desc input’: """
Nenne bitte einige Ku¨nstler oder Alben, die deinen Musikgeschmack
mo¨glichst breit wiedergeben (also nicht nur die 5 Lieblingsbands).
Wichtig ist, dass die Auswahl deinen tatsa¨chlichen Geschmack
beschriebt und nicht etwa einem *o¨ffentlichen* Profil deines
Musikgeschmacks entspricht. Da es in dieser Umfrage um
Datenschutz-Pra¨ferenzen geht, sind auch eher *private* Angaben
sehr wichtig.
Es sind mindestens %d Eingaben erforderlich.
""",
’desc select’: """
Stell dir vor du verbringst einen geselligen Abend mit den oben
genannten Personen. Fu¨r die musikalische Untermalung soll jeder
etwas Musik beisteuern. Welche Auswahl wu¨rdest du bei dieser
Gruppe treffen?
""",
’nvalues min’: 5,
’nvalues max’: 10,
},
{ ’name’: ’Filmgeschmack’, ’plotname’: "Movies",
’desc input’: """
Nenne bitte ein paar Filme, die deinen Filmgeschmack mo¨glichst
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breit wiedergeben. Ob es nun alte, neue, bereits gesehene oder
noch anzuschauende Filme sind, spielt keine Rolle.
Wichtig ist, dass die Auswahl deinen tatsa¨chlichen Geschmack
beschriebt und nicht etwa einem *o¨ffentlichen* Profil deines
Filmgeschmacks entspricht. Da es in dieser Umfrage um
Datenschutz-Pra¨ferenzen geht, sind auch eher *private* Angaben
sehr wichtig.
Es sind mindestens %d Eingaben erforderlich.
""",
’desc select’: """
Stell dir vor du veranstaltest einen Filmabend mit den oben
genannten Personen und du bist fu¨r das Filmprogramm verantwortlich.
Welche der nachfolgenden Filme ko¨nnten Teil dieses Filmprogramms
sein?
""",
’nvalues min’: 5,
’nvalues max’: 10,
},
],
}
Interview Screenshots
The interview specification shown in the previous section results in the following steps of
the online interview.
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Figure A.2: Interview welcome page.
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Figure A.3: In the first interview step participants are asked to name persons from
their social environment.
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Figure A.4: The interview steps 2 to 6 request participants to list personal in-
formation items they potentially may share with other persons. This page ask for
some places the participant frequently or occasionally is located at.
Figure A.5: Participants are asked to list real-time contact modalities they are
using.
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Figure A.6: Step 5 of the interview asks for the different e-mail accounts a partic-
ipant uses.
Figure A.7: In this step participants are supposed to list music artists or albums
they are listening too from time to time.
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Figure A.8: The interview step 7 asks for movies participants have watched or
plan to watch.
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Figure A.9: This and the next 12 steps of the interview capture the actual disclo-
sure behavior (the previous questions only collected data to personalize questions
in this part.) For 13 different group constellations of the persons given in the first
step, participants must state which of the previously specified personal information
items they are willing to share.
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B DiLES
This appendix chapter provides methodological details about the evaluations made in chap-
ter 6 (Learning Disclosure Decisions). For the sake of transperency and reproducibility, it
briefly describes the setup, usage, and extension of the used evaluation system DiLES.
B.1 Introduction
DiLES is an evaluation system for learning methods supposed to conceptualize information
disclosure preferences in social interaction within smart environments. It is a Python
application which uses own learning algorithms as well as algorithms provided by external
libraries like LibSVM1, Orange2 and SciPy3. Evaluation results are rendered using
matplotlib4 and presented within an interactive HTML-based interface.
Software and data related to DiLES is hosted at the Open Science Repository5 of the
Computer Science Department at Rostock University.
B.2 Setup
Buildout6 is used to set up the development and usage environment (DiLES is not meant
to get installed but used directly within the source tree).
To create a buildout, run:
$ python bootstrap.py
$ bin/buildout # this one fails (see buildout.cfg for details)
$ bin/buildout # this one and subsequent calls should succeed
1LibSVM: http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm/
2Orange: http://orange.biolab.si/
3SciPy: http://www.scipy.org/
4matplotlib: http://matplotlib.sourceforge.net/
5Open Science Repository: http://opsci.informatik.uni-rostock.de/index.php/DiLES
6Buildout: http://www.buildout.org/
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As a result, there are some ready to use scripts in the bin directory. Ready to use means,
all dependencies are installed and used properly. These scripts provide some help when
run with the --help option.
B.3 Usage
Defining Scenarios
Scenarios are described in YAML7. They contain of a list of dictionaries of context infor-
mation and disclosures, each describing a single disclosure situation. However, the first
dictionary is not handled as a situation but as a default dictionary providing default val-
ues for information items not given in subsequent dictionaries. The only required items
in a situation dictionary are subject (the one who has to decide a disclosure), persons
(a list of potential information receiver), and disclosure (a list of information items to
disclose). Disclosure information items must be strings which optionally encodes a hi-
erarchical structure using a dot-separator. An simple example scenario might look like
this:
# first, the defaults
- medium: display-wall
- room: 123
- tags: []
# situation 1
- subject: Bob
- persons: Sue
- trigger: start-meeting
- tags: meeting
- disclosure:
- workspace.project-x
- workspace.project-y
- contact
# situation 2
- subject: Bob
- persons: Sue, Paul
- trigger: start-meeting
- tags: meeting
- disclosure:
- workspace.project-x.overview
- contact.business
This scenario describes two situations in which Bob decides the disclosure of information
for collaboration purposes at the beginning of a meeting. The first situation is a meeting of
7YAML: http://yaml.org/
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Bob and Sue only. Here Bob shares all working documents related to projects x and y, as
well as contact information. In the second situation, this time with Paul as an additional
participant, Bob shares only an overview document of project x and business related
contact information. The context items tags and trigger describe the circumstances of
information disclosures and are just examples of how situations may be described besides
the requires items subject, persons, and disclosure.
In case a scenario includes situations where subjects may disclose information using one
of multiple possible modalities, the chosen modality may be encoded within the disclosure
a an itme’s prefix, separated by a colon:
- subject: Bob
- persons: Sue
- medium: wall, mobile
- disclosure:
- wall:workspace.project-x.overview
Scenario preprocessors handle such colon-separated modality information in different ways.
Using the Scripts
Once a buildout of DiLES has been created, several scripts in the bin directory are pro-
vided. Each scripts provides usage instructions when run with the --help option. Follow-
ing is a short overview about the scripts.
diles-evaluate-scenario:
Evaluates preprocessors and learners with regard to a given scenario.
diles-join-evaluation-results:
Joins multiple result files generated by diles-evaluate-scenario. This is useful when a
scenario has been evaluated in multiple steps, each only considering certain subjects,
preprocessors, and learners (which may be necessary for memory-usage reasons).
diles-plot-evaluation-results:
Renders plots for an evaluation results file as produced by the script diles-evaluate-
scenario.
diles-rank-evaluation-results:
Generates various global rankings of evaluation results, e.g. which validators per-
formed best in general (i.e. not in context of a specific subject, preprocessor or
learning method).
diles-render-plot-summary:
Renders HTML-based interactive interface to the plots rendered by the script diles-
plot-evaluation-results.
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diles-analyze-scenario:
Analyzes a scenario and renders corresponding plots. These plots are recognized
by diles-render-plot-summary. These scenario analysis plots help in correlating
evaluation results with disclosure patterns.
diles-convert-dihabs-results-to-scenario:
Converts the results of a DiHabs survey to a DiLES scenario file.
tests:
Runs all or selected tests (written as doctests8).
python:
A Python interpreter with access to the diles package (for interactive testing and
debugging).
B.4 Packages
The package diles consists of several sub-packages and modules. Learning-related func-
tionality is grouped in the sub-package diles.learn. Functionality related to scenario
evaluation is grouped in the sub-package diles.scenario. Modules contained in the
main package diles provide generally used utilities. Inspect the software’s README for
more detailed information.
B.5 Extensions
Adding new scenario preprocessors, base learners, wrapping learners, or validators is easy,
as shown in the following sub-sections.
Next to the instructions below, it pays off to inspect the source code directly which contains
comprehensive and detailed documentation. Especially the doctests9 are very helpful in
understanding how different units of DiLES work and interact.
Adding New Base Learners
To add a new base learner, create a new module in the package diles.learn.learners
which contains a class deriving from diles.learn.Learner. To get automatically recog-
nized, this class’ name must end with Learner. The class must define a static attribute
named paramspace which holds a dictionary mapping the learner’s constructor parameters
8doctests: http://docs.python.org/library/doctest.html
9doctests: http://docs.python.org/library/doctest.html
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to lists of possible values. This paramspace is used for finding optimal learner configura-
tions. The constructor must accept these parameters as keywords.
Following is an example, providing a simple guessing learner:
class GuessLearner(diles.learn.Learner):
paramspace = {’foo’: [1,2,3,4]}
def init (self, foo=1):
self.foo = 1 # unused, just for the paramspace example
def train(self, samples, labels, fwl=None, fwt=0):
label = labels[0]
confidence = 0.2
ranking = None
self.prediction = label, confidence, ranking
def predict(self, sample):
# we always predict the same
return self.prediction
As seen in this example, the prediction method of a learner is expected to return a 3-
tuple: the predicted label, a confidence value between 0 and 1 and optionally a ranking
of all known labels (i.e. a list of rank-value/label pairs). This ranking is mainly used for
debugging purposes and may also be None as in this example.
For more sophisticated examples inspect the package diles.learn.learners.
Adding New Wrapping Learners
To add a new wrapping learner, create a new module in the package diles.learn.
wrapppers which contains a class deriving from diles.learn.Learner. To get auto-
matically recognized as a wrapper, this class’ name must end with Wrapper. Similar to
base learners, the class must define a static attribute named paramspace which holds a
dictionary mapping the wrappers’s constructor parameter names to lists of possible val-
ues.
In contrast to base learners, wrapping learner constructors must accept as first argument
the class of a base learner. Additionally, next to parameters used by the wrapper itself, the
constructor must accept arbitrary parameters for the base learner. The following example
explains these requirements more illustratively:
class DummyWrapper(diles.learn.Learner):
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paramspace = {’bar’: [’a’, ’b’]}
def init (self, basecls, bar=’a’, **baseparams):
super(DummyWrapper, self). init ()
self.bar = bar # unused, just for illustration purposes
self.model = basecls(**baseparams)
def train(self, samples, labels, fwl=None, fwt=0):
self.model.train(samples, labels, fwl=fwl, fwt=fwt)
def predict(self, sample):
return self.model.predict(sample)
Of course, this is a rather useless wrapper which directly forwards any call to an instance
of its base learner class. A dummy wrapper for the above mentioned guessing learner could
be instantiated like this:
dw = DummyWrapper(GuessLearner, bar=’b’, foo=3)
Adding New Validators
Validators are methods of the class Validator in the module diles.learn.validator,
following a certain naming pattern. In particular any method whose name starts with
vld is considered as a validator method. A validator must return True to support a
prediction or False to prevent it. The existing validator methods in the referenced module
shall serve as examples for implementing additional validators.
Adding New Preprocessors and Combinations
Preprocessors are defined in the module dile.scenario.preprocessors. A preprocessor
function expects a list of situations from a scenario and must return a new list of situ-
ations. Preprocessors may be chained. Adding a new preprocessor means to add a new
function to the referenced module and list this function in at least one chain given by the
module’s chains attribute. Again, inspect the referenced module’s source for explanatory
examples.
C Scenarios
This chapter provides additional information on the scenarios which lead to the DiLES
results presented in section 6.6.8. The next section is a detailed description of the manu-
ally composed scenario around the subject Bob. For each disclosure situation it lists the
situation parameters available as context information to learning methods as well as the
actually disclosed information sets. The subsequent section refers to the scenario generated
from the answers participants made in the DiHabs survey presented in section 4.3.
C.1 Manually Composed Scenario
This manually composed scenario is about Bob, a web developer working as a freelancer.
Sue contacts Bob and requests him to develop and set up a customized WCMS for her
company. The scenario describes several meetings which take placing during the lifetime
of this project.
The communication modalities used in this scenario are a display wall and direct transmis-
sions of information to mobile devices of meeting participants. Each disclosure situation
has a trigger — the triggers used here are the start and the end of a meeting (techni-
cally this is just another context information). At the end of meetings, usually contact
information is shared. In contrast to exchange of contact information as it happens today,
where an initial but temporarily unlimited exchange is sufficient, this scenario envisions
a temporarily limited access-token—based information exchange where tokens have to be
renewed regularly.
Specific characteristics of this scenario are a distinct hierarchical structure of disclosed
personal information and a general order-reversing mapping among disclosure situations.
The main purpose of this scenario is to illustrate the composition of scenarios to evaluate
with DiHabs. For this reason it is kept rather simple. More complex scenarios could
involve additional context information, more diversified order mapping types, and a greater
set of participating persons.
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First Meeting
Bob and Sue meet to get to know each other.
Bob contributes a high quality portfolio of references of selected previous work, using the
impressive display wall.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger start-of-meeting
wall:documents.projects.x.reference
wall:documents.projects.y.reference
wall:documents.projects.z.reference
Repeated 1 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Sue
At the end of the meeting Bob hands out a low-resolution and watermarked portfolio,
contact information and access to his calendar (Sue can see possible times for a next
meeting and schedule one). All information items are distributed directly to Sue’s mobile
device.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger end-of-meeting distribute:documents.projects.x.reference.lowres
distribute:documents.projects.y.reference.lowres
distribute:documents.projects.z.reference.lowres
distribute:contact.phone.mobile
distribute:contact.phone.work
distribute:calendar.view.free-meeting-times
distribute:calendar.edit.schedule-meeting
Repeated 1 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Sue
Second Meeting
Second meeting of Bob and Sue, know with Paul, a partner developer of Bob. This meeting
mainly is about technical details.
Bob shares some first drafts as a starting point for discussions.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger start-of-meeting
wall:documents.projects.w.drafts
Repeated 1 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Sue, Paul
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Contact information exchange at the end of the meeting. All participants receive grants
to utilize several standard communication channels.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger end-of-meeting distribute:contact.mail.work
distribute:contact.phone.mobile
distribute:contact.phone.work
distribute:calendar.view.free-meeting-times
distribute:calendar.edit.schedule-meeting
Repeated 1 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Sue, Paul
In the same meeting, Paul is granted more general access to contact information.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger end-of-meeting
distribute:contact distribute:calendar.view
distribute:calendar.edit.schedule-meeting
Repeated 1 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Paul
Working Meetings
Bob has several meetings with Paul to work out specific elements of the site.
In addition to the documents contained in the project’s workspace, Bob shares - as usual
- some generic website projects related working documents.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger start-of-meeting
wall:documents.projects.generic
wall:documents.projects.w
Repeated 5 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Paul
As usual, Bob grants Paul a complete view and limited editing rights to his calendar as
well as complete contact information at the end of the meeting.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger end-of-meeting
distribute:contact distribute:calendar.view
distribute:calendar.edit.schedule-meeting
Repeated 5 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Paul
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Bob meets with Dent, a painter/artist, to work on some graphics. He shows Dent the
drafts of the site.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger start-of-meeting
wall:documents.projects.w.drafts
Repeated 4 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Dent
For future collaboration, Bob prefers plain phone and mail contact.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger start-of-meeting
distribute:contact.phone.work
distribute:contact.mail.work
Repeated 4 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Dent
Bob meets with Sue, to discuss the progress.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger start-of-meeting
wall:documents.projects.w.drafts
Repeated 2 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Sue
Bob meets with Sue, to discuss the progress.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger end-of-meeting distribute:contact.phone.mobile
distribute:contact.phone.work
distribute:calendar.view.free-meeting-times
distribute:calendar.edit.schedule-meeting
Repeated 2 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Sue
Another technical meeting with Sue and Paul.
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Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger start-of-meeting
wall:documents.projects.w.drafts
Repeated 1 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Sue, Paul
Another technical meeting with Sue and Paul.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger end-of-meeting distribute:contact.phone.mobile
distribute:contact.phone.work
distribute:calendar.view.free-meeting-times
distribute:calendar.edit.schedule-meeting
Repeated 1 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Sue, Paul
Again, the contact information exchange with Paul is more open.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger end-of-meeting
distribute:contact distribute:calendar.view
distribute:calendar.edit.schedule-meeting
Repeated 1 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Paul
Final meetings
Bob meets with Dent, to check how the graphics integrate with the current site.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger start-of-meeting
wall:documents.projects.w.release
distribute:contact.phone.work
distribute:contact.mail.work
Repeated 2 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Dent
In the final meetings with Sue, Bob presents release candidates of his work.
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Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger start-of-meeting wall:documents.projects.w.release
distribute:contact.phone.mobile
distribute:contact.phone.work
distribute:calendar.view.free-meeting-times
distribute:calendar.edit.schedule-meeting
Repeated 2 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Sue
Since future collaboration is less likely now, Bob shares only limited contact information
with Sue.
Subject Bob Disclosure
Trigger start-of-meeting
wall:documents.projects.w.release
distribute:contact.phone.work
Repeated 2 times
Modalities distribute, wall
Persons Sue
C.2 Scenario Generated from DiHabs Survey
The scenario generated from the DiHabs survey is too large to be shown here completely
(59 subjects, each with 65 disclosure situations). Instead the reader is referred to the online
available evaluation results mentioned in section 6.6.81. The linked result view includes a
complete dump of the scenario data.
1DiLES evaluation results: http://opsci.informatik.uni-rostock.de/index.php/DiLES.
Abbreviations and Symbols
General Abbreviations
AmI Ambient Intelligence
APPEL A P3P Preference Exchange Language
CBR Case-based reasoning
IoT Internet of Things
IQR Interquartile range
k-NN k-Nearest Neighbors
P3P Platform for Privacy Preferences
RL Rule Learner (learner method ID)
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Learner, Wrapper and Preprocessor IDs
BR Binary Relevance Wrapper
DT Decision Tree Learner
GS Guess Majority Learner
HBR Hierarchical Binary Relevance Wrapper
KNN k-Nearest Neighbors Learner
MR Root Modality Preprocessor
ML Leaf Modality Preprocessor
NB Naive Bayes Learner
OMI Order-Mapping Interpolation Wrapper
PS Powerset Wrapper
RL Rule Induction Learner
SVM Support Vector Machine Learner
Mathematical Symbols
P Powerset operator: P(X) evaluates to the powerset of X
π Tuple projector: πn(t) evaluates to the n-th element in tuple t, e.g.
π2((a, b, c, d)) = b∥ In context of sets, this denotes the relation of unequal sets where
neither one is a subset of the other, i.e. A ∥ B ⇔ A ̸⊆ B ∧A ̸⊇ B
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Theses
1. Personalization, user-adapted behavior, and information exchange are central themes
of smart environments. Next to improving the general user experience they also bear
various privacy issues. Interpersonal privacy is a specific conceptualization of privacy
which addresses the protection of social norms and boundaries as well as the self-
representation of a subject within a social environment. Smart environments may
interfere with this privacy concept because they mediate the communication between
its inhabitants using various and partly hidden modalities.
2. In order to cope with the complex communication modalities and in order to prevent
privacy control from displacing actual activities in smart environments, users need
an assistance which automates as much information management tasks as possible.
Especially an assistance for interpersonal privacy management should enable users
to manage their information individually (e.g. defensively, unconcerned, or pragmat-
ically) and with a strong link to a current situation (instead of primarily considering
access rights specified for information items).
3. Existing assistance solutions for privacy management in smart environments do not
sufficiently handle the specific challenges of interpersonal privacy, where information
disclosure decisions are highly individual as well as more intuitive and dynamic rather
than rational and static. One reason for the minor consideration of privacy control
in context of social interactions is the lack of objective parameters which influence
corresponding information disclosures.
4. This issue can be handled by defining a proper model of disclosure decisions, which
integrates both social and technical disclosure parameters and thus also regards
interpersonal privacy management. The model proposed by this thesis represents
information receivers and disclosed information items as sets, which allows to extract
several set-based patterns of information disclosure. These patterns provide novel
objective parameters to programmatically address the management of interpersonal
privacy.
5. Usage and relevance of different patterns vary significantly among different users,
types of information, and situations – as shown by the analysis of a conducted
survey about interpersonal disclosure behavior. No sole existing disclosure control
method is able to assist in privacy management for all observed patterns.
6. Individual practices to manage information disclosure in smart environments can
be supported by orchestrating multiple control methods. The composite disclosure
control system proposed in this thesis covers all user-side patterns and practices of
privacy management identified by current research (e.g. different temporal manage-
ment schemes and different granularities of disclosure control).
7. One component of the proposed orchestration of disclosure control methods uses
machine learning techniques. As shown by an evaluation of several existing and a
novel learning method, to a large extent privacy preferences can be conceptualized
using machine learning methods. This allows an automated enforcement of privacy
preferences which significantly reduces the privacy-management–related workload
compared to manual disclosures.
8. For subjects where learning methods fail to precisely conceptualize privacy prefer-
ences, the predicted information items to disclose still represent workload-reducing
templates for manual disclosures.
9. The novel learning method, a wrapper method to handle hierarchical multi-label
learning problems, interpolates new disclosures by using the previously developed
patterns of interpersonal privacy. Compared to other hierarchical wrapper methods,
its runtime performance overhead is up to 15 times smaller, while the prediction per-
formance is similar or better in most cases. Additionally, the interpolation wrapper
does not obfuscate the human readability of the decision model of the wrapped base
learner.
10. A significant portion of incorrect predictions made by a learning method can be
detected by verifying that predicted disclosures align with privacy patterns found in
past disclosures. With regard to the evaluations made in this work, usually at least
one out of four incorrect predictions are detected (i.e. prevented) by validators which
utilize the previously developed patterns of interpersonal privacy management.
11. The findings and solutions of this thesis reduce a smart environment’s potential
disruptions of interpersonal privacy. Concluding guidelines and recommendations
presented at the end of this thesis assist engineers in developing environments which
meet the specific requirements for privacy management in social interactions.
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